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Introduction
Necessity. Must. Have to. Inevitably. Bound to. These are the 
words that recur insistently throughout The Prince. And 
then again: success, victory, prestige, achievement, and, on the 
other hand: loss, failure, defeat, death. These opposites are 
linked together by an almost obsessive use of  because, so 
that, hence, therefore, as a result, as a consequence. From start 
to finish we have a vision of  man manoeuvring precariously 
in a suffocating net of  cause and effect. What is at stake is 
survival. Anything extra is luxury.
The Prince was written by a  forty- four- year- old diplomat 
facing ruin. After fourteen years of  influence and prestige, 
a change of  regime had led to his dismissal. Suspected of  
conspiring against the new government, he was imprisoned 
and tortured. The rapid reversal of  fortunes could not have 
been more devastating. Found innocent and released, he 
left town to live with his wife and family on a small farm. 
For a worldly man and compulsive womanizer, used to 
being at the frenetic heart of  public life, this too felt like 
punishment. Idle and bitter, he tramped the hills by day 
and, in the long, empty evenings, began to write down 
some considerations on how to win power and, above 
all,  how to hold on to it, how not to be a victim of  
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circumstance. The result was a slim volume that would be 
a scandal for centuries.
Niccolò Machiavelli was born in Florence in 1469, the 
same year Lorenzo de’ Medici (il Magnifico) came to 
power. First male child after two daughters, Niccolò would 
grow up very close to his father, Bernardo, an  ex- lawyer, 
mostly unemployed, with good contacts but no significant 
wealth or influence. If  the son was to rise in the world, 
and he was determined to do so, he would have to count 
on his own wits and charm. Niccolò’s younger brother, 
Totto, chose not to compete and went into the priesthood. 
The boys’ mother, it should be said, was an extremely 
devout woman, a writer of  religious poems and hymns. 
Their father on the other hand was sceptical, more at home 
with the sober works of  Latin antiquity than the Bible. 
Niccolò may have taken his writing skills from his mother, 
but over divisions on religion he stood with his father and 
the Roman historians.
One says of  Lorenzo il Magnifico that he ‘came to 
power’, but officially Florence was a republic and since 
Lorenzo was only twenty years old in 1469 he was far too 
young to hold elected office; an explanation is required. 
When, in the thirteenth century, the Florentines had 
thrown out the noble families who used to run the town, 
they introduced a republican constitution of  exemplary 
idealism. A government of  eight priori led by one gonfalo-
niere, or prime minister, would be elected every two 
months by drawing tags from a series of  bags containing 
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the names of   well- to- do men from different guilds and 
different areas of  town. This lottery would allow each 
major profession and each geographical area to be ade-
quately and constantly represented. Every individual (of  a 
certain social standing) could expect a brief  share of  power 
in order that no one could ever seize it permanently.
The system was unworkable. Every two months a new 
government might take a different position on key issues. 
The potential for instability more or less obliged whichever 
family was in the ascendant to step in and impose continu-
ity. From 1434 on, the Medicis –  first Cosimo, then Piero, 
then Lorenzo –  had been manipulating the electoral pro-
cess to make sure that most of  the names in the bags were 
friendly to themselves and that all of  those actually selected 
for government would toe the Medici line. Hence, although 
the Florentines still liked to boast that they were free citi-
zens who bowed the knee to no man, by the  mid- fifteenth 
century they were in fact living in something very close to 
a dictatorship. When the rival Pazzi family tried to assas-
sinate Lorenzo in the Duomo in April 1478, it was because 
they saw no legitimate way of  putting him in his place as 
an ordinary citizen. Machiavelli thus grew up in a society 
where the distance between how things were actually run 
and how they were described as being run could not have 
been greater. He was close to his ninth birthday when the 
captured Pazzi conspirators, one an archbishop, were hung 
upside down from the high windows of  the city’s main 
government building and left there for weeks to rot. He 
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would have understood very young the price of  getting it 
wrong in politics.
The young Machiavelli might also have had reason to 
doubt that there was any meaningful difference between 
matters of  religion and matters of  state. The pope had 
backed the Pazzi conspiracy, priests had been involved in 
the assassination attempt and Lorenzo was excommuni-
cated after it failed; the religious edict was a political tool. 
A war between Florence and Rome ensued and the hostility 
only ended in 1480 when Turkish raids on the southern 
Italian coast prompted a rare moment of  unity in the pen-
insula. Years later, Lorenzo would so ingratiate himself  
with a new pope as to get his son Giovanni made a cardinal 
at age thirteen. From excommunication to pope’s favourite 
was quite a change of  fortune and once again it was more 
a matter of  politics than of  faith. Nothing, it appeared, was 
beyond the reach of  wealth and astute negotiation.
At this point Machiavelli was  twenty- one. We know very 
little of  his early adult life, but one thing he definitely did 
at least once was to listen to the fiery preacher Girolamo 
Savonarola, head of  the influential monastery of  San 
Marco. Savonarola’s was a different kind of  Christianity: 
rather than the corrupt,  pleasure- conscious world of  the 
papacy, whose decadence had offered no resistance to the 
rise of  Humanism, this austere monk represented an early 
manifestation of  what we have come to call fundamental-
ism, a return to the biblical text as the sole authority 
on earth and a vision of  the Church as embattled and 
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defensive in a world increasingly interested in values that 
had little to do with the gospel story. With great conviction, 
Savonarola preached the virtues of  poverty, advocated the 
burning of  any book or work of  art that was impure and 
prophesied doom for the sinful Florentines in the form of  
a foreign invasion. In 1494 his prophesy came true.
To get any grasp of  Machiavelli’s diplomatic career and the 
range of  reference he draws on in The Prince, one must 
have some sense of  the complicated political geography 
of  Italy in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and 
of  the profound change that occurred in the 1490s, a change 
that would determine Italy’s fate for the next 350 years.
For most of  the fifteenth century there had been five 
major players in the peninsula: the Kingdom of  Naples, 
the Papal States, Florence, Venice and Milan. Extending 
from just south of  Rome to the southernmost tip of  
Calabria, the Kingdom of  Naples was by far the largest. 
Wedged in the centre, with only precarious access to the 
sea, Florence was the smallest and weakest.
All five powers were in fierce competition for whatever 
territory they could take. Having lost much of  their over-
seas empire to the Turks, the Venetians were eager to 
expand inside the northern Italian plain (Ferrara, Verona, 
Brescia) and down the Adriatic coast (Forlì Rimini). Con-
scious of  the size and power of  a now unified France to 
the north, Milan hoped for gains to the south and west 
(Genoa) as a  counter- weight. Florence simply tried to get 
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bigger in any way that was convenient. Over the previous 
century the Florentines had captured Arezzo, Pisa and 
Cortona and wasted huge energies in a series of  failed 
attempts to conquer Lucca.
Rome’s aim under any pope was always to expand north 
and east into Romagna and Emilia, with a view to swal-
lowing up Perugia, Bologna, Rimini and Forlì, a project 
that would bring it into conflict with both Venice and Flor-
ence. In the far south, Naples was governed by a branch 
of  the house of  Aragon, but the crown was contested by 
the Angevin kings of  France and by the Spanish royal fam-
ily (also Aragons) which already ruled Sicily.
So the scenario was complicated. Scattered between the 
large states were at least a score of  smaller ones, some no 
bigger than a town and the surrounding fields, and all con-
stantly under threat of  invasion from one enemy or 
another. However, if  the situation was rarely static, it is 
also true that there were few major changes. As soon as 
one power achieved some significant military victory, the 
others immediately formed an alliance against it to halt its 
progress. Florence, in particular, owed its continuing inde-
pendence largely to the fact that if  Venice, Milan or Rome 
tried to take it, the other two would at once intervene to 
prevent this happening. So for more than a hundred years 
a certain balance of  power had been kept. All this ended 
with the French invasion of  1494.
The invasion was, as Machiavelli himself  explains in The 
Prince, largely the Italians’ own fault. For some time the 
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five states had been in the habit of  frightening each other 
with the threat of  foreign intervention. During the war 
against Rome and Naples in 1480, Florence had invited the 
French king to pursue his claim to the throne of  Naples 
more actively. In 1482, during a Venetian assault on Ferrara, 
Florence and Milan had encouraged the Turks to step up 
their attacks on Venice’s maritime possessions. Venice had 
replied by inviting the Duke of  Orleans to pursue his claim 
to Milan. In a war against Naples in 1483, Pope Innocent 
VIII had reminded the Duke of  Lorraine that he too had 
a claim to the southern kingdom and invited him to send 
troops.
There was an element of  bluff  and brinkmanship in 
these threats, but in 1494 when King Charles VIII of  France 
accepted Milan’s invitation to make good his claim to the 
crown of  Naples, the bluff  was called. Charles marched 
south with an army far larger than any Italians had seen in 
living memory. From that moment on, the peninsula would 
not be free from foreign intervention until the completion 
of  the Risorgimento in 1870. Struggling to hold Naples, 
the French would invite in the Spanish from Sicily to split 
the kingdom with them, and the Spanish, after Charles I 
of  Spain inherited the crown of  the Holy Roman Empire, 
would eventually push France back north of  the Alps, put 
Rome to the sack and dominate Italy for 150 years.
But that is to leap ahead. In 1494, when the French first 
marched through Lombardy heading for Naples, Florence 
was directly in their path and, what’s more, an ally of  
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Naples. At this point Lorenzo il Magnifico had been dead 
for two years and the Medici regime was led by his incom-
petent son, Piero. So abject was Piero’s capitulation to 
Charles, so spineless his decision simply to surrender the 
city’s dependent territories, that the Florentines rebelled 
against him. The Medici regime collapsed and very soon 
the preacher who had been prophesying this disaster was 
made gonfaloniere, first minister, this time on a yearly, rather 
than a  two- monthly, basis.
Girolamo Savonarola ruled Florence from 1494 to 1498, 
during which time the city passed from being one of  the 
centres of  Renaissance Humanism to a  book- burning, fun-
damentalist theocracy. Realizing that Savonarola’s claim 
to be God’s prophet was a far greater threat to its authority 
than any Humanism, scepticism or eclecticism, the Church 
in Rome did everything possible to bring about his downfall 
and in 1498, having lost much of  his support in Florence, 
the preacher was convicted of  heresy and burned at the 
stake. It was shortly after these dramatic events that Nic-
colò Machiavelli succeeded in getting himself  elected to 
the important positions of  Secretary of  the Second Chan-
cery (one of  two key state departments in Florence) and, 
soon afterwards, Secretary of  the Ten of  War, a committee 
that dealt with foreign relations and war preparations.
Machiavelli was  twenty- eight. We have no idea how he 
arrived at such appointments at this early age. There is no 
record of  any special experience that would warrant such 
confidence in his abilities. But within months he was 
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travelling to neighbouring states to represent Florence’s 
interests, and over the next fourteen years he would be 
involved in important, often  long- drawn- out missions to 
the King of  France, the pope, the Holy Roman Emperor, 
Cesare Borgia, Caterina Sforza and many others. In 
between these missions he was frequently and very actively 
engaged in Florence’s ongoing military campaign to  re- take 
Pisa, which had regained its independence during the 
French invasion. Pisa was crucial to Florentine commerce 
in that it gave the town an outlet to the sea.
Introductions to The Prince generally play down Machi-
avelli’s abilities as a diplomat, presenting these years as 
useful only in so far as they offered him the material he 
would draw on for his writing after he had lost his position. 
Machiavelli would not have seen things that way. For more 
than a decade he was Florence’s top diplomat and proud 
to be so, and if  the missions he undertook did not produce 
spectacular results this was largely because he was repre-
senting the weakest of  the main states in Italy in a period 
of  particular confusion and vulnerability that would even-
tually see four foreign powers militarily involved in the 
peninsula: France, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and 
Switzerland.
Savonarola had taken Florence towards an alliance with 
France; the priest’s successors followed the same policy, 
but without any clear vision of  how the city might achieve 
stability and security in the long term. To make matters 
worse, having decided in 1502 that their gonfaloniere, or first 
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minister, should be elected for life, the Florentines gave the 
job to Piero Soderini, an honourable man but chronically 
incapable of  making any kind of  bold decision. Machia-
velli’s diplomatic career was thus mostly taken up in 
attempts to persuade surrounding and threatening states 
to leave Florence alone and not to expect financial or mili-
tary help from her for their wars elsewhere; that is, as far 
as there was a discernible,  long- term policy it was one of  
prevarication. Far from home, Machiavelli would fre-
quently receive contradictory orders after he had already 
started negotiating. Arriving in foreign towns, he would 
find that his expense allowance wasn’t sufficient to pay 
couriers to take his messages back to Florence. Sometimes 
he could barely afford to feed and clothe himself. Such was 
the contempt of  the more powerful monarchs that he was 
often obliged to wait days or even weeks before being 
granted an audience.
It is in the light of  these frustrations that we have to 
understand Machiavelli’s growing obsession, very much in 
evidence in The Prince, with the formation of  a citizen army. 
Florence was weak partly because of  its size but mostly 
because it had no military forces of  its own. It relied on 
mercenary armies which were notorious for evaporating 
when things got tough, before the gates of  Pisa for example. 
A  power- base built on an efficient and patriotic civilian 
army would give a diplomat like Machiavelli a little more 
clout and respect when he negotiated. Or so he hoped.
In June of  1502, four years into the job, Machiavelli met 
9780141395876_ThePrince_PRE.indd   18 21/05/15   3:00 PM
xix
Introduction
Cesare Borgia, son of  Pope Alexander VI. With his father’s 
support, Borgia was carving out a new state for himself  
on the northern borders of  the Papal States and had just 
captured the city of  Urbino to the east of  Florence. Sent 
on a mission to dissuade Borgia from advancing into Flor-
entine territory, Machiavelli was deeply impressed by the 
man. Seductive, determined, cunning and ruthless, Borgia 
was a leader in the epic mode. Certainly he could hardly 
have been more different from the diplomat’s dithering 
boss, Soderini.
Machiavelli was on another mission to Borgia in January 
1503 when the adventurer invited a group of  rebels to nego-
tiations in the coastal town of  Senigallia, then had them 
seized and murdered as soon as they were inside the town 
walls. Here was a man, Machiavelli realized, determined 
to take circumstance by the scruff  of  the neck. It was not 
so much Borgia’s willingness to ignore Christian principles 
that fascinated him, as his ability to assess a situation rap-
idly, make his calculations, then act decisively in whatever 
way would bring the desired result. This modern, positivist 
attitude, where thought and analysis serve in so far as they 
produce decisive action, rather than abstract concepts, lies 
at the heart of  The Prince.
Meanwhile Florence continued to drift. Machiavelli was 
once again on the scene in 1503, this time in Rome, when 
Borgia’s empire collapsed after both he and his father fell 
seriously ill; legend has it that Alexander had accidentally 
poisoned them both. The pope died and the son lost his 
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 power- base. Three years later Machiavelli was travelling 
with the later Pope Julius at the head of  the papal army 
when Julius demanded admission to the town of  Perugia, 
walked in with only a small bodyguard and told the local 
tyrant, Giampaolo Baglioni, to get out or face certain 
defeat. Sure that Baglioni would simply kill Julius, Machi-
avelli was amazed when the man caved in and fled. Such 
were the pope’s coercive powers as he then marched north 
to lay siege to Bologna that Florence was once again forced 
to enter an alliance and a war in which it had no desire to 
be involved.
As Secretary of  the Ten of  War, Machiavelli enjoyed just 
one moment of  personal glory, in 1509, when the citizen 
army that he had finally been allowed to form overcame 
Pisan resistance and took the town after a long siege. Given 
the many failed attempts to capture Pisa using mercenary 
armies, this victory was a powerful vindication of  Machi-
avelli’s conviction that citizen armies were superior. It was 
also the only occasion in his fourteen years of  service when 
Soderini took the initiative with success.
But in every other respect things went from bad to 
worse. Florence was living on borrowed time, its freedom 
dependent on the whims of  others. Three years after the 
capture of  Pisa, when Pope Julius, now in alliance with the 
Spanish, defeated the French at Ravenna, he immediately 
sent an army to Florence to impose a return of  the Medici 
and transform the city into a puppet state dependent on 
Rome. After brief  resistance, the Florentine army was 
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crushed at Prato a few miles to the north of  the city. 
 Soderini escaped and the Medici returned. Machiavelli 
was unemployed and unemployable.
The scandalous nature of  The Prince was largely deter-
mined by its structure rather than any conscious desire to 
shock. Originally entitled On Principalities, the book opens 
with an attempt to categorize different kinds of  states and 
governments at different moments of  their development, 
then, moving back and forth between ancient and modern 
history, to establish some universal principles relative to 
the business of  taking and holding power in each kind of  
state. Given Machiavelli’s experience, wide reading and 
determined intellectual honesty, the project obliged him 
to explain that there were many occasions when winning 
and holding political power was possible only if  a leader 
was ready to act outside the moral codes that applied to 
ordinary individuals. Public opinion was such, he explained, 
that, once victory was achieved, nobody was going to put 
the winner on trial. Political leaders were above the law.
Had Machiavelli insisted on deploring this unhappy state 
of  affairs, had he dwelt on other criteria for judging a 
leader, aside from his mere ability to stay in power and 
build a strong state, had he told us with appropriate piety 
that power was hardly worth having if  you had to sell your 
soul to get it, he could have headed off  a great deal of  
criticism while still delivering the same information. But 
aside from one or two token regrets that the world is not 
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a nicer place, Machiavelli does not do this. It wasn’t his 
project. Rather he takes it for granted that we already know 
that life, particularly political life, is routinely, and some-
times unspeakably, cruel, and that once established in a 
position of  power a ruler may have no choice but to kill 
or be killed.
This is where the words ‘of  necessity’, ‘must’ and ‘have 
to’ become so ominous. For The Prince is most convincing 
and most scandalous not in its famous general statements –  
that the end justifies the means, that men must be pampered 
or crushed, that the only sure way of  keeping a conquered 
territory is to devastate it utterly, and so on –  but in the 
many historical examples of  barbarous behaviour that 
Machiavelli puts before us, without any  hand- wringing, as 
things that were bound to happen: the Venetians find that 
their mercenary leader Carmagnola is not putting much 
effort into his fighting any more, but they are afraid that 
if  they dismiss him he will walk off  with the territory he 
previously captured for them: ‘at which point the only safe 
thing to do was to kill him.’ Hiero of  Syracuse, when given 
command of  his country’s army, finds that they are all 
mercenaries and ‘realizing that they could neither make 
use of  them, nor let them go, he had them all cut to pieces.’
The climax of  this approach comes with Machiavelli’s 
presentation of  the ruthless Cesare Borgia as a model for 
any man determined to win a state for himself  (as if  such 
a project were not essentially dissimilar from building a 
house or starting a business). Having tamed and unified 
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the Romagna with the help of  his cruel minister Remirro 
de Orco, Machiavelli tells us, Borgia decided to deflect 
people’s hatred away from himself  by putting the blame 
for all atrocities on his minister and then doing away with 
him: so ‘he had de Orco beheaded and his corpse put on 
display one morning in the piazza in Cesena with a wooden 
block and a bloody knife beside. The ferocity of  the spec-
tacle left people both gratified and shocked.’
It’s hard not to feel, as we read the chapters on Borgia, 
that this is the point where Machiavelli’s book ceases to be 
the learned, but fairly tame, On Principalities and is trans-
formed into the extraordinary and disturbing work that 
would eventually be called The Prince. In short, Machiavel-
li’s attention has shifted from a methodical analysis of  
different political systems to a gripping and personally 
engaged account of  the psychology of  the leader who has 
placed himself  beyond the constrictions of  Christian ethics 
and lives in a delirium of  pure power. For a diplomat like 
Machiavelli, who had spent his life among the powerful 
but never really held the knife by the handle, a state 
employee so scrupulously honest that when investigated 
for embezzlement he ended up being reimbursed monies 
that were due to him, it was all too easy to fall into a state 
of  envy and almost longing when contemplating the awe-
some Borgia who had no qualms about taking anything 
that came his way and never dreamed of  being honest to 
anyone.
At a deep level, then, the scandal of  The Prince is 
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intimately tied up with the scandal of  all writers of  fiction 
and history who in the quiet of  their studies take vicarious 
enjoyment in the ruthlessness of  the characters they 
describe –  but with this difference: Machiavelli systematizes 
such behaviour and appears to recommend it, if  only to 
those few who are committed to winning and holding 
 political power. The author’s description, in a letter to a 
friend, of  his state of  mind when writing the book makes 
it clear what a relief  it was, during these months immedi-
ately following his dismissal, imprisonment and torture, 
to imagine himself  back in the world of  politics and, if  
only on paper, on a par with history’s great heroes.
Come evening, I walk home and go into my study. In the 
passage I take off  my ordinary clothes, caked with mud 
and slime, and put on my formal palace gowns. Then when 
I’m properly dressed I take my place in the courts of  the 
past where the ancients welcome me kindly and I eat my 
fill of  the only food that is really mine and that I was born 
for. I’m quite at ease talking to them and asking them why 
they did the things they did, and they are generous with 
their answers. So for four hours at a time I feel no pain, I 
forget all my worries, I’m not afraid of  poverty and death 
doesn’t frighten me. I put myself  entirely in their minds.
In so far as The Prince remains a persuasive account of  how 
political power is won and lost it is so because it eventually 
focuses on the mind, or, to be more precise, on the 
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interaction of  individual and collective psychologies, the 
latter fairly predictable, the former infinitely varied, the 
two together dangerously volatile. The book is not a care-
ful elaboration of  a rigid, predetermined vision. More and 
more, as Machiavelli rapidly assesses different kinds of  
states and forms of  government, different contexts, differ-
ent men and their successes and failures, he runs up against 
two factors that defy codification: the role of  luck and the 
mystery of  personality. By the end of  the book he is beyond 
the stage of  offering heroes and success stories as models, 
aware that if  there is one circumstance that a man cannot 
easily change it is his own character: even had he wanted 
to, Soderini could not have modelled himself  on Borgia, 
nor vice versa.
In particular Machiavelli is fascinated by the way certain 
personality traits can mesh positively or negatively with 
certain sets of  historical circumstances. A man can be suc-
cessful in one situation then fail miserably in another; a 
policy that works well in one moment is a disaster the next. 
Rather than one ideal ruler, then, different men are required 
for different situations. The only key to permanent political 
success would be always to adapt one’s deepest instincts 
to new events, but, as Machiavelli ruefully observes, that 
would effectively mean the end of  ‘luck’ and the end of  
history.
Machiavelli’s own mind was deeply divided during the 
writing of  The Prince and it is the resulting tension that 
accounts for much of  the book’s fascination and ambiguity. 
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On the one hand, as a form of  private therapy, he was 
disinterestedly pursuing the truth about power and politics: 
to establish how states really were won and lost would give 
him an illusion of  control and bolster his  self- esteem. At 
the same time, and perhaps less consciously, he was vicari-
ously enjoying, in the stories of  Borgia and others, the sort 
of  dramatic political achievements that had always been 
denied to him. In this regard it’s interesting to see how 
rapidly he glosses over Borgia’s abject fall from power, his 
arrest, imprisonment and death, almost as if  the author 
were in denial about his hero’s ultimate fallibility.
Therapeutic as this might have been, however, at another 
level The Prince was clearly written for publication and 
meant as a public performance. Machiavelli loves to show 
off  his intelligence, his range of  reference, his clever rea-
soning. Even here, though, his intentions were divided and 
perhaps contradictory. At his most passionate and focused 
he was involved in a debate with all the great historians 
and philosophers of  the past and determined to show his 
contemporaries that his own mind was as sharp as the best. 
But in a more practical mood Machiavelli was planning to 
use the book as a passport to get himself  back into a job: 
so evident and compelling, he hoped, would his analytical 
skills appear, that the ruler to whom he formally gave and 
dedicated the book would necessarily want to employ him; 
hence the flattering tone of  the opening dedication and 
the addition of  The Prince’s final patriotic pages proposing 
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that the ruler in question should be the man to rid Italy of  
foreign oppression.
Who was this ruler? Shortly before Machiavelli had been 
released from prison, Pope Julius had died and been 
replaced by Giovanni de’ Medici, il Magnifico’s son, the 
man who had become a cardinal at thirteen. This was 
March 1513. When he started work on The Prince some 
months later, Machiavelli had intended to dedicate the 
book to Giovanni’s brother, Giuliano, who had been put 
in charge of  Florence after the Medicis’ return. However, 
when the effeminate Giuliano began to move away from 
politics and was replaced in Florence by his aggressive, 
warlike nephew Lorenzo, Machiavelli decided to switch 
the dedication to the younger man.
Thus far the writer showed himself  flexible in the face 
of  changing events. Yet there is something ingenuous and 
almost endearing in the clever diplomat’s miscalculation 
here. The brilliant reasoning required to convince yourself  
that you had got a grip on politics and history, the profound 
analysis that would demonstrate to your fellow intellectu-
als that you were as  clear- headed as Livy, Tacitus and 
Thucydides put together, were not the qualities that a 
young and hardly  well- read Medici prince was likely to 
comprehend, never mind enjoy.
Given the book in 1515, Lorenzo probably never opened 
it and certainly didn’t take time to study Machiavelli’s care-
fully crafted reflections. Then, even if  he had read it, would 
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Lorenzo, or indeed any other ruler, have wanted to employ 
a diplomat who had gone on record as saying that trickery 
was largely the name of  the game and that though it wasn’t 
important to have a religious faith it was absolutely essen-
tial to appear to have one? Machiavelli should have been 
the first to understand that as an instrument for furthering 
his diplomatic career, rather than a literary and philosoph-
ical achievement in its own right, the book’s honesty would 
be  self- defeating: the two goals were never compatible.
Surprised and disappointed by The Prince’s failure, Mach-
iavelli went back to womanizing. Aside from routine 
whoring, he fell in and out of  love easily, pursuing passion 
without discretion or restraint. And just as he had more 
luck with romance than diplomacy, he had more success 
when he wrote ironic,  sex- centred comedies rather than 
candid but dangerous political analyses. In 1518 the first 
performance of  his play The Mandragola, in which a young 
man invents the most absurd subterfuges to get a married 
woman into bed, won Machiavelli immediate celebrity; 
some years later Clizia, which this time has an older man 
 hell- bent on having his way with a very young woman, 
confirmed his talent.
But literary success was not enough for Machiavelli. It 
was active politics that interested him, and, though he 
laboured for ten years or so on his Discourses on Livy, then 
on a long history of  Florence and finally on a short work 
entitled The Art of  War, it was his old job as the city’s prin-
cipal ambassador that he always yearned for. Finally, in 
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1525, Pope Clement VII, alias Giulio de’ Medici (Giovanni’s 
cousin), drew the  ex- diplomat back into politics, asking 
him for advice on how to deal with the growing antagon-
ism between the French and the Spanish. As an eventual 
clash between the two great powers inside Italy loomed 
ever closer, Machiavelli was given the task of  overseeing 
Florence’s defensive walls. When the crunch came, how-
ever, and the armies of  Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, 
now united under the same crown, marched south into 
Italy, they simply bypassed Florence, went straight to Rome 
and sacked it. It was an occasion of  the most disgraceful 
savagery on a scale Italy had not witnessed for centuries. 
In the aftermath, the Medici regime in Florence collapsed 
and once again Machiavelli was out of  favour. Over-
whelmed with disappointment and in the habit of  taking 
medicines that weren’t good for him, he died in June 1527, 
aged  fifty- eight, having accepted, no doubt after careful 
calculation, extreme unction.
That there are many different roads to notoriety and that 
a man’s achievements may combine with historical events 
in unexpected ways, are truths Machiavelli was well aware 
of. So he would have appreciated the irony that it was 
largely due to Luther’s Protestant reform and the ensuing 
wars of  religion that his name became the object of  the 
most implacable vilification and, as a consequence, univer-
sally famous.
The turning point came in 1572. The Prince had not been 
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published in Machiavelli’s lifetime. After circulating for 
years in manuscript form, then in a printed Latin edition 
(still entitled On Principalities), it finally appeared in Italian 
in 1532, only to be put on Pope Paul IV’s Index of  Prohibited 
Books in 1559, this partly in response to the prompting of  
the English cardinal Reginald Pole, who maintained that, 
written as it was by ‘Satan’s finger’, The Prince was largely 
responsible for Henry VIII’s decision to take the English 
Church away from Rome.
Meantime, in France, the conflict between the Protest-
ant Huguenots and the Catholics was intensifying and 
would reach a head under the reign of  the sickly young 
Charles IX, who for the most part was controlled by his 
mother, the Italian, indeed Florentine, Catherine de’ Med-
ici, daughter of  the same Lorenzo de’ Medici to whom 
Machiavelli had dedicated The Prince. Catherine had 
brought a great many Italian favourites into the French 
court, a move guaranteed to arouse  anti- Italian feeling. In 
general, she sought to dampen down the religious conflict 
which threatened to tear France apart, but nevertheless 
she would be held responsible for the St Bartholomew’s 
Day Massacre of  1572 when thousands of  Huguenots were 
murdered. One potential victim, Innocent Gentillet, 
escaped to Protestant Geneva and wrote a Discours contre 
Machiavel that was to set the tone for  anti- Machiavellian 
criticism for decades to come.
Intended as an attack on Catherine de’ Medici and mili-
tant French Catholicism, and hence a defence of  the 
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Huguenots, the book described Catherine as a compulsive 
reader of  Machiavelli and, playing on  anti- Italian feeling, 
claimed that both queen and writer were representative of  
a callous and villainous trait in Italian national character. 
Listed out of  context, the ideas developed in The Prince 
were schematized and simplified, allowing readers to 
imagine they had read Machiavelli himself  when what they 
were actually getting was a travesty that legitimized any 
form of  brutality and rejoiced in amoral calculation.
From this point on, Machiavelli’s name escaped from 
the restricted circle of  intellectual reflection and became 
a popular term of  denigration. ‘Mach Evil’ and ‘Match- a- 
villain’ were typical English corruptions, ‘Mitchell Wylie’ 
a Scottish. Many critics would not bother reading his work 
in the original but take their information from Gentillet, 
whose ‘ Anti- Machiavel’, as his book became known, was 
quickly translated into Latin for English readers and then, 
some twenty years later, directly into English. At this point 
(the end of  the sixteenth century) the first English trans-
lation of  Machiavelli’s work was yet to appear.
Ironically, in the years after the St Bartholomew’s Day 
Massacre, as Catherine de’ Medici struggled to find some 
solution to France’s civil wars, and in particular to convince 
Catholics of  the need to tolerate the existence of  the 
Huguenots, if  only in Huguenot enclaves, both she and 
her supposed mentor Machiavelli once again came under 
attack, this time from the Catholic side. The accusation 
now was that, in the attempt to avoid conflict, religious 
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truths of  supreme importance were being subordinated 
to questions of  political convenience, something that 
would eventually transform France, the Catholics feared, 
into a secular state.
Here the criticism comes closer to the real spirit of  
Machiavelli. Renaissance Humanism in general had shifted 
the focus of  intellectual reflection from questions of  the-
ology and metaphysical truth to matters of  immediate and 
practical human interest. In general, however, lip service 
had always been paid to the ultimate superiority of  reli-
gious matters and writers had avoided suggesting that there 
might be a profound incompatibility between rival value 
systems: it was perfectly possible, that is, to be a good Chris-
tian and an effective political leader.
Machiavelli, on the contrary, made it clear that, as he 
saw it, Christian principles and effective political leadership 
were not always compatible; situations would arise where 
one was bound to choose between the two. It was not, 
as his critics claimed, that he rejected all ethical values 
outright; the strength, unity and independence of  a people 
and state certainly constituted goals worth fighting 
for (‘I love my country more than my soul’, Machiavelli 
declared in a letter to fellow historian Francesco Guicciar-
dini). But such goals could not always be achieved without 
abandoning Christian principles; two  value- systems were 
at loggerheads. To make matters worse, Machiavelli did 
not appear to be concerned about this. He took it as an 
evident truth: Christian principles were admirable, but not 
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applicable for politicians in certain circumstances; the idea 
that all human behaviour could be assessed in relation to 
one set of  values was naive and utopian. It was in so far as 
Machiavelli allowed these dangerous implications to sur-
face in his writing that he both unmasked, and himself  
became identified with, what we might call the unaccept-
able face of  Renaissance Humanism.
How much the presentation of  the Machiavellian villain 
in Elizabethan and Jacobean drama, from Kyd and Marlowe, 
through to Middleton, Shakespeare and ultimately Ben 
Jonson, owed to Gentillet’s ‘ Anti- Machiavel’ and how much 
to a direct knowledge of  Machiavelli’s writings is still a 
matter of  academic dispute. In the 1580s an Italian version 
of  The Prince was printed in England, avoiding a publication 
ban by claiming falsely on the frontispiece that it was 
printed in Italy. Many educated English people at the time 
had a good knowledge of  Italian. Sir Francis Bacon had 
certainly read The Prince before its first legal publication in 
English in 1640, defending the Florentine in the Advancement 
of  Learning (1605) with the remark: ‘We are much beholden 
to Machiavel and others, that write what men do and not 
what they ought to do.’
But the ‘murderous Machiavel’ who gets more than 
400 mentions in Elizabethan drama, thus making the Flor-
entine’s name synonymous with the idea of  villainy for 
centuries to come, is another matter. The Roman author 
Seneca had long ago established a tradition in tragic drama 
that featured an evil, calculating tyrant who would stop at 
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nothing to grasp all the power he could. Renaissance Italian 
theatre had updated this type of  villain with elements from 
Machiavelli, transforming the character into an unscrupu-
lous courtier who takes pleasure in wicked calculation and 
cruelty. It was from this model that the English theatre 
developed its endless  mani festations of  the devious rogue 
(pander, miser, or revengeful cuckold) who administers 
poisons with aplomb and is never without a dagger 
beneath his cloak.
From the point of  view of  the dramatist, an unscrupu-
lous character who has a secret agenda and relies on his 
presumed intellectual superiority to dupe those around 
him is obviously an exciting proposition. Such a figure can 
be depended upon to create tension, keep the plot moving 
and allow for resolutions where the larger group’s benign 
order once again imposes itself  after the tragic disturbance 
caused by the wicked, scheming individual. Beyond a super-
ficial repulsion that the audience feels towards such a 
character, be it Marlowe’s Jew of  Malta, Webster’s Flami-
neo in The White Devil, or Shakespeare’s Iago, there is also 
an undercurrent of  excitement at the thought that it might 
be possible to take life entirely into one’s hands, manipulate 
people and circumstances at will and generally pursue one’s 
selfish goals without a thought for moral codes or eternal 
damnation: in this sense the Machiavellian villain looks 
ahead to the worst of  modern individualism.
Then there was also, of  course, the contrasting pleasure 
of  seeing the clever schemer ‘hoist with his own petard’. 
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As the years passed and the high tension of  Jacobean tra-
gedy relaxed into the comedies of  Ben Jonson and his 
contemporaries, the evil Machiavel became a pathetic fail-
ure whose complacently wicked designs inevitably and 
reassuringly led to his making a fool of  himself. Fading out 
of  British drama in the  mid- seventeenth century, this stock 
figure is still resurrected from time to time, most recently 
and hilariously in Rowan Atkinson’s Blackadder, a charac-
ter who adds a visceral cowardice to the already long list 
of  Machiavel’s vices.
To a great extent, no doubt, it was this identification of  
Machiavelli’s name with everything that was evil which 
kept The Prince in print and guaranteed that, despite the 
papal ban, it would be widely read. But there was more. 
As medieval Christianity and scholasticism sank into the 
past and science and reason made their slow, often unwel-
come advances, as Europe got used to religious schism and 
competing versions of  the truth, the overriding question 
for any modern ruler inevitably became: how can I con-
vince people that I have a legitimate, reasonable right to 
hold power and to govern? In England Charles Stuart 
would insist on the notion that kings had a divine right, 
this at a time when so many English monarchs had seized 
their crowns by force and cunning. Curiously enough, 
Charles’s great antagonist Cromwell felt that he too had 
a direct line to God and legitimacy, but through belief  
and piety rather than family and inheritance. Officially a 
 parliamentarian, Cromwell frequently governed without 
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parliament or elections for fear the people might not see 
things God’s way.
Meantime, across Europe, the princes and princesses of  
ancient noble families took to marrying and remarrying 
each other in an  ever- thickening web of  defensive alliances, 
as if  density of  blood and lineage might offer protection 
against the threat of  usurpers or, worse still, republicanism 
and democracy. No family was more practised at this 
upmarket dating game than the Medici, who, partly thanks 
to an extraordinary network of  connections, would hang 
on in Florence in a  client- state twilight lasting more than 
200 undistinguished years. Meantime, from Paris to Madrid 
to Naples, the court clothes became finer, the statues and 
monuments more pompous and the whole royal charade 
more colourful and more solemn, as though people might 
somehow be dazzled into believing that a king or a duke 
really did have a right to rule. Many prestigious works of  
art were commissioned with precisely this idea in mind.
But most of  all Europe’s rulers worked hard to put a 
halo round their crowned heads, to appear religious and 
at all costs to uphold the Faith, sensing that this too would 
bolster their position and draw attention away from the 
mystery of  their privileges. Later still, particularly after 
the French Revolution had destroyed any illusions about 
the rights of  monarchs, the rather desperate card of  
‘respectability’ was played. Members of  court, Napoleon 
ordered, shortly after usurping power, must attend soirées 
with their wives, to appear respectable and avoid gossip. 
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‘The death of  conversation’, Talleyrand opined. Certainly, 
when a leader has to rely on appearing respectable to claim 
legitimacy, he is on thin ice indeed.
To this  long- drawn- out conspiracy of  pomp and pious 
circumstance, Machiavelli’s little book was a constant 
threat. It reminded people that power is always up for 
grabs, always a question of  what can be taken by force or 
treachery, and always, despite all protests to the contrary, 
the prime concern of  any ruler. In their attempt to dis-
credit The Prince, both religious and state authorities played 
up the author’s admiration for the ruthless Borgia, and 
never mentioned his perception that in the long run a ruler 
must avoid being hated by his people and must always put 
their interests before those of  the aristocracy; the people 
are so many, Machiavelli reflected, that power ultimately 
lies with them.
Liberal and  left- wing thinkers were not slow to pick up 
on this aspect of  the book. As Rousseau saw it, the whole 
of  The Prince was itself  a Machiavellian ruse: the author 
had only pretended to give lessons to kings whereas in fact 
his real aim was to teach people to be free by showing them 
that royal power was no more than subterfuge. Both Spi-
noza and, later, the Italian poet Ugo Foscolo saw it the 
same way: The Prince was a cautionary tale about how 
power really worked, the underlying intention being to 
deprive those who held it of  dignity and glamour and teach 
the people as a whole how to resist it; Machiavelli after all 
declared himself  a republican and a libertarian. The 
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communist leader Antonio Gramsci would even see The 
Prince as looking forward to the dictatorship of  the 
proletariat.
Others took a more traditional view: Bertrand Russell 
described The Prince as ‘a handbook for gangsters’, and in 
so doing did no more than repeat the position of  Frederick 
the Great, who wrote a book to refute Machiavelli and 
present a more idealistic vision of  monarchical govern-
ment. Others again ( Jakob Burckhardt and Friedrich 
Meinecke) found a space between denigration and admir-
ation to suggest that the novelty of  Machiavelli was to 
present leadership and  nation- building as creative processes 
that should be judged not morally but aesthetically; in a 
manner that looked forward to Nietzsche the charismatic 
leader made a work of  art of  himself  and his government. 
Mussolini simply took the book at face value: it was a useful 
‘vade mecum for statesmen’, he enthused.
But whatever our interpretation of  his intentions, one 
reaction that Machiavelli never seems to provoke is indif-
ference. Reading The Prince it is impossible not to engage 
with the disturbing notion that politics cannot be governed 
by the ethical codes that most of  us seek to observe in our 
ordinary lives. And however we react to this idea, once we 
have closed the book it will be very hard to go on thinking 
of  our own leaders in quite the same way as we did before.
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Translations have a way of  gathering dust. This isn’t true 
of  an original text. When we read Chaucer or Shakespeare 
we may need a gloss, or in the case of  Chaucer a modern 
translation, but we only look at these things so that we can 
then enjoy the work as it was first written. And we’re struck 
by its immediacy and freshness, as if  we had been able to 
learn a foreign language in a very short space of  time with 
little effort and maximum reward.
This is not the case with an old translation. If  we read 
Pope’s translation of  Homer today, we read it because we 
want to read Pope, not Homer. Linguistically, the transla-
tion draws our attention more to the language and poetry 
of  our eighteenth century than to Homer or ancient 
Greece.
So to attempt a new translation of  Machiavelli is not to 
dismiss previous translations as poor. We are just acknowl-
edging that these older versions now draw attention to 
themselves as moments in the English language. My efforts 
of  course will some day meet the same fate. Such distrac-
tions are particularly unfortunate with Machiavelli, who 
insisted that he was only interested in style in so far as it 
could deliver content without frills or distraction. ‘I haven’t 
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prettified the book,’ he tells us, ‘or padded it out with long 
sentences or pompous, pretentious words, or any of  the 
irrelevant flourishes and attractions so many writers use; 
I didn’t want it to please for anything but the range and 
seriousness of  its subject matter.’
I have taken that statement of  intention as my guide in 
this translation, attempting wherever possible to free the 
text from the archaisms and corrosive quaintness of  older 
English versions, to get to the essential meaning of  the 
original and deliver it, as we say today, but perhaps not 
tomorrow, straight.
It isn’t easy. The first problem, and one that sets up all 
the others, is already there in the title: The Prince. What is 
a prince for Machiavelli? Well, a duke is a prince. The pope 
is a prince. A Roman emperor is a prince. The King of  
France is a prince. The Lord of  Imola is a prince.
This won’t work in modern English. The English have 
Prince Charles. And the thing about Prince Charles is that 
he is not King Charles and probably never will be. And 
even if  he were king he would wield no real power, not 
even the kind of  power the pope wields, and we never think 
of  the pope as a king or prince.
The only other idea we have of  ‘the prince’, in English, 
is Prince Charming. This concept is a long way from the 
ageing Prince Charles and even further from the kind of  
prince Machiavelli was talking about. Machiavelli’s word 
‘prince’ does not mean ‘the son of  the king’, and even less 
‘an attractive young suitor’. Machiavelli’s ‘principe’ refers 
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generically to men of  power, men who rule a state. The 
prince is the first, or principal, man.
So the translator is tempted to use the word ‘king’. At 
least in the past a king stood at the apex of  a hierarchical 
system, he was the man who mattered. But it is difficult, 
translating Machiavelli, to use the word ‘king’ to refer to 
the lord of  Imola, or a pope, or a Roman emperor. In the 
end, as far as possible, I have resolved this problem by using 
the rather unattractive word ‘ruler’, or even the more gen-
eric ‘leader’, though always making it clear that we’re 
talking about the political leader of  a state. The book’s 
famous title, however, must be left as it is.
Even harder to solve is the translation of  ‘virtù’, together 
with a number of  other words that cluster round it. It 
would be so easy to write the English cognate ‘virtue’, 
meaning the opposite of  vice, but this is not what Machi-
avelli was talking about. He was not interested in the 
polarity ‘good’/‘evil’, but in winning and losing, strength 
and weakness, success and failure. For Machiavelli ‘virtù’ 
was any quality of  character that enabled you to take pol-
itical power or to hold on to it; in short, a winning trait. It 
could be courage in battle, or strength of  personality, or 
political cunning, or it might even be the kind of  ruthless 
cruelty that lets your subjects know you mean business. 
But one can hardly write ‘cunning’ or ‘cruelty’ for ‘virtù’, 
even if  one knows that in this context that is what the text 
means; because then you would lose the sense that 
although Machiavelli is not talking about the moral virtues 
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he nevertheless wants to give a positive connotation to the 
particular qualities he is talking about: this cruelty is aimed 
at solving problems, retaining power, keeping a state 
strong, hence, in this context it is a ‘virtù’.
Ugly though it may sound, then, I have sometimes been 
obliged to translate ‘virtù’ as ‘positive qualities’ or ‘strength 
of  character’, except of  course on those occasions –  because 
there are some –  when Machiavelli does mean ‘virtues’ 
in the moral sense: in which case he’s usually talking 
about the importance of  faking them even if  you may not 
have them. Faking, of  course, when cunningly deployed 
for an appropriate end, is another important virtù. The spin 
doctor was not a notion invented in the 1990s.
Related to both these particular problems  –   prince, 
virtue –  is the more general difficulty that so many of  the 
key words Machiavelli uses have English cognates through 
Latin –  for tuna, audace, circospetto, malignità, diligente, etc. 
In some cases they are true cognates –  prudente/prudent, 
for example –  but even then to use the cognate pulls us 
back to a rather dusty, archaic style. Aren’t the words ‘care-
ful’ or ‘cautious’ or ‘considered’ more often used now than 
the word ‘prudent’?
Something of  the same difficulty can occur where there 
is no cognate in English but a traditional and consolidated 
dictionary equivalent for an old Italian term. Machiavelli 
frequently uses the word ‘savio’, which has usually been 
translated ‘wise’, but again this invites the English version 
9780141395876_ThePrince_PRE.indd   42 21/05/15   3:00 PM
xliii
Translator’s Note
to drift towards that slightly stilted archaic style so often 
used to render great texts from the past; ‘sensible’ or on 
other occasions ‘shrewd’ are choices that, depending on 
the context, can combine accuracy with a prose that draws 
less attention to itself  as a translation.
So the constantly recurring question as one translates 
The Prince is: what words would we use today to describe 
the qualities and situations Machiavelli is talking about? 
Of  course sometimes there are no modern words, because 
there are certain things –  siege engines, cavalry attacks –  that 
we don’t talk about any more. On the whole, though, 
Machiavelli is chiefly interested in psychology or, rather, in 
the interaction of  different personalities in crisis situations, 
and here, so long as the translator avoids the temptation 
to introduce misleading contemporary jargon, a great deal 
can be done to get The Prince into clear, contemporary 
English.
However, the difficulty of  these lexical choices is infin-
itely compounded by Machiavelli’s wayward grammar and 
extremely flexible syntax. Written in 1513, The Prince is not 
easily comprehensible to Italians today. Recent editions of  
the work are usually parallel texts with a modern Italian 
translation printed beside the original. The obstacle for the 
Italian reader, however, is hardly lexical at all –  in the end 
he can understand a good ninety per cent of  the words 
Machiavelli is using –  rather it has to do with a combination 
of  extreme compression of  thought, obsolete, sometimes 
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erratic grammar, and, above all, a syntax where subordin-
ate and  pre- modifying clauses abound in ways that the 
modern reader is not used to.
We are not talking here about those complex but always 
elegant Ciceronian sentences so admired and frequently 
mimicked by the English Augustans. Machiavelli has a 
more spoken, flexible, persuading, sometimes brusque 
voice, and to get that tone in English one has to opt for a 
syntax that is quite different from the original Italian. In 
particular, the sequence with which information is deliv-
ered within the sentence frequently has to be reorganized. 
Here, to give the reader a sense of  what he can expect, are 
three versions of  the same paragraph, the last being my 
own. I haven’t chosen anything especially complex; it’s a 
fairly ordinary passage in which, as so often, Machiavelli 
poses a situation, then considers possible responses to it 
and the consequences of  each response. The first transla-
tion is from W. K. Marriot and was published in 1908.
A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend 
or a downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any 
reservation, he declares himself  in favour of  one party 
against the other; which course will always be more advan-
tageous than standing neutral; because if  two of  your 
powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of  such a 
character that, if  one of  them conquers, you have either 
to fear him or not. In either case it will always be more 
advantageous for you to declare yourself  and to make war 
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strenuously; because, in the first case, if  you do not declare 
yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, 
to the pleasure and satisfaction of  him who has been con-
quered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything 
to protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does 
not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time 
of  trial; and he who loses will not harbour you because 
you did not willingly, sword in hand, court his fate.
The second is from George Bull, published in 1961.
A prince also wins prestige for being a true friend or a 
true enemy, that is, for revealing himself  without any 
reservation in favour of  one side against another. This pol-
icy is always more advantageous than neutrality. For 
instance, if  the powers neighbouring on you come to 
blows, either they are such that, if  one of  them conquers, 
you will be in danger, or they are not. In either case it will 
always be to your advantage to declare yourself  and to 
wage a vigorous war; because, in the first case, if  you do 
not declare yourself  you will always be at the mercy of  the 
conqueror, much to the pleasure and satisfaction of  the one 
who has been beaten, and you will have no justification 
nor any way to obtain protection or refuge. The conqueror 
does not want doubtful friends who do not help him when 
he is in difficulties; the loser repudiates you because you 
were unwilling to go, arms in hand, and throw in your 
lot with him.
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And here is my own.
A ruler will also be respected when he is a genuine friend 
and a genuine enemy, that is, when he declares himself  
unambiguously for one side and against the other. This 
policy will always bring better results than neutrality. For 
example, if  you have two powerful neighbours who go to 
war, you may or may not have reason to fear the winner 
afterwards. Either way it will always be better to take sides 
and fight hard. If  you do have cause to fear but stay neutral, 
you’ll still be gobbled up by the winner to the amusement 
and satisfaction of  the loser; you’ll have no excuses, no 
defence and nowhere to hide. Because a winner doesn’t 
want  half- hearted friends who don’t help him in a crisis; 
and the loser will have nothing to do with you since you 
didn’t choose to fight alongside him and share his fate.
A typically tricky moment in this passage comes when 
Machiavelli says of  these neighbouring powers:
. . . o sono di qualità che, vincendo uno di quelli, tu abbia 
a temere del vincitore, o no.
Literally:
. . . either they are of  qualities that, winning one of  those, 
you ought to fear the winner, or not.
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Here Marriot gives:
. . . they are of  such a character that, if  one of  them con-
quers, you have either to fear him or not.
And Bull:
. . . either they are such that, if  one of  them conquers, you 
will be in danger, or they are not.
Here it’s clear that Bull is closer to modern prose, yet 
one still feels that nobody writing down this idea today 
in English would introduce the second part of  Machiavelli’s 
alternative as Bull does by tagging that ‘or they are not’ on 
to the end of  the sentence after the introduction of  an ‘if ’ 
clause. If  we follow Bull’s general structure but move 
the alternative forward  –   thus, ‘either they are or they 
aren’t such that if  one of  them conquers, you will be in 
danger’ –  the sentence gains in fluency. In the end, however, 
the simplest solution seemed to me to shift the alternative 
aspect towards the verb ‘fear’ and away from a description 
of  the two states; this leaves the sense of  the sentence intact 
and allows us to get closer to the original’s telegraphic 
delivery.
. . . you may or may not have reason to fear the winner 
afterwards.
9780141395876_ThePrince_PRE.indd   47 21/05/15   3:00 PM
xlviii
Translator’s Note
Let me say at this point that I have the greatest respect 
for both these earlier translations and indeed various 
others. I owe a lot to them, because, although I have always 
translated directly from the original, I have then gone 
to these and to the modern Italian translations to see 
where they disagree and to mull over what I can learn from 
them. The original text is such that on occasion all four 
of  the translations I have been looking at, two English and 
two Italian, offer different interpretations. In these cases 
one really must attune oneself  to Machiavelli’s mental pro-
cesses, his insistence on logic, reason and deduction, and 
remember that every clause, if  not every word, is there for 
a purpose.
Here is a small example. Having stated that rulers must 
at all costs avoid being hated by their subjects, and that 
such hatred is almost always the cause of  a leader’s down-
fall, Machiavelli foresees that some people will object that 
this wasn’t the case with many Roman emperors who 
either held on to power despite being hated by the people, 
or lost it despite being loved. ‘To meet these objections’, 
he tells us, ‘I shall consider the qualities of  some of  these 
emperors, showing how the causes of  their downfall are 
not at all out of  line with my reasoning above.’ So far so 
good, but this sentence then ends:
. . . e parte metterò in considerazione quelle cose che sono 
notabili a chi legge le azioni di quelli tempi.
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Translating word for word, this gives:
. . . and part I will put in consideration those things that 
are important to people who read the events of  those times.
What is this about? Why did Machiavelli feel the need to 
add these words to a sentence that already seems clear 
enough. Bull offers:
. . . I shall submit for consideration examples which are 
well known to students of  the period.
This may sound sensible and vaguely academic, but it 
simply isn’t accurate: the word ‘parte’ has gone; to ‘submit 
for consideration’ may be a standard English formula, but 
does it mean the same as Machiavelli’s actually rather 
unusual ‘put in consideration’? ‘Notabile’ doesn’t so much 
mean ‘well known’ as ‘worthy of  note’ or ‘important’. Mar-
riot gives:
. . . at the same time I will only submit for consideration 
those things that are noteworthy to him who studies the 
affairs of  those times.
Again we have the standard ‘submit for consideration’, 
while ‘at the same time’ and ‘only’ are both translator’s 
additions. It now sounds as if  Machiavelli is reassuring us 
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that he will only look at examples that are relevant, but 
this sort of  defensiveness is not the author’s way. Why 
would the reader have suspected him of  introducing irrele-
vant examples?
One modern Italian translation gives: ‘e in parte indi-
cherò quei fatti che sono important per chi si interessa alla 
storia di quei tempi.’ Literally: ‘and in part I will indicate 
those facts that are important for people interested in the 
history of  those times.’
This is now extremely close to our literal translation of  
Machiavelli’s original but still not particularly helpful. 
What is the author getting at? What does the phrase add 
to what has already been said?
Another Italian translation gives: ‘nello stesso tempo 
indicherò i fatti che devono essere messi in evidenza da chi 
si interessa alla storia di quei tempi.’ Literally: ‘at the same 
time I will indicate the facts that must be put in evidence 
by people interested in the history of  those times.’
Despite the fact that ‘parte’ has once again been mysteri-
ously transformed into ‘at the same time’ –  a classic filler 
when a translator is lost –  an idea at last emerges: that there 
are facts that people interested in those times ‘must put in 
evidence’, and the implication is that without these facts 
we won’t understand what has to be understood if  we are 
to be persuaded by the author’s argument.
At this point the translator tries to enter Machiavelli’s 
reasoning, reassured by the knowledge that here we have 
an author who always put sense and clarity before anything 
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else. Machiavelli, remember, is facing objections from 
people who claim that the question of  whether a ruler’s 
people do or do not hate him is not the crucial criterion 
when it comes to considering whether that leader will sur-
vive. Those objections, what’s more, are based on the lives 
of  certain Roman emperors. What Machiavelli is going 
to show in the following paragraphs is that the nature 
of power and political institutions in the Roman empire 
was profoundly different from that in a modern (early 
 sixteenth- century) state, the key difference being the exist-
ence, in Roman times, of  a strong standing army that, for 
safety’s sake, a leader had to satisfy before satisfying the 
people and that could often only be kept happy by allowing 
it to treat the people very harshly, stealing and raping at 
will. What this little clause appears to be doing, then, is 
preparing us for Machiavelli’s approach to answering the 
objection that has been raised: it is a question, he is going 
to tell us, of  understanding a different historical context.
The word ‘parte’ could be short for ‘a parte’ (apart, sep-
arately) or ‘in parte’ (in part), as both the Italian translations 
take it. Now perhaps we can read the sentence as a whole 
thus:
To meet these objections, I shall consider the qualities of  
some of  these emperors, showing how the causes of  their 
downfall are not at all out of  line with my reasoning above, 
and bringing into the argument some of  the context that 
historians of  the period consider important.
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The original ‘mettere in considerazione’ (‘put in consider-
ation’) is used only once in the whole of  The Prince (having 
the text in electronic form is a huge help to the translator), 
hence the decision not to translate with a standard formula 
such as ‘submit for consideration’, but to give a more pre-
cise sense to the words with the expression ‘bringing into 
the argument’: Machiavelli is advising us that for these 
particular examples he will have to fill in a different context. 
The idea of  ‘parte’ I have understood as ‘in part’, and then 
for the sake of  fluency rendered it with ‘some’: the author 
can’t bring in all the context, but some of  it.
One has no way of  knowing whether this is exactly what 
Machiavelli meant, but the sentence now gives an internal 
cohesion to the passage that was lacking in other versions. 
And if  we return to our  word- for- word translation of  the 
original – ‘and part I will put in consideration those things 
that are important to people who read the events of  those 
times’ –  we see that it can indeed be read in the way we 
have chosen to render it.
One particularly pernicious problem a translator faces as 
he grapples with The Prince is the book’s reputation. Machi-
avelli is a scandal, every schoolboy knows, because he puts 
the ends before the means to the point of  condoning acts 
of  violence, cruelty and betrayal, something Christian and 
modern western ethics consider unacceptable: we don’t 
condone a brutal killing just because it puts an end to a 
riot and we are no longer at ease with the idea of  torture, 
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even when it might prevent a terrorist atrocity. The climax 
of  this scandal comes with the author’s discussion of  
Cesare Borgia, a man who rose to power and kept it with 
the use of  extraordinary treachery and cruelty. The temp-
tation for the translator is to play to the reputation of  the 
book, underlining Machiavelli’s extreme views and making 
sure the text doesn’t ‘disappoint’, even when its tone and 
subtlety are not, perhaps, exactly what readers were 
expecting.
At the end of  the discussion of  Borgia, having recounted 
how he eventually lost power when his father, Pope Alex-
ander, suddenly and unexpectedly died and a pope hostile 
to Borgia was elected, Machiavelli writes: ‘Raccolte io 
adunque tutte le azioni del duca, non saprei riprenderlo.’ 
Literally, we have: ‘Having gathered then all the actions of  
the duke, I would not know how to reproach him.’
Bull gives: ‘So having summed up all that the duke did, 
I cannot possibly censure him.’ Here the word ‘censure’ 
has a strong moral connotation, and the statement is made 
stronger still by the introduction of  ‘can’t possibly’, which 
seems a heavy interpretation of  the standard Italian for-
mula ‘I wouldn’t know how to’. In Bull’s version it seems 
that Machiavelli is making a point of  telling us that he has 
no moral objections to anything Cesare Borgia did, this in 
line with the author’s reputation for cynicism.
Marriot more cautiously gives: ‘When all the actions of  
the duke are recalled, I do not know how to blame him’, 
and both Italian translations take the same line. The fact 
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is that just as the word ‘virtù is rarely used in a strictly moral 
context, so the word ‘riprendere’, ‘reproach’, refers not to 
moral behaviour, but to the question: did the duke get 
something wrong, did he make a mistake? A key to reading 
the word comes at the opening to the next paragraph 
where we have: ‘Solamente si può accusarlo nella creazione 
di Iulio pontefice, nella quale lui ebbe mala elezione’, 
which, more or less literally, gives us: ‘The only thing Bor-
gia can be accused of  is his role in the election of  Pope 
Julius, where he made a bad choice’ (that is, as far as his 
own interests were concerned, he backed the wrong man).
Here we approach the subtler scandal of  Machiavelli’s 
text: it is not that the author is insisting that Borgia’s 
immoral acts should not be censured, rather that Machi-
avelli is just not interested in discussing the moral aspect 
of  the question at all, or not from a Christian point of  view. 
For him it is a case of  shrewd or mistaken choices, not of  
good or evil. When he proposes Borgia as a model, neither 
morality nor immorality come into it, only the fact that 
this man knew how to win power and hold it and build a 
strong state.
Finally, one can’t help noticing a certain Victorian bashful-
ness in previous translations. Machiavelli was a notorious 
womanizer and in writing The Prince he believed he was 
addressing an audience of  men who had no worries about 
political correctness. When he says ‘la fortuna è donna, et 
è necessario, volendola tenere sotto, batterla et urtarla’ –  
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literally: ‘fortune is woman and it is necessary wanting to 
keep her underneath to beat her and shove her’ –  there is 
an obvious sexual reference. The phrase comes in the last 
paragraph of  The Prince proper (the closing exhortation is 
very much a piece apart) and Machiavelli wants to go out 
on a strong but, as he no doubt saw it, witty note.
Here is Marriot’s version of  the whole last paragraph:
I conclude, therefore, that fortune being changeful and 
mankind steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in 
agreement men are successful, but unsuccessful when they 
fall out. For my part I consider that it is better to be adven-
turous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if  
you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and  ill- use 
her; and it is seen that she allows herself  to be mastered 
by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work 
more coldly. She is, therefore, always,  woman- like, a lover 
of  young men, because they are less cautious, more violent, 
and with more audacity command her.
And Bull’s:
I conclude, therefore, that as fortune is changeable whereas 
men are obstinate in their ways, men prosper so long as 
fortune and policy are in accord, and where there is a clash 
they fail. I hold strongly to this: that it is better to be impetu-
ous than circumspect; because fortune is a woman and if  
she is to be submissive it is necessary to beat and coerce 
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her. Experience shows that she is more often subdued by 
men who do this than by those who act coldly. Always, 
being a woman, she favours young men, because they are 
less circumspect and more ardent, and because they com-
mand her with greater audacity.
I hope I am getting closer to the spirit of  the thing and, for 
better or worse, the kind of  man Machiavelli was, offering 
this:
To conclude then: fortune varies but men go on regardless. 
When their approach suits the times they’re successful, and 
when it doesn’t they’re not. My opinion on the matter is 
this: it’s better to be impulsive than cautious; fortune is 
female and if  you want to stay on top of  her you have to 
slap and thrust. You’ll see she’s more likely to yield that way 
than to men who go about her coldly. And being a woman 
she likes her men young, because they’re not so cagey, 
they’re wilder and more daring when they master her.
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.Letter to Lorenzo de’ Medici
People trying to attract the good will of a sovereign usually
offer him something they care a lot about themselves, or
something they’ve seen he particularly likes. So rulers are
always being given horses, arms, gold brocades, jewels and
whatever finery seems appropriate. Eager myself to bring
Your Highness some token of my loyalty, I realized there was
nothing more precious or important to me than my know-
ledge of great men and their doings, a knowledge gained
through long experience of contemporary affairs and a con-
stant study of ancient history. Having thought over all I’ve
learned, and analysed it with the utmost care, I’ve written
everything down in a short book that I am now sending to
Your Highness.
And though this gift is no doubt unworthy of you, I feel
sure the experience it contains will make it welcome,
especially when you think that I could hardly offer anything
better than the chance to grasp in a few hours what I have
discovered and assimilated over many years of danger and
discomfort. I haven’t prettified the book or padded it out with
long sentences or pompous, pretentious words, or any of the
irrelevant flourishes and attractions so many writers use; I
didn’t want it to please for anything but the range and serious-
ness of its subject matter. Nor, I hope, will you think it
presumptuous that a man of low, really the lowest, station
should set out to discuss the way princes ought to govern
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4 the prince
their peoples. Just as artists who draw landscapes get down
in the valley to study the mountains and go up to the moun-
tains to look down on the valley, so one has to be a prince to
get to know the character of a people and a man of the people
to know the character of a prince.
Your Highness, please take this small gift in the spirit in
which it is given. Study it carefully and you will find that my
most earnest wish is that you should achieve the greatness
that your status and qualities promise. Then if, from the high
peak of your position, you ever look down on those far below,
you will see how very ungenerously and unfairly life continues
to treat me.
1
Different kinds of states and how
to conquer them
All states and governments that ever ruled over men have
been either republics or monarchies. Monarchies may be
hereditary, if the ruler’s family has governed for gener-
ations, or new. New monarchies can either be entirely new,
as when Francesco Sforza captured Milan, or they could be
territories a ruler has added to his existing hereditary state
by conquest, as when the King of Spain took Naples. An
additional territory won by conquest will be accustomed
either to living under a monarch or to the freedom of self-
government and may be conquered by the new ruler’s own
army or that of a third party, by luck or deservedly.
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2Hereditary monarchies
I won’t be considering republics since I’ve written about them
at length elsewhere. Instead I’ll concentrate on monarchies,
taking the situations mentioned above and discussing how
each kind of state can best be governed and held.
So I’ll begin by noting that hereditary monarchies where
people have long been used to the ruler’s family are far easier
to hold than new ones; all a monarch need do is avoid
upsetting the order established by his predecessors, trim
policies to circumstances when there is trouble, and, assum-
ing he is of average ability, he will keep his kingdom for life.
Only extraordinary and overwhelming force will be able to
take it off him and even then he’ll win it back as soon as the
occupying power runs into trouble.
An example of this situation in Italy is the Duchy of Ferrara.
In 1484 and 1510 the Duchy was briefly conquered by foreign
powers, first the Venetians, then Pope Julius, but these defeats
had nothing to do with the territory’s having a well-
established ruling family. A ruler who inherits power has less
reason or need to upset his subjects than a new one and as a
result is better loved. If he doesn’t go out of his way to get him-
self hated, it’s reasonable to suppose his people will wish him
well. When a dynasty survives for generations memories fade
and likewise motives for change; upheaval, on the contrary,
always leaves the scaffolding for building further change.
3
Mixed monarchies
When a monarchy is new, things are harder. If it’s not entirely
new but a territory added to an existing monarchy (let’s call
this overall situation ‘mixed’) instabilities are caused first and
foremost by what is an inevitable problem for all new regimes:
that men are quick to change ruler when they imagine they
can improve their lot – it is this conviction that prompts them
to take up arms and rebel – then later they discover they were
wrong and that things have got worse rather than better.
Again this is in the normal, natural way of things: a ruler is
bound to upset the people in his new territories, first with
his occupying army and then with all the endless injustices
consequent on any invasion. So not only do youmake enemies
of those whose interests you damaged when you occupied the
territory, but you can’t even keep the friendship of the people
who helped you to take power, this for the simple reason that
you can’t give them as much as they expected. And you can’t
get tough with them either, since you still need them; because
however strong your armies, you’ll always need local support
to occupy a new territory. This is why Louis XII, King of
France, took Milan so quickly and equally quickly lost it. The
first time this happened Duke Ludovico was able to retake
the city with his own forces, because the people who had
previously opened the gates to Louis saw their mistake, real-
ized they wouldn’t be getting the benefits they’d hoped for
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and didn’t want to submit to the harsh conditions imposed
by the new king.
Of course, when a king returns to win back a territory that
has rebelled like this, he is less likely to lose it a second time.
Having learned from the rebellion, he’ll have fewer scruples
when it comes to punishing troublemakers, interrogating sus-
pects and strengthening any weak points in his defences. So
while the first time Louis invaded Milan it took no more than
a little sword-rattling along the borders from Ludovico to
force a retreat, the second time it would take the whole world
to defeat his armies and drive them out of Italy. This for the
reasons listed above. All the same, they were driven out both
times.
The general reasons behind the first French defeat have
been discussed. It remains to explain why Louis lost Milan
the second time and to see what counter-measures he could
have taken and what options a ruler has in a situation like
this if he wants to hold on to his conquest.
Needless to say, any territory annexed to the realm of a
conquering ruler may or may not be in the same geographical
region and share the same language. If it is and the language
is shared, the territory will be much easier to hold on to,
especially if its people are not used to the freedom of self-
government. In that case all you have to do is eliminate the
family of the previous ruler and your hold on power is guaran-
teed. Everything else in the territory can then be left as it was
and, given that there are no profound differences in customs,
people will accept the situation quietly enough. Certainly
this has proved true in Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony and
Normandy, all of which have now been under French rule for
many years. Even where there is some difference in language,
the customs of these territories are similar and people can get
along with each other. So a ruler who has taken territories in
these circumstances must have two priorities: first, to elimin-
ate the family of the previous rulers; second, to leave all laws
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and taxes as they were. In this way the acquired territory and
the king’s original possessions will soon form a single entity.
But when a ruler occupies a state in an area that has a
different language, different customs and different insti-
tutions, then things get tough. To hold on to a new possession
in these circumstances takes a lot of luck and hard work.
Perhaps the most effective solution is for the new ruler to go
and live there himself. This will improve security and make
the territory more stable. The Turkish sultan did this in
Greece, and all the other measures he took to hold on to the
country would have been ineffective if he hadn’t. When you’re
actually there, you can see when things start going wrong and
nip rebellion in the bud; when you’re far away you only find
out about it when it’s too late. Another advantage is that the
new territory won’t be plundered by your officials. Its subjects
will be happy that they can appeal to a ruler who is living
among them. So, if they’re intending to be obedient, they’ll
have one more reason to love you, and if they’re not, all the
more reason to fear you. Anyone planning an attack from
outside will think twice about it. So, if you go and live in the
new territory you’ve taken, you’re very unlikely to lose it.
Another good solution is to establish colonies in one or
two places. These work rather like chains to bind the captured
state to your own. If you don’t do this you’ll have to keep
large numbers of infantry and cavalry in the territory.
Colonies don’t cost a great deal. You can send and maintain
them very cheaply and they only arouse the hostility of the
people whose houses and land are expropriated to give to the
colonists. Since that will only be a very small proportion of
the population, and since these people will now be poor and
will have fled to different places, they can hardly cause much
trouble. Everyone else will be unaffected (hence prone to keep
quiet) and at the same time frightened of stepping out of line
for fear of having their own houses and land taken away.
In conclusion, colonies are cheap, more loyal, provoke less
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hostility among your new subjects, and, as I’ve said, those
few who are provoked can’t fight back since they’ll be dispos-
sessed refugees. In this regard it’s worth noting that in general
you must either pamper people or destroy them; harm them
just a little and they’ll hit back; harm them seriously and they
won’t be able to. So if you’re going to do people harm, make
sure you needn’t worry about their reaction. If, on the other
hand, you decide to send an occupying army rather than
establish colonies, the operation will be far more expensive
and all the revenues from the new territory will be used up in
defending it, turning what should have been a gain into a loss.
And you’ll provoke more hostility: an army moving about
and requisitioning lodgings will do damage across the entire
territory, something that has consequences for the whole
population and turns them all into enemies. And these are
enemies who can hit back, people beaten but still on their
own ground. So however you look at it military garrisons are
as pointless as colonies are useful.
A ruler who has moved into a new region with a different
language and customs must also make himself leader and
protector of the weaker neighbouring powers, while doing
what he can to undermine the stronger. In particular, he must
take care that no foreign power strong enough to compete
with his own gets a chance to penetrate the area. People who
are discontented, whether out of fear or frustrated ambition,
will always encourage a foreign power to intervene. It was
the Aetolians who invited the Romans into Greece. Every
time the Romans moved into a new region it was on the
invitation of local people. And it’s in the nature of things that
as soon as a powerful foreign ruler moves into a region, all the
weaker local powers support him, if only out of resentment
towards the stronger states that previously kept them down.
So the new ruler will have no trouble winning their support;
they’ll all run to ally themselves with the territory he has
taken. He just has to watch out that they don’t grab too much
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power and authority. Then, with his own strength and their
support, he can easily undermine the more powerful neigh-
bours and hence dominate the region. However, an invader
who fails to manage relations with his new neighbours will
soon lose what territory he has taken; and even while he’s
still holding on to it, he’ll be up against all kinds of trouble
and hostility.
The Romans followed these principles whenever they took
a new province: they sent colonists; they established friendly
relations with weaker neighbours, though without allowing
them to increase their power; they undermined stronger neigh-
bours and they prevented powerful rulers outside the region
from gaining influence there. Their handling of Greece will
be example enough: they established good relations with the
Achaeans and the Aetolians; Macedonia’s power was under-
mined; they drove out Antiochus. They didn’t reward the
good behaviour of the Achaeans and the Aetolians by
allowing them any new territory and whenever Philip con-
vinced them to establish friendly relations with him they made
sure he was weakened as a result. Antiochus, for all his
strength, was never allowed any influence in the region. The
Romans were simply doing what all wise rulers must: not
restricting themselves to dealing with present threats but using
every means at their disposal to foresee and forestall future
problems as well. Seen in advance, trouble is easily dealt with;
wait until it’s on top of you and your reaction will come too
late, the malaise is already irreversible.
Remember what the doctors tell us about tuberculosis: in
its early stages it’s easy to cure and hard to diagnose, but if
you don’t spot it and treat it, as time goes by it gets easy to
diagnose and hard to cure. So it is with affairs of state. See
trouble in advance (but you have to be shrewd) and you can
clear it up quickly. Miss it, and by the time it’s big enough
for everyone to see it will be too late to do anything about it.
However, since they had this capacity for seeing a threat in
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advance, the Romans always knew how to respond. They
never put off a war when they saw trouble coming; they knew
it couldn’t be avoided in the long run and that the odds would
simply shift in favour of their enemies. They chose to fight
Philip and Antiochus in Greece, so as not to have to fight them
in Italy. They could have put off both wars, but they didn’t.
They never took the line our pundits are constantly giving us
today – relax, time is on your side – but rather they put their
faith in their own foresight and spirit. Time hurries everything
on and can just as easily make things worse as better.
But let’s get back to the King of France and see if he took
any of the measures we’ve been discussing. And when I say
the King, I mean Louis, not Charles, since Louis held territory
in Italy for longer than Charles and it’s easier to see what his
methods were. You’ll notice that he did the opposite of what
a ruler must do to hold on to conquests in a region whose
customs and language differ from those of his home kingdom.
It was Venetian ambitions that brought Louis into Italy.
The Venetians planned to take half of Lombardy while he
seized the other half. I’m not going to criticize Louis for
agreeing to this. He wanted to get a first foothold in Italy, he
didn’t have any friends in the region – on the contrary, thanks
to King Charles’s behaviour before him, all doors were barred
– so he was forced to accept what allies he found. And the
arrangement would have worked if he hadn’t made mistakes
in other departments. Taking Lombardy, the king recovered
in one blow the reputation that Charles had lost. Genoa
surrendered. The Florentines offered an alliance. TheMarquis
of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, Bentivogli of Bologna,
Caterina Sforza of Forlı`, the lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini,
Camerino and Piombino, as well as the republics of Lucca,
Pisa and Siena, all queued up to make friends. At which point
the Venetians were in a position to see how rash they had
been when they proposed the initial deal: for two towns in
Lombardy they had made Louis king over a third of Italy.
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Think how easily Louis could have held on to his position
in Italy if he had observed the rules outlined above and
guaranteed security and protection to all those friends. There
were so many of them and they were so weak and frightened,
either of Venice or Rome, that they were simply forced to side
with Louis. Thenwith their help he could easily have defended
himself against the states that were still powerful. But no
sooner had he arrived in Milan than Louis did the opposite;
he helped Pope Alexander to invade Romagna. He didn’t see
that this decision weakened his own position, losing him
friends and the support of those who had run to him for help,
while reinforcing the pope, adding temporal dominion to the
spiritual power that already gives a pope so much authority.
Having made that first mistake, he was dragged in deeper,
since, to curb Alexander’s ambitions and prevent him from
taking control of Tuscany, he was forced to advance further
into Italy himself. Not content with having lost his friends
and increased the power of the Church, he was eager now to
get hold of the Kingdom of Naples and so made an agreement
to split it with the King of Spain. Until then Louis had been the
dominant power in Italy, but this move introduced another
equally great power into the peninsula, with the result that
anyone in the region who had ambitions or was disgruntled
with Louis now had someone else to turn to. Louis could
have kept Naples under a client king but instead he kicked
the man out and brought in a king who was powerful enough
to kick him out.
The desire to conquer more territory really is a very natural,
ordinary thing and whenever men have the resources to do
so they’ll always be praised, or at least not blamed. But when
they don’t have the resources, yet carry on regardless, then
they’re at fault and deserve what blame they get. If Louis was
in a position to capture the Kingdom of Naples with his own
forces, then he should have gone ahead and done it; if he
wasn’t, he certainly shouldn’t have split the territory with
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another king. Sharing Lombardy with the Venetians was
forgivable, in that it gave him a foothold in Italy; but there
was nothing necessary about sharing Naples with Spain and
hence it was a mistake.
So Louis made five mistakes: he eliminated the weaker
states; he enhanced the power of one of Italy’s stronger states;
he brought in an extremely powerful foreign king; he didn’t
go to live in the territory he’d acquired and he didn’t establish
colonies there.
All the same, these mistakes might not have done serious
damage during his lifetime had he not now made a sixth by
stripping Venice of its power. Of course, if he hadn’t increased
the pope’s power and brought Spain into Italy, it would have
been quite reasonable and even necessary to cut the Venetians
down to size. But having taken those earlier decisions, he
should never have reduced Venice to such a state of weakness.
As long as Venice was militarily strong, no one else was
going to try to take Lombardy from the French; the Venetians
wouldn’t have allowed another state to attack the region
unless they were going to get territory themselves and the
other states would never have wanted to take Lombardy from
France if it meant giving it to Venice; plus, they would never
have had the courage to confront France and Venice together.
Someone might object: but Louis gave Romagna to Pope
Alexander and Naples to Spain to avoid war; in which case,
let me repeat what I said earlier: youmust never fail to respond
to trouble just to avoid war, because in the end you won’t
avoid it, you’ll just be putting it off to your enemy’s advan-
tage. Someone else might insist that Louis had promised
the pope he would attack Venice on his behalf in return for
the pope’s granting the French king a divorce and making the
Archbishop of Rouen a cardinal; in this case let me refer the
reader to what I’ll be saying later about when rulers should,
or then again shouldn’t, keep their promises.
So Louis lost Lombardy because he didn’t take themeasures
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others have taken when they conquered territory and were
determined to hold on to it. There’s nothing mysterious about
this; it’s all very normal and reasonable. In fact I discussed
the matter in Nantes with the Cardinal of Rouen when Duke
Valentino (that was what people used to call Cesare Borgia,
Pope Alexander’s son) was invading Romagna; and when the
cardinal told me that the Italians knew nothing about war, I
told him that the French knew nothing about politics, because
if they did they wouldn’t be letting the pope grow so powerful.
And as it turned out, it was Rome and Spain, the two states
whose power in Italy France had built up, that proved
France’s downfall. From which we can infer a general rule
that always holds, or almost always: that to help another ruler
to grow powerful is to prepare your own ruin; because it
takes flair or military strength to build up a new power, and
both will seem threatening to the person who has benefited
from them.
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others have taken when they conquered territory and were
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4Conquered by Alexander the Great, the
Kingdom of Darius did not rebel against
his successors after his death. Why not?
Now that we’ve seen how difficult it is to hold on to recently
acquired territory some readers will be surprised to recall
what happened when Alexander the Great conquered Asia in
just a few years, then died very soon after his victory was
complete. You would have thought the whole area would
have rebelled, yet Alexander’s successors held on to it and
the only trouble they had arose from their own personal
ambitions and infighting. To explain this situation let’s start
by remembering that all monarchies on record have been
governed in one of two ways: either by a king and the servants
he appoints as ministers to run his kingdom; or by a king and
a number of barons, who are not appointed by the king
but hold their positions thanks to hereditary privilege. These
barons have their own lands and their own subjects who
recognize the barons as their masters and are naturally loyal
to them. Where a state is governed by a king and his ministers
the king is more powerful since he is the only person in the
state whom people recognize as superior. When they obey
someone else it is only because he is a minister or official and
they have no special loyalty to him.
Examples of these two forms of government in our own
times are Turkey and France. The whole of Turkey is gov-
erned by one ruler, or sultan. Everyone serves him. He divides
his realm into provinces, or sanjaks, and sends administrators
to run them, appointing and dismissing them as he sees fit.
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The King of France, on the other hand, is surrounded by any
number of barons whose rights date back to ancient times
and who are acknowledged and loved by their subjects. Each
baron has specific privileges which a king can only take away
at his peril. Looking at these two kinds of states, it’s clear
that Turkey is hard to conquer but once conquered very easy
to hold. France on the other hand will be somewhat easier to
conquer but very hard to hold.
The reason why it’s hard to conquer a country like Turkey
is that there are no barons to invite you in and you can’t expect
anyone to make your invasion easier by rebelling against the
king. This follows naturally from the situation as described
above; since all subjects are the king’s servants and indebted
to him it’s hard to corrupt them, and even assuming you do
manage to bribe someone he’s not likely to be much help
because he can’t bring any local people along with him, this
again for the reasons I’ve explained. So, anyone attacking this
kind of country has to reckon that he will find it united against
him and hence has to rely on his own armed forces rather
than on any mutiny in enemy ranks. But once you have won
and routed the enemy and made sure he can’t rebuild his
armies, then the only thing to worry about is the king and his
family. Eliminate them and no one else can threaten you since
no one commands the loyalty of the people. Just as before
your victory you couldn’t look to any barons for help, so
after it there are none around to pose a threat.
The opposite is true in countries run along French lines.
Here you can make inroads easily enough, winning the sup-
port of a baron or two. There’s always someone unhappy
with the king and eager for change. Then these people are
well placed to get you a foothold in the country and help you
to victory. But afterwards you’re going to have all kinds of
problems holding on to what you’ve won, problems with the
people who fought on your side and problems with those who
fought against you and lost. This time it won’t be enough to
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eliminate the king’s family because there will always be barons
ready to assume authority when circumstances swing their
way, and, since you can never give them everything they want
and never eliminate them all, you’ll lose the territory you took
as soon as your enemies get an opportunity to rebel.
If we go back now to the Kingdom of Darius, we’ll find
that it was of the Turkish variety. So Alexander first had to
defeat its entire army and get control of the country; but once
he’d done that, and once Darius was dead, he was securely in
command for the reasons cited above. And if his successors
had been united they could have run the region without any
worries; in fact the only trouble was the infighting they started
themselves. But states organized the French way can never be
held so easily. The frequent uprisings against Roman power
in Spain, Gaul and Greece, for example, were the result of
those regions’ being internally divided into so many princi-
palities. So long as people remembered their old loyalties to
local lords, Rome was never in complete control. But once
the power and permanence of empire had extinguished those
loyalties, then Rome became the undisputed master of the
region. In fact, when the Romans started fighting among
themselves, each warring commander was able to bring the
province he was running into the conflict on his side, since
once the families of the old local rulers had been eliminated
the only authority people recognized was Rome’s representa-
tive. When you take all this into account, it’s really not sur-
prising how easy it was for Alexander to hold Asia, nor how
hard it was for many others, Pyrrhus for example, to hold on
to the territories they took. It wasn’t a question of the abilities
of each particular conqueror, but of the different kinds of
state they had invaded.
5
How to govern cities and states that were
previously self-governing
When the states you invade have been accustomed to gov-
erning themselves without a monarch and living in freedom
under their own laws, then there are three ways of holding
on to them: the first is to reduce them to rubble; the second
is to go and live there yourself; the third is to let them go on
living under their own laws, make them pay you a tax and
install a government of just a few local people to keep the
state as a whole friendly. Since this government has been set
up by the invading ruler, its members know they can’t survive
without his support and will do everything they can to defend
his authority. Once you’ve decided not to destroy it, the best
way to hold a previously self-governing city is with the help
of its own citizens.
Let’s takeour examples fromSpartaandRome.TheSpartans
held Athens and Thebes by setting up governments run by a
few local people, but in the end they lost these towns. The
Romans razed Capua, Carthage and Numantia to the ground
and that way held on to them. They tried to hold Greece
in much the same way the Spartans had, granting it self-
government and leaving it its own laws, but it didn’t work
and eventually they were forced to destroy quite a number of
cities so as to keep hold of the region as a whole.
The truth is that the only sure way to hold such places is
to destroy them. If you conquer a city accustomed to self-
government and opt not to destroy it you can expect it to
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destroy you. Rebelling, its people will always rally to the
cry of freedom and the inspiration of their old institutions. It
doesn’tmatter how long they’vebeenoccupiedorhowbenevo-
lent the occupation, these things will never be forgotten.
Whatever you do, whatever measures you take, if the popu-
lation hasn’t been routed and dispersed so that its freedoms
and traditions are quite forgotten, they will rise up to fight
for those principles at the first opportunity; just as the Pisans
did after a hundred years of Florentine dominion.
But when a people has been accustomed to living under a
ruler and the ruler’s family has been eliminated, then, since
they’re used to obeying but now have no one to follow, they
won’t be able to choose a new leader from among themselves
nor to live in freedom without one, so they’ll be slower to
rebel and an invader can win them over and gain their loyalty
more easily. Republics, on the other hand, have more life in
them, more hatred and a greater thirst for revenge. Their
memory of old freedoms lingers on and won’t let them rest.
In these cases, your only options are to reduce the place to
rubble or go and live there yourself.
6
States won by the new ruler’s own
forces and abilities
In the following discussion dealing with states where both the
ruler and the form of government are entirely new, no one
should be surprised if I choose to cite the most impressive
examples. The fact is that although people almost always
proceed by imitation, following in another man’s footsteps,
you can never tread a model’s path or reproduce his qualities
exactly. So, if you’re sensible, you set out to follow a trail
blazed by someone whowas truly great, someone really worth
imitating, so that even if you’re not on the same level yourself
at least you’ll reflect a little of his brilliance. It’s like the clever
archer who senses that his target is too far off, knows the
limitations of his bow, and so aims far higher than he nor-
mally would, not because he really wants his arrow to go that
high, but to have it fall from a height on to his target.
So let’s start by saying that when it comes to entirely new
regimes where a new ruler has seized the state, the ease or
difficulty of his staying in power will be in proportion to his
abilities or failings. And since you can’t go from being an
ordinary citizen to a ruler without either talent or favourable
circumstances, we must suppose that one or the other of
these factors will be offsetting, at least in part, a great many
difficulties. That said, those who haven’t relied too much
on lucky circumstances have lasted longer. Another positive
factor is that since in this case the ruler doesn’t already possess
another state, he will be forced to live in his new territory.
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But to turn to those who became rulers through their own
qualities rather than by luck, no doubt the most impressive
are: Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus and suchlike figures.
And though we can hardly say much about Moses, since he
merely carried out God’s orders, all the same we have to
admire him for the grace that made him worthy of God’s
attention. But let’s look at Cyrus and other men who won
and founded kingdoms. We’ll find they are all admirable and
when we look into the specific actions each took and the
institutions they established, we’ll see they don’t differ that
much from what Moses did under divine guidance. Analysing
their lives and achievements, we notice that the only part luck
played was in giving them an initial opportunity: they were
granted the raw material and had the chance to mould it into
whatever shape they wanted. Without this opportunity their
talent would have gone unused, and without their talent the
opportunity would have gone begging.
So, if Moses hadn’t found the people of Israel in Egypt,
enslaved and oppressed and in need of a leader to get them
out of the situation, they would never have been willing to
follow him. If Romulus hadn’t been abandoned at birth and
chosen to leave Alba Longa, how could he have become king
and founder of Rome? If Cyrus hadn’t found the Persians
ready to rebel against the occupation of the Medes, and the
Medes undisciplined and effeminate after a long period of
peace, he couldn’t have achieved what he did. And Theseus
could hardly have shown his qualities if the Athenians hadn’t
first been defeated and dispersed. These opportunities made
these men’s fortunes and it was because of their remarkable
qualities that they were able to recognize and grasp the oppor-
tunities, bringing glory and even greater good fortune to their
countries.
These men and others like them who rise to sovereignty
through their own abilities face all kinds of difficulties when
setting up their states but then hold on to them fairly easily.
states won by the new ruler’s own forces 23
The initial difficulties depend in large part on the fact that in
order to establish their government and guarantee its security
they have to impose a new administrative system and new
procedures. Here we have to bear in mind that nothing is
harder to organize, more likely to fail, or more dangerous
to see through, than the introduction of a new system of
government. The person bringing in the changes will make
enemies of everyone whowas doing well under the old system,
while the people who stand to gain from the new arrange-
ments will not offer wholehearted support, partly because
they are afraid of their opponents, who still have the laws on
their side, and partly because people are naturally sceptical:
no one really believes in change until they’ve had solid experi-
ence of it. So as soon as the opponents of the new system see
a chance, they’ll go on the offensive with the determination
of an embattled faction, while its supporters will offer only
half-hearted resistance, something that will put the new ruler’s
position at risk too.
To get a better grasp of the problem, we have to ask: is the
leader introducing the changes relying on his own resources,
or does he depend on other people’s support; that is, does he
have to beg help to achieve his goals, or can he impose them?
If he’s begging help, he’s bound to fail and will get nowhere.
But if he’s got his own resources and can impose his plans,
then it’s unlikely he’ll be running serious risks. This is why
the visionary who has armed force on his side has always won
through, while unarmed even your visionary is always a loser.
Because on top of everything else, we must remember that the
general public’s mood will swing. It’s easy to convince people
of something, but hard to keep them convinced. So when they
stop believing in you, you must be in a position to force them
to believe.
Moses, Cyrus, Theseus and Romulus couldn’t have got
people to respect their new laws for long if they hadn’t pos-
sessed armed force. We saw what happened in our own times
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to Girolamo Savonarola: he was overthrown along with all
his reforms when people stopped believing in him. He had no
way of keeping the initial believers on board or forcing the
sceptical to see the light. But any new ruler bringing in changes
will have to deal with huge obstacles and dangers, mostly in
the early stages, and must overcome them with his own abil-
ities. Once he’s done that and eliminated those who resented
his achievements, so that people start to respect and admire
him, then he can enjoy his power in safety and will live
honoured and fulfilled.
I’ve mentioned four exceptional leaders but now I want to
bring in a lesser man, Hiero of Syracuse, who nevertheless
had some of the same qualities as the others and will serve as
an example of a whole category. Originally an ordinary
citizen, Hiero became King of Syracuse. Once again the only
luck he had lay in the initial situation: under threat from
Carthage, the Syracusans elected him as their military com-
mander and he was so successful they then made him king. In
fact, even as a private citizen he was so capable that one writer
said of him: ‘He had all it takes to be a king except a kingdom.’
Hiero disbanded the existing army and mustered a new one.
He broke off old alliances and made new ones; that way, with
his own soldiers and his own allies to support him, he had
laid the foundation for building whatever he wanted. So it
cost him considerable effort to establish his power, but very
little to hold on to it.
7
States won by lucky circumstance
and someone else’s armed forces
A private citizen who becomes a ruler out of sheer good luck
needn’t make much effort to take his state but will have to
sweat if he is to hold on to it. He has no trouble climbing on
to his pedestal, since he is lifted there; but as soon as he is up
on top, there will be any number of problems. I’m talking
about situations where someone buys a territory with money,
or is simply granted it as a favour. This was the case with
quite a few rulers of cities in Ionia and the Hellespont: Darius
gave them their thrones so that they would govern with his
security and prestige in mind. Another example is those
emperors who started out as private citizens and rose to power
by bribing the army.
These men rely entirely on the support and continuing
success of the people who gave them their power, which is to
say on two extremely unreliable and unstable quantities. They
don’t know how to hang on to power and even if they did,
they wouldn’t be able to. They don’t know how because,
unless they are remarkably gifted and competent, we can
hardly suppose that their lives as private citizens have
equipped them for command. They won’t be able to in any
event because they don’t possess an army that can be relied
on to stay friendly and loyal. Like anything that appears
suddenly and grows fast, regimes that come out of nothing
inevitably have shallow roots and will tend to crash in the
first storm. Unless of course the man who is suddenly made a
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event because they don’t possess an army that can be relied
on to stay friendly and loyal. Like anything that appears
suddenly and grows fast, regimes that come out of nothing
inevitably have shallow roots and will tend to crash in the
first storm. Unless of course the man who is suddenly made a
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ruler turns out to be so talented that he immediately sets to
work to defend what luck has brought his way and to build
the foundations that another leader would have established
before coming to power.
I’d like to mention two men from our own times who
achieved power in these different ways, one through his own
abilities and one by luck. The people I have in mind are
Francesco Sforza and Cesare Borgia. With the right policies
and great courage, Sforza, a commoner, became Duke of
Milan and, having won power with enormous effort, held
on to it easily enough. Borgia, on the other hand, or Duke
Valentino as he was commonly known, received his territories
thanks to his father’s position, and when his father died he
lost them, this despite the fact that he used all means available
and did everything a sensible, capable man could have done
to lay the foundations for his own rule in the lands that
another man’s army and position had won for him. As we
said earlier on, if you haven’t laid the foundations before
becoming king, it takes very special qualities to do it after-
wards, and even then it’ll be tough for the architect and risky
for the building. If we look carefully at Borgia’s strategies,
we’ll see that he did in fact lay down good foundations for
future power; and I think it makes sense to discuss how he
did it, because I wouldn’t know what better advice to give a
ruler new to power than to follow his example. If his efforts
eventually came to nothing, it was not due to his own short-
comings, but to an extraordinary run of bad luck.
When Pope Alexander VI decided to turn his son into a
powerful duke, he faced all kinds of obstacles, present and
future. First, he couldn’t see how he could make him ruler of
anywhere that wasn’t Church territory. But he knew that if he
gave away Church land, the Duke of Milan and the Venetians
would block him, since Faenza and Rimini were already under
Venetian protection. What’s more, the armies then operating
in Italy, particularly those the pope might have called on for
states won by lucky circumstance 27
help, were all controlled by people – the Orsini, the Colonna
and associated families –who had reason to fear papal expan-
sionism, and hence couldn’t be trusted. What Alexander had
to do then was undermine the status quo and the authority of
his rivals so as to seize control of part of their lands with
impunity. This turned out to be easy because, for reasons all
their own, the Venetians were now determined to bring the
French back into Italy. Rather than opposing the move, the
pope smoothed the way by dissolving King Louis’s first
marriage for him.
So the French king entered Italy with Venetian help and
papal consent. No sooner had he taken Milan than the pope
got the king to send troops to help his son, Borgia, take
Romagna, something that would have been impossible with-
out Louis’s support. With the forces of the Colonna family
now beaten, Borgia faced two obstacles if he was to hold on
to Romagna and acquire further territory: the first was his
own army, which he suspected of disloyalty; the second was
French policy. Duke Valentino had been using the forces of
the Orsini family but was afraid they would stop obeying his
orders, preventing him from making new gains and perhaps
depriving him of the old. And he had the same worries about
the King of France. His doubts about the Orsinis were con-
firmed when, after taking Faenza, he attacked Bologna, and
saw the soldiers anything but enthusiastic. Louis’s position
became clear when, having taken Urbino, Borgia advanced
towards Tuscany only to have the French king insist he turn
back. After that he decided never to rely on other people’s
armies and authority again.
So first of all he weakened the Orsini and Colonna factions
in Rome by luring the noblemen who supported them over
to his side with generous salaries and military and political
appointments in line with each man’s rank. In a few months
old loyalties were forgotten and they were all for the duke.
Then, having broken up the Colonna leaders, he waited for a
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chance to eliminate the main Orsini men. The chance came
and he took it. Having realized, too late, that the growing
power of Borgia and the Church would be their ruin, the
Orsini arranged to meet together at Magione, near Perugia.
The meeting produced a rebellion in Urbino, uprisings in
Romagna and all kinds of dangers for Borgia. But with the
help of the French he won through.
Having recovered credibility, and not wanting to have to
put the loyalty of the French or anyone else to the test, Borgia
turned to trickery. He was so good at disguising his intentions
that even the Orsini made peace with him, sending Paulo
Orsini as mediator. Borgia was extremely generous to Paulo,
reassuring him with gifts of money, clothes and horses, until
the ingenuous Orsinis eventually responded and accepted an
invitation to Senigallia, thus delivering themselves into the
duke’s hands. Having killed the Orsini leaders then and forced
their followers to become his allies, Borgia had laid solid
foundations for his power: he held Romagna and the Duchy
of Urbino and, what’s more, he felt he had won the support of
the local people whowere beginning to enjoy some prosperity.
Since this last achievement deserves to be more widely
known and imitated, I want to give it the proper space. On
taking control of Romagna, Borgia found it had been run by
weak leaders who had been stripping the people of their
wealth rather than governing them, and provoking division
rather than unity, with the result that theft, feuds and all
kinds of injustice were endemic. So he decided some good
government was required to pacify the area and force people
to respect authority. With this in mind, he appointed Remirro
de Orco, a cruel, no-nonsense man, and gave him complete
control. In a short while de Orco pacified and united the
area, establishing a considerable reputation for himself in the
process. At this point the duke decided that such draconian
powers were no longer necessary and might cause resentment.
So he set up a civil court of law in the middle of the territory
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to which every town was to send a representative and he
placed a distinguished man in charge. And since he was aware
that the recent severity had led some people to hate him, in
order to have them change their minds, and hence win them
over entirely to his side, he decided to show that if the regime
had been cruel, that was due to the brutal nature of his
minister, not to him. So as soon as he found a pretext, he had
de Orco beheaded and his corpse put on display one morning
in the piazza in Cesena with a wooden block and a bloody
knife beside. The ferocity of the spectacle left people both
gratified and shocked.
But let’s get back to where we left off. Borgia had consoli-
dated his power and secured himself against most immediate
dangers, building up an army of his own and seeing off the
majority of the other armies that had been near enough to
attack him. At this point the only obstacle to further expan-
sion was the King of France. Borgia knew the king had real-
ized he’d made a mistake supporting him earlier on and hence
would not put up with further adventures. So he began to
look around for new alliances and was less than generous in
his support when Louis marched south to fight the Spanish
who were besieging Gaeta in the northern part of the King-
dom of Naples. His aim was to be safe from French inter-
ference, something he would have managed soon enough no
doubt, if his father, Pope Alexander, had not died.
So that was how Borgia dealt with the immediate situation.
As far as the future was concerned, what worried the duke
most of all was that his father’s eventual successor would be
hostile and try to deprive him of the territory Pope Alexander
had given him. He devised four strategies to guard against
this: first, eliminate the families of all the local rulers whose
land he had taken, thus denying a new pope the option of
restoring them; second, win the support of all the noble
families of Rome (as we’ve already seen) so as to put the
brakes on any papal initiative; third, get as much control as
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possible of the College that would elect the next pope; fourth,
win so much territory before the pope died as to be able to
resist a first attack with his own resources. By the time his
father died he had achieved three of these four goals and
wasn’t far off achieving the fourth. He had killed all the local
rulers he could get his hands on and hardly anyone had
escaped; he had won over the Roman nobility and he had
enormous influence over the Electoral College. As far as
extending his territory was concerned, he was aiming to be-
come master of all Tuscany, having already captured Perugia
and Piombino and taken Pisa under his protection.
As soon as France’s restraining influence weakened (actu-
ally, it already had, since, having lost the Kingdom of Naples
to Spain, the French – and the Spanish too for that matter –
now needed Borgia’s support) he would grab Pisa. At that
point Lucca and Siena would quickly surrender, partly out of
fear and partly thanks to their old enmity with Florence, after
which the Florentines would be unable to defend themselves.
If Borgia had managed all this (and he was almost there the
very year Alexander died) he would have accumulated so
much power and prestige that he could have responded to
any aggression with his own forces and talent and wouldn’t
have needed to rely on anyone else’s armies or authority. But
Alexander died just five years after his son had first drawn his
sword. Only in Romagna had Borgia consolidated his power;
all his other territorial gains were still shaky. He was isolated,
caught between two extremely powerful, hostile armies, and,
what’s more, mortally ill.
Borgia was so ruthless and so talented, he knew so well
that you have to win over people or destroy them and he had
built up such solid foundations for his power in such a short
time that if he hadn’t had these two armies threatening him,
or if he hadn’t been so ill, he would have overcome every
obstacle. That the foundations Borgia had built were sound
was soon evident: Romagna waited loyally for more than a
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month while he lay half dead in Rome, and in Rome itself no
one took advantage of his weakness; when his enemies, the
Baglionis, Vitellis and Orsinis, turned up no one went over
to their side. And though Borgia wasn’t able to choose who
would be the new pope, at least he was in a position to block
anyone he didn’t want. So if he had been in good health when
his father died, everything would have been easy. He himself
told me, in the days when the College was meeting to elect
Julius II, that he had thought over what might happen on his
father’s death and had made plans for every contingency; it
was just that it never occurred to him that when the time
came he too might be at death’s door.
Having given this summary of everything Cesare Borgia
did, I can’t find anything to criticize; on the contrary, and as
I said, I mean to propose him as a model for anyone who
comes to power through fortunate circumstances or with the
help of another ruler’s armed forces. Given his great determi-
nation and considerable ambitions, Borgia could hardly have
behaved any differently; only the combination of Alexander’s
early death and his own illness prevented him from achieving
his goals. A new ruler who reckons he must ward off enemies
and woo friends, overcome obstacles by force or fraud, have
himself loved and feared by his people, followed and respected
by his soldiers, who must eliminate enemies likely or certain
to attack him, reform old institutions, show himself both
severe and gracious, generous and spontaneous, break up a
disloyal army and build a new one, keep the friendship of
kings and princes so that they support him with deference, or
at least think twice before harming him, will find no better
recent example to study than the policies of Cesare Borgia.
The only criticism one can level at him is his role in the
election of Pope Julius. As we’ve said, Borgia wasn’t in a
position to impose the pope he wanted but he did have influ-
ence enough to keep out the candidates he didn’t want. And
he should never have allowed a cardinal whose interests he
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had damaged, or who as pope would have reason to fear him,
to win the election. Because it’s fear or hatred that makes
men attack each other. The cardinals Borgia had wronged
were, among others, Giuliano della Rovere, cardinal of San
Pietro ad Vincula, Cardinal Colonna, cardinal of San Giorgio
of Savona, and Ascanio Sforza. All the others, with the excep-
tion of the cardinal of Rouen and the Spanish cardinals, would
have had reason to fear him had they become pope. With the
King of France behind him, the cardinal of Rouen was a very
powerful man, while the Spanish cardinals were related to
Borgia and indebted to him. So the best solution for Borgia
was a Spanish pope; failing that, he should have let Rouen
take the throne, but not Giuliano della Rovere. Anyone who
thinks that an important man will forget past grievances just
because he’s received some new promotion must think again.
Borgia miscalculated in this election, and the mistake was
fatal.
8
States won by crime
Aside from lucky circumstances and positive qualities, there
are two other ways a private citizen can become a ruler and
we should include them in our discussion, though one of these
would find more space in a book about republics. They are,
first, when a man seizes power by some terrible crime and,
second, when a private citizen becomes hereditary ruler with
the support of his fellow citizens. As for achieving kingship
by crime, we’ll discuss two examples, one from ancient history
and one from modern times, and look no deeper into the
question, since these will be models enough for anyone
obliged to take this course.
Agathocles was a Sicilian. From being a private citizen, one
of the lowest of the low in fact, he became King of Syracuse.
Born a potter’s son, he lived a life of depravity from start to
finish. All the same, mixed with that depravity were such
excellent mental and physical qualities that, having joined
the Syracusan army, he rose through the ranks and eventu-
ally became commander-in-chief. Once he’d taken charge,
Agathocles decided to make himself king, using whatever
violence was necessary to keep the power conferred on him
as commander without being obliged to anyone. He discussed
his intentions with Hamilcar, a Carthaginian whose army was
then fighting in Sicily, and reached an agreement with him.
Then one morning he called an assembly of the people and
the Senate as if he had important state business to discuss.
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At a prearranged signal his soldiers moved in and killed all
the senators and richest men in town. After this massacre
Agathocles became King of Syracuse and held his throne
without any resistance from the people. Twice defeated by
the Carthaginians and then actually besieged, not only did he
manage to defend his town but, leaving some men behind to
resist the siege, he led the rest out of Syracuse to attack Africa.
The siege was lifted and the Carthaginians pushed to the brink
of collapse, at which point they accepted an agreement which
allowed them to keep Africa and left Sicily to Agathocles.
Looking at Agathocles’ life and achievements, you won’t
find much that can be attributed to luck. As I said, he had no
backers or benefactors when he took power but rose through
the ranks, surviving all kinds of hardships and dangers. And
when he’d got power he knew how to take tough, dangerous
decisions to hold on to it. On the other hand, we can hardly
describe killing fellow citizens, betraying friends and living
without loyalty, mercy or creed as signs of talent. Methods
like that may bring you power, but not glory. If you consider
Agathocles’ ability to take risks and come out on top, and his
remarkable spirit when it came to facing and overcoming
obstacles, it’s hard to see why he isn’t rated as highly as the
most outstanding military leaders. But his brutality, cruelty
and inhumanity, together with the endless crimes he com-
mitted, mean he has no place among the men we most admire.
In conclusion, we can’t attribute Agathocles’ achievements to
luck or to positive qualities, since he needed neither.
In our own times, we have the example of Oliverotto, a
man from the town of Fermo who lived during the papacy of
Alexander VI. Orphaned of his father while still very young,
Oliverotto was brought up by his uncle, Giovanni Fogliani,
who had him join the army under Paulo Vitelli in the hope
that, with military discipline, he would rise to a high rank. On
Paulo’s death, Oliverotto served under his brother, Vitellozzo,
and being very capable, with a strong personality and power-
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ful physique, he soon became the army’s top man. But since
he felt that working with others was demeaning, he decided
to take Fermo for himself. Having got the support of some of
the town’s citizens, people who preferred to see their city
enslaved rather than free, and with the backing of Vitellozzo,
he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani saying that now so many years
had gone by he was eager to come home and see his uncle
again, visit the town, and check over some of his property.
And since, he wrote, he’d been working hard for nothing but
the prestige of his position, he wanted to ride into town in
style with a hundred mounted friends and servants beside
him; that way his fellow citizens would see that he hadn’t been
wasting his time. And he asked his uncle please to arrange for
the people of Fermo to organize an appropriate reception,
something that would not only honour him but also his uncle,
who had brought him up.
Giovanni spared no effort to do his nephew proud and,
after the people of Fermo had given him a formal reception,
Oliverotto was welcomed into his uncle’s house. A few days
later, having used the time to make secret arrangements for
the crime he was planning, he threw an impressive banquet
to which he invited Giovanni Fogliani and all the town’s
leading men. After they’d finished eating and sat through all
the entertainments you get on these occasions, Oliverotto
slyly launched into some weighty reflections on the power
and achievements of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare
Borgia. When Giovanni and the others joined the conver-
sation, Oliverotto suddenly got to his feet and said these were
matters best discussed in a more private place and he headed
for another room with Giovanni and all the other citizens
trailing after him. They had barely sat down before
Oliverotto’s soldiers rushed out of their hiding places and
killed the lot of them.
After the massacre, Oliverotto got on his horse, rode round
the town and surrounded the chief magistrate in the state
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palace, with the result that people were forced to do what he
said and set up a government with Oliverotto as the ruler.
Having killed everyone who opposed the coup and might hit
back, he strengthened his position by setting up a new army
and new civil institutions, so that within the year he was not
only undisputed master of Fermo but also a serious threat to
the neighbouring towns. And as with Agathocles, it would
have been very hard to unseat Oliverotto, had he not let
himself be fooled by Cesare Borgia, when, as explained earlier
on, Borgia lured the Orsini and Vitelli men to Senigallia.
Oliverotto went with them and so, just a year after killing
his uncle, he was strangled along with Vitellozzo Vitelli, his
mentor in courage and crime.
You might well wonder how on earth, after all their count-
less betrayals and cruelties, men like Agathocles could sit safe
on their thrones for years and even defend themselves against
foreign enemies without their citizens ever conspiring against
them; and this while many others, equally ready to use cruelty,
weren’t even able to hold on to their power in peacetime,
never mind in war. I think it’s a question of whether cruelty
is well or badly used. Cruelty well used (if we can ever speak
well of something bad) is short-lived and decisive, no more
than is necessary to secure your position and then stop; you
don’t go on being cruel but use the power it has given you to
deliver maximum benefits to your subjects. Cruelty is badly
used when you’re not drastic enough at the beginning but
grow increasingly cruel later on, rather than easing off. A
leader who takes the first approach has a chance, like Aga-
thocles, of improving his position with his subjects and with
God too; go the other way and you have no chance at all.
It’s worth noting that when you take hold of a state, you
must assess how much violence and cruelty will be necessary
and get it over with at once, so as not to have to be cruel on
a regular basis. When you’ve stopped using violence your
subjects will be reassured and you can then win them over
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with generosity. If you don’t do all it takes at the beginning,
because you were badly advised or didn’t have the nerve, then
you’ll always have to be wielding the knife; and you’ll never
be able to count on your subjects, since with all the violence
you’re handing out they won’t be able to count on you. So
get the violence over with as soon as possible; that way there’ll
be less time for people to taste its bitterness and they’ll be less
hostile. Favours, on the other hand, should be given out
slowly, one by one, so that they can be properly savoured.
Most of all, though, a ruler should have the kind of relation-
ship with his subjects where nothing that can happen, good
or bad, will force him to change his approach, because if hard
times demand it, your cruelty will come too late, while any
concessions you make will be seen as wrung out of you and
no one will be impressed.
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Now let’s turn to our second case, where a private citizen
becomes king in his own country not by crime or unacceptable
violence, but with the support of his fellow-citizens. We can
call this a monarchy with public support and to become its
king you don’t have to be wholly brilliant or extraordinarily
lucky, just shrewd in a lucky way. Obviously, to take control
of this kind of state you need the support of either the common
people or the wealthy families, the nobles. In every city one
finds these two conflicting political positions: there are the
common people who are eager not to be ordered around and
oppressed by the noble families, and there are the nobles who
are eager to oppress the common people and order them
around. These opposing impulses will lead to one of three
different situations: a monarchy, a republic, or anarchy.
A monarchy can be brought about either by the common
people or the nobles, when one or the other party finds it
convenient. Seeing that they can’t control the people, the
wealthy families begin to concentrate prestige on one of their
number and make him king so as to be able to get what they
want in his shadow. Likewise, the people, seeing that they
can’t resist the power of the nobles, concentrate prestige on
one citizen and make him king so that his authority will
protect them. A king who comes to power with the help of
the rich nobles will have more trouble keeping it than the
king who gets there with the support of the people, because
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he will be surrounded by men who consider themselves his
equals, and that will make it hard for him to give them orders
or to manage affairs as he wants.
But a man coming to power with the support of the
common people holds it alone and has no one, or hardly
anyone, around him who’s unwilling to obey. What’s more,
you can’t in good faith give the nobles what they want without
doing harm to others; but you can with the people. Because
the people’s aspirations are more honourable than those of
the nobles: the nobles want to oppress the people, while the
people want to be free from oppression. What’s more, a king
can never be safe if the common people are hostile to him,
because there are so many of them; but he can protect himself
against the nobles, since there are not so many. The worst a
king can expect if the people turn hostile is that they will
desert him; but when the nobles turn against him, he has
to fear not only desertion, but a direct attack. The nobles are
smarter, they see further ahead, they always move early
enough to save their skins, ingratiating themselves with who-
ever they think will turn out the winner. Then, of necessity, a
king will always have to live with the same common people;
but he can perfectly well get by without the same nobles, since
he can make and unmake noblemen every day, giving and
taking away honours as he likes.
Let’s settle this question of the nobles. As I see it, they can
be divided for the most part into two categories: either they
behave in such a way as to tie themselves entirely to your
destiny, or they don’t. Those who do tie themselves and aren’t
greedy should be honoured and loved; the ones who don’t
can be further divided into two groups. Maybe they are
anxious men, naturally lacking in character, in which case
you’d better make use of them, especially the ones with good
advice to offer, since when things are going well they’ll respect
you and when things are tough you needn’t fear them; but if
they’re hanging back out of calculation and ambition that’s a
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sign they’re looking more to their own interests than to yours.
These are the ones you have to watch out for and guard
against as if they were already declared enemies, because,
inevitably, when things start going wrong, these men will be
working to bring you down.
A man who becomes king with the support of the people,
then, must keep those people on his side. This is easy enough
since all they want is to be free from oppression. But the man
who becomes king against the will of the majority and with
the support of the wealthy nobles must make it an absolute
priority to win over the affection of the common people. This
will be easy if he takes them under his protection. When
people are treated well by someone they thought was hostile
they respond with even greater loyalty; they’ll go over to his
side at once and be even more devoted than if he had taken
power with their support. There are all kinds of ways a king
can win the people’s affection, but since these depend on
particular circumstances and one can hardly lay down rules,
I’ll leave them out of our discussion. I’ll just conclude, then,
that a ruler must have the people on his side; otherwise when
things get tough there’ll be no way out.
Nabis, the Spartan king, was besieged by forces from all
over Greece plus a hugely successful Roman army, but he
held out and defended his country and his position against
the lot of them. All he had to do when danger threatened was
take precautions to deal with a few internal enemies, but if
he’d had the people against him, this wouldn’t have been
enough. And if anyone objects to my reasoning here with that
trite proverb: the man who builds his house on the people is
building on mud, my answer is that this is true if it’s a private
citizen doing the building and imagining the people will come
to his rescue when he’s in trouble with the law or his enemies.
Men like this usually find themselves being let down, as did
the Gracchi brothers in Rome and Giorgio Scali in Florence.
But when it’s a king building on the people, and when he’s a
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man of spirit who knows how to lead and doesn’t panic when
things get tough, a man who takes the right precautions and
whose personality and style of government keeps everybody
in a positive state of mind, then the people will never let him
down and time will show what solid foundations he laid.
This kind of ruler is most at risk when passing from publicly
supported leadership to absolute rule. At this point he either
commands directly himself or gives orders by proxy through
magistrates. If he’s ruling by proxy he’ll be weaker and
exposed to greater risks, since he now depends entirely on the
good will of the men appointed as magistrates and they can
very easily strip him of his power, particularly when times are
hard, either by attacking him directly or by just not carrying
out his orders. Once the trouble has begun, the ruler won’t
have time to take absolute command himself because his
citizens and subjects will be used to taking orders frommagis-
trates and they aren’t going to start obeying him in a moment
of crisis; so when he’s up against it, he’ll always be struggling
to find anyone he can trust. A ruler in this position mustn’t
count on what he sees when things are going well and the
citizens need his government. Then everybody comes running,
everyone is promising this and that, everyone is ready to die
for him, since there is no question of dying. But when things
get tough and it’s the government that needs the citizens,
then hardly anyone shows. And what’s so dangerous about a
critical moment like this is that you only get one shot at it. So
if he’s sensible the ruler must work out a situation where
his citizens will always need both his government and him,
however well or badly things are going. Then they will always
be loyal.
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Assessing a state’s strength
When looking at the nature of these various states one
important question to ask is: if attacked, does a ruler have
sufficient power to defend himself with his own resources, or
will he always have to rely on the protection of others? To
make the question more precise, let’s say that a ruler who
has enough men or enough money to put together an army
that can take on all comers is, by my definition, capable
of defending himself, while a ruler who can’t take on an
enemy in the field but has to withdraw behind his city
walls and defend those, is one who will always be in need of
outside help. We’ve already said something about the first
kind of ruler [Chapter 6] and later on there’ll be more
[Chapters 11–13]. As for the second kind, one can only
encourage them to fortify their home towns and keep them
well supplied, while leaving the surrounding countryside
entirely to its fate. If a ruler has built good fortifications and
managed his relationship with his subjects as suggested above
and further elaborated in the following pages, his enemies
will always think twice before attacking him. People are
always wary of projects that present obvious difficulties, and
attacking a well-defended town and a ruler whose subjects
don’t hate him is never an easy proposition.
German cities are completely independent, don’t havemuch
territory around them and obey the emperor only when it
suits. They are not afraid of him, nor of any other powerful
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rulers in the area. This is because these towns are so well
fortified that everyone realizes what an arduous, wearisome
business it would be to attack them. They all have properly
sized moats and walls; they have the necessary artillery; they
have public warehouses with food, drink and firewood for a
year; what’s more, to keep people well fed without draining
the public purse, they stock materials for a year’s worth of
work in whatever trades are the lifeblood of the city and
whatever jobs the common folk earn their keep with. They
hold military exercises in high regard and make all kinds of
arrangements to make sure they’re routinely practised.
So, a ruler whose city is well fortified and who doesn’t
inspire hatred among his subjects isn’t going to be attacked,
and even if he is, his attackers will leave humiliated, because
the world is such a changeable place that it’s almost impos-
sible to keep an army camped outside a city’s walls doing
nothing for a whole year. Someone will object: what if people
have houses outside the walls and see them being burned
down; won’t they get impatient; won’t the long siege and their
worries for their own futures make them forget their ruler?
My answer is that a leader with power and personality will
always get round problems like this; he can raise hopes that
the siege won’t last long; he can frighten people with stories
about the enemy’s cruelty; he can move quickly to block
anyone who seems too hot-headed. Aside from this, it’s obvi-
ous that the enemy is going to be burning and razing the
countryside as he approaches the town at a time when people
are still enthusiastic and determined to resist. This actually
gives the ruler less cause for concern, because a few days later,
when hearts are cooling, the damage is already done, the blow
struck, and there’s no way back. As a result, people will rally
round their ruler all the more, they’ll see him as indebted to
them because their houses have been burned and their prop-
erty destroyed in his defence. It’s human nature to tie yourself
to a leader as much for the services you’ve done him as the
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good he’s done you. Hence, when you think about it, if the
ruler is sensible, it won’t be that hard to keep people solid
throughout the siege, so long as they have food to eat and
weapons to defend themselves.
11
Church states
The last kind of state we have to look at is the Church state.
In this case all the difficulties an eventual ruler must face come
before he takes power; because while you need ability or luck
to take a state like this you can hold on to it without either.
Church states are upheld by ancient religious institutions that
are so strong and well established as to keep their rulers in
power no matter what they do or how they live. Only Church
leaders possess states without defending them and subjects
without governing them. And even when undefended their
states are not taken off them; even when left ungoverned their
subjects don’t rebel; they don’t think about changing ruler
and wouldn’t be able to anyway. So this is the only form of
government that is secure and relaxed.
But since Church states depend on forces beyond the reach
of human reason, I shall say nomore about them. God created
them and sustains them and it would be rash and presump-
tuous for amereman to discuss them. All the same, if someone
were to ask me how the Church has increased its temporal
power so dramatically in recent times, progressing from a
situation prior to Pope Alexander where even the most insig-
nificant rulers of Italy hardly rated the Church at all in tem-
poral terms to one where a pope can scare the King of France
himself and chase him out of Italy and crush the Venetians,
then I think it would be worthwhile sorting out the facts for
the record, however well known they may already be.
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Before Charles, King of France, came down into Italy, the
country was controlled by the pope, the Venetians, the King
ofNaples, the Duke ofMilan and the Florentines. Necessarily,
these powerful states had two main concerns: to keep foreign
armies out of Italy and to prevent each other from grabbing
more territory. The pope and the Venetians were the most
eager expansionists. The only way to hold back the Venetians
was for all the other states to band together, as they did in
the defence of Ferrara; to frustrate the pope, on the other
hand, they relied on the Roman barons. Since these barons
were divided into two factions, the Orsinis and the Colonnas,
they always had something to fight about, and with their
swords drawn under the pope’s nose they kept him weak and
indecisive. And though from time to time you might get a
really determined pope, like Sixtus, all the same he was never
quite cunning enough or lucky enough to solve the problem.
The reason was that papacies tended to be short-lived. In the
ten years, on average, that a pope was in power he might just
manage to beat down one of the two factions; but if, for
example, one pope had almost finished off the Colonnas,
the next would be hostile to the Orsinis and so resurrect the
Colonnas, but without quite having the time to see off the
Orsinis. This is why the Italian states did not rate the pope’s
temporal power very highly.
Then came Alexander VI, who more than any other pope
in history showed what could be done with finance and force
of arms. Using Valentino Borgia and taking advantage of the
intrusions of the French, he made all the gains I mentioned in
my discussion of Duke Valentino. And though Alexander’s
aim was to make his son great, not the Church, all the same
his achievements enhanced the power of the Church, which,
after his and then Valentino’s death, inherited his conquests.
So on his election Pope Julius took over a Church that now
possessed the whole of Romagna and was all the more power-
ful because Alexander had quashed the Roman barons and
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their factions. He also found a new way of increasing Church
income which had never been used before.*
Julius not only followed Alexander’s lead, but went further.
He aimed to take Bologna, defeat the Venetians and push the
French out of Italy. In the end all three goals were achieved
and Julius’s credit was the greater because he did it for the
glory of the Church, not out of private interest. He kept the
Orsini and Colonna factions in the same reduced state he
found them in, and, though one or two of their leaders tried
to change things, two obstacles held them back: the first was
the Church’s power, which unnerved them, and the second
was the fact that they had no cardinals. Cardinals are always a
cause of internal division; when they have their own cardinals,
these factions are never quiet, because the cardinals feed party
animosity both inside and outside Rome and the barons are
forced to come to their party’s defence. So it’s the ambition
of the cardinals that prompts hostility and conflict between
the barons. On Julius’s death, his Holiness Pope Leo found
the papacy in an extremely strong position and it is to be
hoped that while his predecessors made the Church great by
armed force, he can make it even greater and more praise-
worthy thanks to his goodness and many, many other virtues.
* The sale of Church benefices and indulgences.
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Different kinds of armies and a
consideration of mercenary forces
Now that I’ve given a detailed account of the characteristics
of the states I set out to talk about, and examined to some
extent the reasons for their being powerful or weak and the
ways people in the past have tried to take and to hold them,
I shall offer a more general discussion of the means of attack
and defence available to each kind of state. We’ve already
said that a ruler’s power must be based on solid foundations;
otherwise he’s bound to fall. And the main foundations of any
state, whether it be new, or old, or a new territory acquired by
an old regime, are good laws and good armed forces. And
since you can’t have good laws if you don’t have good armed
forces, while if you have good armed forces good laws inevi-
tably follow, I’ll leave aside a discussion of the law and go
straight to the question of the army.
Now, the armies a ruler is depending on to defend his state
will either be his own, or mercenaries, or auxiliaries, or some
combination of these. Mercenaries and auxiliaries are useless
and dangerous. If you are counting on mercenaries to defend
your state you will never be stable or secure, because mercen-
aries are ambitious, undisciplined, disloyal and they quarrel
among themselves. Courageous with friends and cowardly
with enemies, they have no fear of God and keep no promises.
With mercenaries the only way to delay disaster is to delay
the battle; in peacetime they plunder you and in wartime they
let the enemy plunder you. Why? Because the only interest
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they have in you and their only reason for fighting is the
meagre salary you’re paying them, and that’s not reason
enough to make them want to die for you. Sure, they’re happy
to be your soldiers while you’re not at war, but when war
comes, they run for it, or just disappear.
It shouldn’t be hard to convince the reader of this, since
Italy’s present ruin has been caused precisely by a prolonged
dependence on mercenaries. It’s true that mercenary forces
did win some battles and seemed courageous when fighting
other mercenaries; but as soon as a foreign army turned up
we saw what they were made of: Charles, King of France,
didn’t even have to fight; his men just put chalk crosses on
the buildings they planned to use as billets. When Savonarola
said we brought this on ourselves with our own sins, he was
right; except the sins were not what he was thinking of, but
the ones I’ve been talking about. And because they were our
rulers’ sins, it was our rulers who paid the price.
I’d like to offer a better explanation of why mercenaries are
not a good idea. A mercenary commander may or may not be
an excellentmilitary leader: if he is, you can’t trust himbecause
hewill always aspire to power himself, either by attacking you,
his paymaster, or by attacking others against your wishes; but
if he isn’t a capable leader, he’ll ruin you anyway. And if some-
one objects that it hardly matters who commands the army
since commanders always behave like this, whethermercenary
or no,my response is as follows: armed forces are always at the
service of a hereditary ruler or a republic. A ruler must go in
person and act as commander himself; a republic must send
its citizens; if it sends a man who turns out to be no good it
must replace him; if he is good it must keep him in line with
laws that prevent him exceeding his brief. Experience shows
that only rulers and republics with their own armies make
serious progress, while mercenaries bring nothing but trouble.
And a republic with a citizen army is less likely to fall victim
to a coup than a republic paying for mercenary armies.
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Rome and Sparta stood for many centuries armed and free.
The Swiss are extremely well armed and completely free. One
example of the use ofmercenaries in ancient times is Carthage.
After the first war with Rome the Carthaginians were almost
overthrown by their mercenaries despite the fact that these
men were commanded by Carthaginian citizens. After the
death of Epaminondas the Thebansmade Philip ofMacedonia
commander of their army and no sooner had he won the war
than he stripped them of their freedom. On the death of
Filippo Maria Visconti, the Milanese hired Francesco Sforza
to fight against the Venetians. Having beaten the Venetians
at Caravaggio, Sforza joined forces with them to overthrow
his paymasters, the Milanese. When Francesco’s father was
mercenary commander for Queen Joanna of Naples, he sud-
denly made off and left her undefended so that she had to put
herself into the hands of the King of Aragon or risk losing her
kingdom.
It’s true that in the past both Venice and Florence did
increase their territories with the use of mercenaries whose
commanders did not seize power but actually defended their
employers. The fact is that the Florentines were lucky; various
powerful captains were indeed potential threats, but one
didn’t win his war, while others either found themselves facing
strong opposition or turned their ambitions elsewhere. The
one who didn’t win was Giovanni Acuto [ John Hawkwood],
and since he lost we don’t know whether he would have been
loyal or not; but everyone must admit that, had he won, the
Florentines would have been at his mercy. Francesco Sforza
had the forces of Braccio da Montone against him and the
two commanders kept each other in check: Sforza turned his
ambitions to Lombardy while Braccio went to fight Rome
and Naples.
But let’s remember what happened just a short while ago.
Florence took on Paulo Vitelli as military commander, an
extremely serious manwho had come from nothing to achieve
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enormous prestige. Had he taken Pisa for them, you could
hardly deny that the Florentines would have been right to
hang on to him, because if he had gone over to the enemy,
they wouldn’t have had a chance; but keeping him would
have meant accepting him as their ruler.
Turning to the Venetians, we find they fought confidently
and successfully when they fought for themselves, at sea that
is, where both nobles and armed commoners showed great
courage. But when they began to fight on land, they left
these strengths behind and, like other Italian states, hired
mercenaries. In the early stages of their expansion on the
mainland they had so little territory and so much prestige
they hardly needed to worry about their mercenary com-
manders; but when they pushed deeper into the peninsula,
under the leadership of Carmagnola, they got a taste of the
trouble mercenaries bring. They’d seen what a fine com-
mander Carmagnola was and under his leadership they had
defeated the Duke of Milan, so they soon noticed when he
lost his enthusiasm for the war. They realized they couldn’t
win anything else with him, because that wasn’t what he
wanted, but they couldn’t fire him either for fear of losing
what they had previously won; at which point the only safe
thing to do was to kill him. Later they hired Bartolomeo da
Bergamo, Ruberto da San Severino, Niccolo` Orsini, Count of
Pitigliano, and other such mercenary commanders who were
always more likely to lose than win, and in fact at the battle
of Vaila` the Venetians eventually lost in a single day all the
gains they had so determinedly accumulated over the past
800years.The fact is thatmercenariesbringonly slow,belated,
unconvincing victories, then sudden, bewildering defeats.
Since these examples all have to do with Italy, which has been
dominated by mercenaries for many years, I’d now like to get
a broader view of the problem, because if we can trace its
origin and developments it will be easier to find a solution.
What we must remember is that over recent centuries, as
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the empire began to lose its hold in Italy while the pope
increased his temporal power, so the country broke up into
smaller states. Many of the larger cities rose up against the
local nobles who had needed the emperor’s backing to keep
control of them; the Church supported the rebels to increase
its own political influence. In many other towns private
citizens took over as rulers. The result was that with much of
Italy now controlled by the Church and republics, which is
to say by people who had no experience of war, leaders
began to hire men from outside. The first successful mercenary
commander was Alberigo da Conio from Romagna. With
what they learned from him, Braccio da Montone and
Francesco Sforza and others would become arbiters of Italy’s
destiny. After them came all the other mercenary commanders
down to our own times. And the end result of all their genius
is that Italy was overrun by Charles, ransacked by Louis, torn
apart by Ferdinand and humiliated by the Swiss.
The mercenaries’ first tactic was to increase their own
importance by playing down the importance of infantry. Hav-
ing no territory of their own and living on what they got from
fighting, they couldn’t feed large numbers of infantry, while
smaller numbers weren’t sufficiently impressive; so they con-
centrated on cavalry and were fed and respected with more
manageable numbers. Things reached the point where an
army of 20,000 would have fewer than 2,000 infantry. Aside
from this the mercenaries did everything possible to avoid
hard work and danger; they wouldn’t kill each other in
combat but took prisoners, then didn’t even ask for a ran-
som. They wouldn’t attack fortifications at night; and they
wouldn’t leave their own fortifications to attack a besieging
army’s camp. They didn’t dig ditches or build stockades round
their camps; in winter they didn’t camp out at all. All these
omissions became accepted practice for the simple reason, as
I said, that they wanted to steer clear of danger and hard
work. Thus they brought Italy to slavery and humiliation.
13
Auxiliaries, combined forces and
citizen armies
Auxiliary armies – that is, when you ask a powerful ruler to
send military help to defend your town – are likewise useless.
In recent times we have the example of Pope Julius during his
Ferrara campaign: having seen what a sad lot his mercenaries
were in battle, he reached an agreement with Ferdinand, King
of Spain, to have his forces come to help. Auxiliaries may be
efficient and useful when it comes to achieving their own
ends, but they are almost always counterproductive for those
who invite them in, because if they lose, you lose too, and if
they win, you are at their mercy.
Although ancient history is full of pertinent examples, I’d
like to stick to this recent case of Pope Julius II, whose decision
to put himself entirely in a foreign army’s hands merely to
take Ferrara could hardly have been more rash. But he was
lucky and the unlikely outcome of the campaign spared him
the possible consequences of his mistake: when his Spanish
auxiliaries were beaten at Ravenna, the Swiss turned up and
against all expectations – the pope’s included – routed the
hitherto victorious French, so that Julius escaped being a
prisoner either to his enemies, who had fled, or to his auxil-
iaries, who weren’t the ones to win the day for him. The
Florentines, who had no armed forces at all, took 10,000
French auxiliaries to lay siege to Pisa, a decision that put them
in greater danger than any they had experienced in their whole
troubled history. To fight his neighbours, the emperor of
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Constantinople brought 10,000 Turks into Greece and when
the war was over they wouldn’t leave, which was how the
infidels began to get control of Greece.
So anyone looking for a no-win situation should turn to
auxiliaries, because they are far more dangerous even than
mercenaries. With auxiliaries your ruin is guaranteed: they
are a tightly knit force and every one of them obedient to
someone else; when mercenaries win they need time and a
convenient opportunity before they can attack you, if only
because they’re not a solid united force, you chose them,
you’re paying them, and hence it will take the man you put
in command a while to build up sufficient authority to turn
against you. To summarize, the big danger with mercenaries
is their indecision, with auxiliaries their determination.
So, sensible rulers have always avoided using auxiliaries
and mercenaries, relying instead on their own men and even
preferring to lose with their own troops than to win with
others, on the principle that a victory won with foreign forces
is not a real victory at all. As always Cesare Borgia offers a
good example. He invaded Romagna with an army entirely
made up of French auxiliaries and took Imola and Forlı` with
them; but since he felt they weren’t reliable he turned to
mercenaries as a less dangerous option. He hired the Orsini
and Vitelli armies, but when he found that they dithered in
battle and were disloyal and dangerous, he had them killed
and trained his own men. It’s easy to see the difference
between these various kinds of armies if you look at the duke’s
standingwhen he had just the French, when he had theOrsinis
and the Vitellis, and when he had his own soldiers and relied
on his own resources. With each change his prestige grew and
he was only truly respected when everyone could see that his
troops were entirely his own.
I had planned to stick to these recent Italian examples, but
I wouldn’t like to leave out Hiero of Syracuse since he is
one of the men I talked about before. Given command, as I
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explained, of the Syracusan armies, Hiero soon realized that
the mercenaries among them were no good, led as they were
by men like our Italian commanders. Realizing that he could
neither make use of them nor let them go, he had them all cut
to pieces, and from then on fought only with his own soldiers.
I’d also like to bring in a parable from the Old Testament.
When David offered to go and fight the Philistine trouble-
maker, Goliath, on Saul’s behalf, Saul gave him his own
weapons to bolster the boy’s courage. But no sooner had
David put them on than he refused the gift, saying he wouldn’t
feel confident with them, he would rather face the enemy with
his own sling and knife. In the end, other people’s arms are
either too loose, too heavy or too tight.
When, with luck and good leadership, Charles VII,
Louis XI’s father, had pushed the English out of France, he
saw that a ruler needs his own troops and so set up a standing
army of both cavalry and infantry. Later, his son Louis dis-
banded the infantry and began to hire Swiss mercenaries.
It’s now plain that this mistake, together with others that
followed, is what lies behind France’s present troubles. By
giving this important role to the Swiss, Louis had weakened
his whole army, since, with no infantry of their own, his
cavalry were now relying on others, and once they’d got
used to fighting alongside the Swiss they started to think
they couldn’t win without them. As a result the French are
unable to take on the Swiss in battle and won’t fight anyone
else without their help. So French forces are now mixed,
part mercenary and part their own men. Such composite
forces are much better than just auxiliaries or just mercen-
aries, but much worse than having all your ownmen. France’s
situation proves the point, because if the standing army
Charles recruited had been reinforced or just maintained, the
French would be unbeatable. But men are so thoughtless
they’ll opt for a diet that tastes good without realizing there’s
a hidden poison in it: it’s like the problem I mentioned earlier
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about people not diagnosing tuberculosis until it’s too late.
So, if a man can’t spot a problem in the making, he can’t
really be a wise leader. But very few men have this gift. If you
look for the initial cause of the collapse of the Roman empire,
you’ll find it was when they started hiring Goths as mercen-
aries. From that moment on the strength of the empire began
to decline and all the determination that drained out of it
went to strengthen its rivals.
So, to conclude: no state is secure without its own army; if
it hasn’t got men to defend it determinedly and loyally in a
crisis, it is simply relying on luck. As those who understand
these things have always thought and said: There is nothing
so weak and unstable as a reputation for power that is not
backed up by its own army.* And having your own army
means having a force made up of subjects, or citizens, or
men dependent on you. All other forces are mercenaries or
auxiliaries. To see how to set up your own armed forces, all
you need do is consider how the four men I mentioned above
organized and arranged theirs, or Philip, Alexander the
Great’s father, or many other kingdoms and republics. They
are all entirely reliable models.
* Quod nihil sit tam infirmum aut instabile quam fama potentiae non sua
vi nixa.
14
A ruler and his army
A ruler, then, must have no other aim or consideration, nor
seek to develop any other vocation outside war, the organiz-
ation of the army and military discipline. This is the only
proper vocation of the man in command. And it’s such a
potent one that it not only keeps those born to rule on their
thrones but often raises private citizens to political power.
Vice versa, when rulers think more about frills than fight-
ing they lose their thrones. In fact, the thing most likely to
bring about a ruler’s downfall is his neglect of the art of
war; the thing most likely to win him power is becoming an
expert in it.
A military man with his own army, Francesco Sforza rose
from commoner to Duke of Milan; shunning military hard-
ships, his sons fell from dukes to commoners. For one of the
many negative consequences of not having an army is that
people will find you pathetic, and this is a stigma a ruler must
guard against, as I’ll explain. The fact is that between a man
who has an army and a man who hasn’t there is simply no
comparison. And there is no reason why a man who com-
mands an armed force should willingly obey a man who
doesn’t, or why a man who doesn’t command an army should
live safely beside a servant who does. The one will harbour
contempt and the other suspicion and they won’t be able to
work well together. So, quite apart from the other disadvan-
tages, a ruler who doesn’t involve himself in military matters
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won’t, as I’ve said, have his soldiers’ respect and won’t be
able to trust them.
A ruler, then, must never stop thinking about war and
preparing for war and he must work at it even more in peace-
time than in war itself. He can do this in two ways, physically
and mentally. Physically, aside from keeping his men exer-
cised and disciplined, he should go hunting a great deal, which
will toughen up his body. It will also help him get to know
different landscapes, how the mountains rise and the valleys
open out, the lie of the plains, what rivers and marshes are
like. These are things he should study really carefully since
this kind of knowledge is useful in two ways. First, he’ll get
to know his own country and hence will have a better sense
of how it can be defended. Second, familiarity with these
places will make it easier for him to grasp the topography of
places he needs to understand but hasn’t seen before. The
hills, valleys, plains, rivers and marshes of Tuscany, for
example, have much in common with those of other areas, so
that knowing the lie of the land in one region makes it easier
to get to know it in another. The ruler who doesn’t have
this facility lacks the first thing a commander needs, because
understanding the land helps you find the enemy, lead your
army by the right route, choose a place to camp, plan out the
battle and lay siege to a town, all in the best way possible.
One of the things historians admired about the Achaean
leader Philopoemen was that even in peacetime he thought of
nothing but military strategy and when he was in the country
with his friends he would often stop and ask them: If the
enemy were over there on that hill and we were down here
with our army, who would be in the better position? How
could we attack them without breaking ranks? If we decided
to retreat, how would we do it? And if they retreated, how
would we go after them? And as he and his friends went along
he would list all the predicaments an army can find itself in.
He listened to their ideas, expressed and explained his own;
a ruler and his army 59
so much so that, thanks to this constant work of mental
preparation, when he was back leading his armies there was
simply nothing that could happen that he didn’t know how
to deal with.
Another thing a ruler must do to exercise his mind is read
history, in particular accounts of great leaders and their
achievements. He should look at their wartime strategies and
study the reasons for their victories and defeats so as to avoid
the failures and imitate the successes. Above all he must do
what some great men have done in the past: take as model a
leader who’s been much praised and admired and keep his
example and achievements in mind at all times. Alexander
the Great, it seems, modelled himself on Achilles, Caesar on
Alexander and Scipio on Cyrus. Anyone who reads Xeno-
phon’s life of Cyrus will see how valuable his example was to
Scipio, and how closely Scipio’s decency, charm, humanity
and generosity conform to the description Xenophon gives of
Cyrus. A sensible leader must follow this advice and never
relax in peacetime but work hard to make the most of it and
turn it to his advantage in the tough times ahead. That way,
when his luck does turn, he’ll be ready.
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What men and particularly rulers are
praised and blamed for
It’s time to look at how a ruler should behave with his subjects
and his friends. Given that a great deal has already been
written about this, I fear people may find my contribution
presumptuous, especially since, here more than elsewhere, the
code of conduct I’m offering will be rather controversial.
But since my aim was to write something useful for anyone
interested, I felt it would be appropriate to go to the real truth
of the matter, not to repeat other people’s fantasies. Many
writers have dreamed up republics and kingdoms that bear
no resemblance to experience and never existed in reality;
there is such a gap between how people actually live and how
they ought to live that anyone who declines to behave as
people do, in order to behave as they should, is schooling
himself for catastrophe and had better forget personal secur-
ity: if you always want to play the good man in a world where
most people are not good, you’ll end up badly. Hence, if a
ruler wants to survive, he’ll have to learn to stop being good,
at least when the occasion demands.
So leaving aside things people have dreamed up about rulers
and concentrating instead on reality, let’s say that when we
talk about anyone, but especially about leaders, who are more
exposed than others to the public eye, what we point are the
qualities that prompt praise or blame. One man is thought
generous and another miserly; one is seen as benevolent,
another as grasping; one cruel, the other kind; one treacherous,
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another loyal; one effeminate and fearful, another bold and
brave; one considerate, another arrogant; one promiscuous,
another chaste; one straightforward, another devious; one
stubborn, another accommodating; one solemn, another
superficial; one religious, another unbelieving, and so on.
And I’m sure we’d all agree that it would be an excellent
thing if a ruler were to have all the good qualities mentioned
above and none of the bad; but since it’s in the nature of life
that you can’t have or practise all those qualities all of the
time, a ruler must take care to avoid the disgrace that goes
with the kind of failings that could lose him his position. As
for failings that wouldn’t lead to his losing power, he should
avoid them if he can; but if he can’t, he needn’t worry too
much. In the same way, he mustn’t be concerned about the
bad reputation that comes with those negative qualities that
are almost essential if he is to hold on to power. If you think
about it, there’ll always be something that looks morally right
but would actually lead a ruler to disaster, and something else
that looks wrong but will bring security and success.
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Generosity and meanness
If we take the first of the qualities listed above, we can say
that it would be nice to be seen as generous. All the same,
being generous just to be seen to be so will damage you.
Generosity practised out of real good will, as it should be,
risks passing unnoticed and you won’t escape a reputation
for meanness. Hence, if you’re determined to have people
think of you as generous, you’ll have to be lavish in every
possible way; naturally, a ruler who follows this policy will
soon use up all his wealth to the point that, if he wants to
keep up his reputation, he’ll have to impose special taxes and
do everything a ruler can to raise cash. His people will start
to hate him and no one will respect him now he has nomoney.
Since his generosity will have damaged the majority and bene-
fited only a few, he’ll be vulnerable to the first bad news, and
the first real danger may well topple him. When he realizes
this and tries to change his ways, he’ll immediately be accused
of meanness.
Since a ruler can’t be generous and show it without putting
himself at risk, if he’s sensible he won’t mind getting a repu-
tation for meanness. With time, when people see that his
penny-pinching means he doesn’t need to raise taxes and can
defend the country against attack and embark on campaigns
without putting a burden on his people, he’ll increasingly be
seen as generous – generous to those he takes nothing from,
which is to say almost everybody, and mean to those who get
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nothing from him, which is to say very few. In our own
times the only leaders we’ve seen doing great things were
all reckoned mean. The others were failures. Pope Julius II
exploited his reputation for generosity to get the papacy, then
gladly let it go to finance his wars. The present King of France
has fought many wars without resorting to new taxes, some-
thing he can do because his constant cost-cutting has provided
for the extra expenditure. The present King of Spain would
not have won all the wars he has if he had had a reputation
for generosity.
So, if as a result he has the resources to defend his country,
isn’t obliged to steal from his subjects or prey on others, and
is in no danger of falling into poverty, a ruler need hardly
worry about a reputation for meanness; it is one of the nega-
tive qualities that keep him in power. And if someone protests:
But it was generosity that won Caesar the empire and many
others have risen to the highest positions because they were
and were seen to be generous, my response is: A ruler in
power and a man seeking power are two different things. For
the ruler already in power generosity is dangerous; for the
man seeking power it is essential. Caesar was one of a number
of men who wanted to become emperor of Rome; but if he’d
survived as emperor and gone on spending in the same way,
he would have destroyed the empire. And if someone were to
object: Many rulers who scored great military victories were
considered extremely generous, I’d reply: Either a ruler is
spending his own and his subjects’ money, or someone else’s.
When the money is his own or his subjects’, he should go easy;
when it’s someone else’s, he should be as lavish as he can.
A ruler leading his armies and living on plunder, pillage
and extortion is using other people’s money and had better
be generous with it, otherwise his soldiers won’t follow him.
What’s not your own or your subjects’ can be given away
freely: Cyrus did this; so did Caesar and Alexander. Spending
other people’s money doesn’t lower your standing – it raises
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it. It’s only spending your own money that puts you at risk.
Nothing consumes itself so much as generosity, because while
you practise it you’re losing the wherewithal to go on practis-
ing it. Either you fall into poverty and are despised for it, or,
to avoid poverty, you become grasping and hateful. Above
all else a king must guard against being despised and hated.
Generosity leads to both. It’s far more sensible to keep a
reputation for meanness, which carries a stigma but doesn’t
rouse people’s hatred, than to strive to be seen as generous and
find at the end of the day that you’re thought of as grasping,
something that carries a stigma and gets you hated too.
17
Cruelty and compassion. Whether it’s
better to be feared or loved
Continuing with our list of qualities, I’m sure every leader
would wish to be seen as compassionate rather than cruel.
All the same he must be careful not to use his compassion
unwisely. Cesare Borgia was thought to be cruel, yet his
cruelty restored order to Romagna and united it, making the
region peaceful and loyal. When you think about it, he was
much more compassionate than the Florentines whose reluc-
tance to be thought cruel led to disaster in Pistoia. A ruler
mustn’t worry about being labelled cruel when it’s a question
of keeping his subjects loyal and united; using a little exem-
plary severity, he will prove more compassionate than the
leader whose excessive compassion leads to public disorder,
muggings and murder. That kind of trouble tends to harm
everyone, while the death sentences that a ruler hands out
affect only the individuals involved. But of all rulers, a man
new to power simply cannot avoid a reputation for cruelty,
since a newly conquered state is a very dangerous place. Virgil
puts these words in Queen Dido’s mouth:
The difficult situation and the newness of my kingdom
Force me to do these things, and guard my borders everywhere.*
*Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt
Moliri, et late fines custode tueri.
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All the same, a leader must think carefully before believing
and responding to certain allegations and not get frightened
over nothing. He should go about things coolly, cautiously
and humanely: if he’s too trusting, he’ll get careless, and if he
trusts no one he’ll make himself unbearable.
These reflections prompt the question: is it better to be
loved rather than feared, or vice versa? The answer is that
one would prefer to be both but, since they don’t go together
easily, if you have to choose, it’s much safer to be feared than
loved.We can say this of most people: that they are ungrateful
and unreliable; they lie, they fake, they’re greedy for cash and
they melt away in the face of danger. So long as you’re gener-
ous and, as I said before, not in immediate danger, they’re all
on your side: they’d shed their blood for you, they’d give you
their belongings, their lives, their children. But when you need
them they turn their backs on you. The ruler who has relied
entirely on their promises and taken no other precautions is
lost. Friendship that comes at a price, and not because people
admire your spirit and achievements, may indeed have been
paid for, but that doesn’t mean you really possess it and you
certainly won’t be able to count on it when you need it. Men
are less worried about letting down someone who has made
himself loved than someone who makes himself feared. Love
binds when someone recognizes he should be grateful to you,
but, since men are a sad lot, gratitude is forgotten the moment
it’s inconvenient. Fear means fear of punishment, and that’s
something people never forget.
All the same, while a ruler can’t expect to inspire love
when making himself feared, he must avoid arousing hatred.
Actually, being feared is perfectly compatible with not being
hated. And a ruler won’t be hated if he keeps his hands off
his subjects’ property and their women. If he really has to
have someone executed, he should only do it when he has
proper justification and manifest cause. Above all, he mustn’t
seize other people’s property. A man will sooner forget the
cruelty and compassion 67
death of his father than the loss of his inheritance. Of course
there are always reasons for taking people’s property and a
ruler who has started to live that way will never be short of
pretexts for grabbing more. On the other hand, reasons for
executing a man come more rarely and pass more quickly.
But when a ruler is leading his army and commanding large
numbers of soldiers, then above all he must have no qualms
about getting a reputation for cruelty; otherwise it will be
quite impossible to keep the army united and fit for combat.
One of Hannibal’s most admirable achievements was that
despite leading a huge and decidedly multiracial army far
from home there was never any dissent among the men or
rebellion against their leader whether in victory or defeat. The
only possible explanation for this was Hannibal’s tremendous
cruelty, which, together with his countless positive qualities,
meant that his soldiers always looked up to him with respect
and terror. The positive qualities without the cruelty wouldn’t
have produced the same effect. Historians are just not think-
ing when they praise him for this achievement and then
condemn him for the cruelty that made it possible.
To show that Hannibal’s other qualities wouldn’t have
done the job alone we can take the case of Scipio, whose army
mutinied in Spain. Scipio was an extremely rare commander
not only in his own times but in the whole of recorded history,
but he was too easy-going and as a result gave his troops a
freedom that was hardly conducive to military discipline.
FabiusMaximus condemned him for this in the Senate, claim-
ing that he had corrupted the Roman army. When one of
his officers sacked the town of Locri, Scipio again showed
leniency; he didn’t carry out reprisals on behalf of the towns-
folk and failed to punish the officer’s presumption, so much
so that someone defending Scipio in the Senate remarked that
he was one of those many men who don’t make mistakes
themselves, but find it hard to punish others who do. If
Scipio had gone on leading his armies like this, with time his
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temperament would have undermined his fame and dimin-
ished his glory, but since he took his orders from the Senate,
not only was the failing covered up but it actually enhanced
his reputation.
Going back, then, to the question of being feared or loved,
my conclusion is that since people decide for themselves
whether to love a ruler or not, while it’s the ruler who decides
whether they’re going to fear him, a sensible man will base
his power on what he controls, not on what others have
freedom to choose. But he must take care, as I said, that
people don’t come to hate him.
18
A ruler and his promises
Everyone will appreciate how admirable it is for a ruler to
keep his word and be honest rather than deceitful. However,
in our own times we’ve had examples of leaders who’ve done
great things without worrying too much about keeping their
word. Outwitting opponents with their cunning, these men
achieved more than leaders who behaved honestly.
The reader should bear in mind that there are two ways of
doing battle: using the law and using force. Typically, humans
use laws and animals force. But since playing by the law often
proves inadequate, it makes sense to resort to force as well.
Hence a ruler must be able to exploit both the man and the
beast in himself to the full. In ancient times writers used fables
to teach their leaders this lesson: they tell how Achilles and
many other leaders were sent to the centaur Chiron to be fed
and brought up under his discipline. This story of having a
teacher who was half-man and half-beast obviously meant
that a ruler had to be able to draw on both natures. If he had
only one, he wouldn’t survive.
Since a ruler has to be able to act the beast, he should take
on the traits of the fox and the lion; the lion can’t defend itself
against snares and the fox can’t defend itself from wolves. So
you have to play the fox to see the snares and the lion to scare
off the wolves. A ruler who just plays the lion and forgets the
fox doesn’t know what he’s doing. Hence a sensible leader
cannot and must not keep his word if by doing so he puts
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himself at risk, and if the reasons that made him give his word
in the first place are no longer valid. If all men were good,
this would be bad advice, but since they are a sad lot and
won’t be keeping their promises to you, you hardly need to
keep yours to them. Anyway, a ruler will never be short of
good reasons to explain away a broken promise. It would be
easy to cite any number of examples from modern times to
show just how many peace treaties and other commitments
have been rendered null and void by rulers not keeping their
word. Those best at playing the fox have done better than the
others. But you have to know how to disguise your slyness,
how to pretend one thing and cover up another. People are
so gullible and so caught up with immediate concerns that a
con man will always find someone ready to be conned.
There’s one recent example that really should be men-
tioned. Pope Alexander VI never did anything but con people.
That was all he ever thought about. And he always found
people he could con. No one ever gave more convincing
promises than Alexander, or swore greater oaths to back them
up, and no one ever kept his promises less; yet his deceptions
always worked, because he knew this side of human nature
so well.
So, a leader doesn’t have to possess all the virtuous qualities
I’ve mentioned, but it’s absolutely imperative that he seem to
possess them. I’ll go so far as to say this: if he had those
qualities and observed them all the time, he’d be putting
himself at risk. It’s seeming to be virtuous that helps; as, for
example, seeming to be compassionate, loyal, humane, honest
and religious. And you can even be those things, so long as
you’re always mentally prepared to change as soon as your
interests are threatened. What you have to understand is that
a ruler, especially a ruler new to power, can’t always behave
in ways that would make people think a man good, because
to stay in power he’s frequently obliged to act against loyalty,
against charity, against humanity and against religion. What
a ruler and his promises 71
matters is that he has the sort of character that can change
tack as luck and circumstances demand, and, as I’ve already
said, stick to the good if he can but know how to be bad
when the occasion demands.
So a ruler must be extremely careful not to say anything
that doesn’t appear to be inspired by the five virtues listed
above; he must seem and sound wholly compassionate,
wholly loyal, wholly humane, wholly honest and wholly
religious. There is nothing more important than appearing to
be religious. In general people judge more by appearances
than first-hand experience, because everyone gets to see you
but hardly anyone deals with you directly. Everyone sees what
you seem to be, few have experience of who you really are,
and those few won’t have the courage to stand up to majority
opinion underwritten by the authority of state. When they’re
weighing up what someone has achieved – and this is particu-
larly true with rulers, who can’t be held to account – people
look at the end result. So if a leader does what it takes to
win power and keep it, his methods will always be reckoned
honourable and widely praised. The crowd is won over by
appearances and final results. And the world is all crowd: the
dissenting few find no space so long as the majority have any
grounds at all for their opinions. There’s a certain king today*
– I’d better not call him by name – who never stops preaching
peace and trust and is actually sworn enemy to both; and if
he had ever practised either he would have lost his authority
or his kingdom many times over.
* Ferdinand of Aragon.
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Avoiding contempt and hatred
Now that I’ve discussed the most important of the qualities I
listed I’d like to look at the others more briefly in relation to
the principle, already mentioned, that a ruler must avoid any
behaviour that will lead to his being hated or held in con-
tempt; every time he manages this he’s done what a ruler
should and can indulge other bad habits without worrying
about the consequences. As I’ve already said, what most leads
to a ruler being hated is seizing and stealing his subjects’
property and women; that he must not do. As long as you
don’t deprive them of property or honour most men will be
happy enough and you’ll only have to watch out for the
ambitious few who can easily be reined back in various ways.
You’ll be held in contempt, on the other hand, if you’re seen
as changeable, superficial, effeminate, fearful or indecisive.
So a ruler must avoid those qualities like so many stumbling
blocks and act in such a way that everything he does gives an
impression of greatness, spirit, seriousness and strength; when
presiding over disputes between citizens he should insist that
his decision is final and make sure no one imagines they can
trick or outwit him.
The ruler who projects this impression of himself will be
highly thought of and it’s hard to conspire against a man who
is well thought of. Then so long as he has a reputation for
excellence and is respected by his people it will be hard for
outside enemies to attack him either. A ruler must guard
avoiding contempt and hatred 73
against two kinds of danger: one internal, coming from his
own people; the other external, coming from foreign powers.
To defend yourself against foreign powers you need a good
army and good allies. And if you have a good army you’ll
always have good allies, and when you’re secure against
foreign powers you’ll always be secure internally too, assum-
ing there wasn’t already a conspiracy under way. Then even
when a foreign power does move against you, if you’ve lived
and organized yourself as I’ve suggested, you only have to
keep your nerve and you’ll survive any and every attack, like
the Spartan ruler Nabis in the example I gave earlier.
To get back to the internal situation: when there is no threat
from outside, a ruler must take care that his subjects don’t
start conspiring against him. He can guard against this by
making sure he isn’t hated or despised and that people are
happy with him, all of which is very important, as I’ve
explained at length. In fact, one of the most powerful prevent-
ive measures against conspiracies is simply not being hated
by a majority of the people. People planning a conspiracy
must believe that killing the ruler will be popular; when they
realize that, on the contrary, it would be unpopular they
lose heart, because conspiracies are always beset with endless
difficulties. Experience shows that for every successful con-
spiracy there are any number of failures. A conspirator can’t
act alone and can look for accomplices only among people he
believes are unhappy with the situation. But as soon as he
reveals his intentions to someone else he’s giving that person
the chance to improve his position, since obviously there are
all kinds of advantages to be had from betraying a conspiracy.
When you reckon that the benefits of betrayal are assured,
while joining a conspiracy is a risky and extremely dangerous
business, the man will have to be a rare friend indeed, or a
very bitter enemy of the government, if he’s going to keep
faith.
To summarize: on the conspirator’s side all you have is
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fear, envy and the demoralizing prospect of punishment, while
the ruler on his side has the authority of the government and
its laws plus the protection of his friends and the state. Add
to all that the good will of the people and it’s extremely
unlikely that anyone will be so crazy as to start a conspiracy.
Because, while in general a conspirator has most to fear prior
to the coup, in this case, with the people against him, he’s
going to be in danger afterwards too and the fact that he’s seen
off the ruler doesn’t mean he can expect to escape unscathed.
I could give infinite examples of this but let’s make do
with just one that happened in our fathers’ times. Annibale
Bentivogli, grandfather of the present Annibale, was Duke of
Bologna when the Canneschis conspired against him and
killed him. At that point the only surviving Bentivogli was his
son, Giovanni, whowas still a baby. All the same, immediately
after the murder, the people rose up and killed all the Can-
neschis. This was because the Bentivogli family was extremely
popular at the time. In fact, when the Bolognese realized that
with Annibale dead there were no family members capable of
ruling the town, they went to Florence to get a man who was
supposedly a Bentivogli, though until shortly before that he
had passed himself off as the son of a blacksmith; they asked
him to govern Bologna and he duly did so until Giovanni was
old enough to take over.
My conclusion, then, is that so long as he has the people
on his side a ruler needn’t worry about conspiracies, but
when they are against him and hate him he’ll have to watch
everyone’s every move. Sensible rulers and well-run states
have always done all they can not to drive the nobles to
despair and to keep the people happy and satisfied; indeed
this is one of a ruler’s most important tasks.
One of the better organized and well-governed states in our
own times is France. It is full of good institutions which
guarantee the king’s security and freedom of action. The most
important of these is parliament and parliamentary authority.
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In fact the king who set up the country’s constitution was
aware of the ambition and presumption of the nobles and
reckoned they needed a bit in their mouths to rein them back.
He also knew how much the people hated and feared the
nobles and he wanted to protect them. But it was important
that the king shouldn’t be personally responsible for doing
this since then he might be blamed by the nobles for favouring
the people or by the people for favouring the nobles. So he
introduced an independent body, parliament, that could keep
the nobles in their place and protect the people without the
king’s being responsible. There really couldn’t be a better or
more sensible institution, nor one more conducive to the
security of the king and the realm. This prompts the following
reflection: that a ruler must get others to carry out policies
that will provoke protest, keeping those that inspire gratitude
to himself. In conclusion, let me repeat that a ruler should
respect the nobles but must make sure he is not hated by the
people.
Perhaps many readers familiar with the fate of certain
Roman emperors will feel that their examples contradict these
opinions of mine, in that they consistently behaved well and
showed great character but nevertheless lost their empire or
even their lives at the hands of subjects who conspired against
them. To meet these objections, I shall consider the qualities
of some of these emperors, showing how the causes of their
downfall are not at all out of line with my reasoning above,
and bringing into the argument some of the context that
historians of the period consider important. I hope it will be
enough to take all the emperors who held power from the
philosopher Marcus Aurelius down to Maximinus, which is
to say: Marcus, his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus,
Antoninus Caracalla his son, Macrinus, Heliogabalus,
Alexander and Maximinus.
The first thing to note is that, while in other states a ruler
has only to guard against the ambition of the nobles and
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the disrespect of the people, Roman emperors faced a third
hazard: the greed and cruelty of the army. This was such a
tough problem that it proved the downfall of many emperors,
because it was so hard to keep both the people and the army
happy. The people were for a quiet life and hence loved
low-profile leaders, while the soldiers loved leaders with mili-
tary ambitions, men who were brazen, grasping and cruel;
they wanted the emperor to unleash these qualities on the
people so that they could double their incomes and give vent
to their own greed and cruelty.
As a result, emperors who for lack of natural authority or
political flair didn’t have the kind of standing that could hold
both soldiers and people in check always ended badly. When
they saw how difficult it was to deal with these conflicting
demands, most of them, and especially those new to power,
chose to satisfy the army andmore or less ignored the people’s
suffering. It was a policy dictated by necessity: if a ruler can’t
avoid hatred altogether, he must first try to avoid the hatred
of the country as a whole, and when that proves impossible
he must do everything he can to escape the hatred of the
classes that wield the most power. So emperors new to their
positions and in need of special support turned to the army
rather than the people, a policy that worked for as long as
they were able to maintain their prestige in the eyes of the
soldiers.
This is why, although Marcus, Pertinax and Alexander
were benign, humane men, who led unassuming lives, loving
justice and hating cruelty, only Marcus managed to avoid a
sad end and still commanded respect at his death. This was
because he succeeded to the emperor’s throne by hereditary
right and owed nothing to either the soldiers or the people.
Possessing many good qualities that aroused general admir-
ation, he kept both the people and the army in their place
throughout his reign and was never either hated or despised.
But Pertinax was made emperor against the army’s will; under
avoiding contempt and hatred 77
Commodus the soldiers had got used to a degenerate lifestyle
and wouldn’t accept the standards of honesty Pertinax tried
to impose on them. This aroused their hatred and since Perti-
nax was also despised for being old he was soon overthrown.
In this regard it’s worth noting that you can be hated just
as much for the good you do as the bad, which is why, as I
said before, a ruler who wants to stay in power is often forced
not to be good. Because when a powerful group – whether
they be the common people, the army or the nobility – is
corrupt, then if you reckon you need their support you’ll have
to play to their mood and keep them happy, and at that point
any good you do will only put you at risk. But let’s move on
to Alexander. He was such a good man that among the many
things he was praised for was the fact that over fourteen years
in power he never had anyone executed without a trial. All
the same, people despised him; they thought him effeminate
and said he let his mother run the show; as a result the army
conspired against him and killed him.
Going to the opposite extreme and looking at the characters
of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus Caracalla andMaximinus,
we find they were extremely cruel and grasping; to keep the
army happy they committed every crime a leader can commit
against his people and all of them, with the exception of
Severus, came to a sad end. Severus had such a strong character
that though he tyrannized the people to keep the army friendly
he was always able to govern with success; his qualities
amazed and awed the people, impressed and pleased the army,
so that both groups in their different ways admired him.
Since, for a man who took power rather than inheriting it,
Severus achieved such a lot, I’d like very briefly to show how
well he was able to play both the fox and the lion, animals
that, as I said, a ruler must learn to imitate.
Aware that the emperor Julian was weak and indecisive,
Severus persuaded the army he commanded in Slavonia to
march onRome and avenge Pertinax, who had beenmurdered
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by the Praetorian Guard. With this pretext and betraying no
sign of any ambition to become emperor, he led his army
towards Rome and was already in Italy before people realized
he’d set out. When he arrived in Rome, the Senate, out of
fear, elected him emperor and had Julian killed. Having got
thus far, Severus faced two obstacles if he was to take com-
plete control of the empire: one in Asia, where the commander
of the Asian armies, Pescennius Niger, had declared himself
emperor; and the other in the west, where Albinus also aspired
to become emperor. Deciding it would be dangerous to show
he was hostile to both opponents at once, Severus chose to
attack Niger and trick Albinus. So he wrote to Albinus, in
France, saying that now that the Senate had elected him
emperor he wanted to share the honour with him, Albinus.
He sent him the title of Caesar and had the Senate vote to
make him co-emperor. Albinus was taken in, but as soon as
Severus had defeated and killed Niger and got control of the
eastern empire, he went back to Rome and complained in the
Senate that Albinus, far from being grateful for everything
Severus had given him, had set a trap to kill him; as a result,
he, Severus, would have to go and punish his ingratitude. In
fact he went to France, stripped Albinus of his power and had
him killed.
If we look carefully at what Severus did, we find he played
both the ferocious lion and the cunning fox very well; he was
feared and respected by all parties and he managed to avoid
being hated by the army. It’s hardly surprising, then, that
despite being a new arrival he was able to hold so much
power: his enormous reputation always protected him from
the hatred people might otherwise have felt as a result of his
pillage and violence.
Severus’s son, Antoninus, was also a man with some excel-
lent qualities; the people thought him remarkable and the
army welcomed him. He was a warlike leader, capable of
handling every hardship and contemptuous of fine foods and
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easy living of any kind. So the army loved him. But his cruelty
and ferocity were overwhelming and unspeakable, to the
extent that, after endless individual murders, he wiped out
much of the population of Rome and all the people of Alexan-
dria. At this point everybody really hated him and even those
close to him began to get nervous so that in the end he was
killed by a centurion while among his soldiers.
It’s worth noting that assassinations like this, coming as
they do when a determined man takes a considered decision,
are bound to happen to rulers sometimes, if only because,
once a person no longer cares about dying, he’s free to strike.
That said, a ruler shouldn’t be too concerned, because such
murders are extremely rare. He must just take care not to do
a serious injustice to any of the men he has serving him or
keeps beside him to run the state. Antoninus in fact had killed
the centurion’s brother in disgraceful circumstances and was
threatening the man himself every day, yet still kept him in
his bodyguard. It was the kind of rash behaviour that can,
and in this case did, lead to disaster.
But let’s turn to Commodus, who could so easily have held
on to the empire. Son of Marcus Aurelius, Commodus came
to power by hereditary right; all he had to do was follow in
his father’s footsteps and he would have been welcome to
army and people alike. But the man was cruel, bestially so,
and to unleash his appetite and greed on the people he set
about currying favour with the soldiers and corrupting them.
He had no self-respect either and would often go down to the
floor of the amphitheatre to fight the gladiators. He did so
many things that were sordid and unworthy of an emperor
that his soldiers found him contemptible, until, hated by the
people and despised by the army, he eventually fell victim to
a conspiracy.
Which leaves Maximinus. He was a real warmonger. As I
said earlier on, the armies had been frustrated with the effem-
inate Alexander, and when they’d got rid of him they elected
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Maximinus in his place. But he didn’t last long. Two things
led to his being both hated and despised. First, his extremely
lowly background: he had been a shepherd in Thrace – every-
body knew it and thought it scandalous; second, on becoming
emperor he had put off going to Rome for the formal investi-
ture and got himself a reputation for extreme cruelty by
ordering his prefects in Rome and all over the empire to
carry out numerous atrocities. Universally despised for his
low birth, hated and feared for his ferocity, he faced rebellions
first in Africa, then in the Senate; the Senate rebellion was
supported by the entire population of Rome. Then the whole
of Italy conspired against him, until finally his own army got
involved; they were laying siege to Aquileia and finding it
tough going; they were also fed up with his cruelty and when
they realized how many enemies he had they became less
afraid of the man and killed him.
I don’t want to talk about Heliogabalus, Macrinus or
Julian, whowere all intensely despised and swiftly dispatched.
Instead I’ll conclude this discussion with the reflection that
contemporary rulers do not have to give the same priority to
satisfying the army that the Roman emperors did. True, one
does have to pay the army some attention, but the problem is
soon resolved, because none of today’s rulers has to live
with armies that have long experience in the government and
administration of the provinces, as the armies of the Roman
empire did. If the emperors had to put their armies before the
people it was because the armies were the more powerful.
These days it is more important for all rulers, with the excep-
tions of the Turkish and Egyptian sultans, to put the people
before the army, because the people are more powerful.
I’ve made an exception of the Turkish leader because he
keeps an army of 12,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry beside
him. Depending on them as he does for the strength and
security of his realm he has to put their good will before any
other consideration. In the same way, Egypt is entirely at the
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mercy of its army and again the sultan has to satisfy the
soldiers before worrying about the people. It’s worth noting
that Egypt is a unique case; it is similar to the papal state,
which can’t be classified as a hereditary monarchy or as a
new monarchy. When the old ruler dies he is not replaced by
one of his children, but a new leader is elected by a body
vested with this authority. Since the state’s institutions are
well established, this can hardly be compared with a situation
where a new ruler seizes a state, and in fact a pope or Egyptian
sultan faces none of the difficulties that a new ruler usually
faces, because although he may be new to power the insti-
tutions are old and set up to work on his behalf as if he were
a hereditary king.
But let’s get back to our discussion. I’m sure that anyone
reflecting on what I’ve said will see that it was hatred or
contempt that led to the downfall of these Roman emperors;
they will also understand how it was that, while some behaved
one way and some another, there were nevertheless successes
and failures in both groups. Since they had seized rather than
inherited power, it was futile and dangerous for Pertinax
and Alexander to try to imitate Marcus Aurelius, who had
inherited his position; similarly, since they didn’t have the
necessary qualities, it was a fatal mistake for Caracalla, Com-
modus and Maximinus to imitate Severus. Though a man
who has seized power and is establishing a new monarchy
cannot imitate the likes ofMarcus Aurelius, that doesn’t mean
he has to behave like Severus.What hemust take from Severus
are the policies you need to found a state, and from Marcus
the policies that bring stability and glory once the state is
firmly established.
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Whether fortresses and other strategies
rulers frequently adopt are useful
To hold power more securely, some rulers have disarmed
their citizens; some have kept subject towns divided in fac-
tions; some have encouraged hostility towards themselves;
others have sought to win over those who were initially sus-
picious of their rise to power; some have built fortresses;
others have torn them down and destroyed them. And though
one can’t pass final judgement on these policies without
detailed knowledge of the states where such decisions were
taken, all the same I shall try to discuss the matter in general
terms as far as is possible.
No one new to power has ever disarmed his subjects; on
the contrary, finding them disarmed new rulers have always
armed them. When you’re the one giving people arms, those
arms become yours; men who were potentially hostile become
loyal, while those already loyal become your supporters rather
than just your subjects. It’s true you can’t arm everyone, but
in favouring some you can feel safer about the others too.
Seeing that they’ve been preferred, the men you’ve armed will
be under an obligation to you. The others won’t be resentful,
understanding that the people facing danger for you and
binding their lives to yours will inevitably deserve the greater
rewards. But when you take arms away from people, then
you start to upset them; you show you don’t trust them
because you’re frightened or cagey. Either way, they’ll begin
to hate you. Then, since you can hardly manage without an
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army, you’ll have to turn to mercenary forces, which will
have all the failings I discussed earlier. And even if your
mercenaries are good, they’ll never be good enough to defend
you against powerful enemies and a hostile people.
So, as I said, a new ruler in a newly constituted state has
always armed his subjects. History offers endless examples.
But when a ruler acquires a new territory to add like an extra
limb to an existing state, then he must disarm its people,
except for the men who supported him when he took it. But
with time and opportunity even those men should be kept
weak and emasculated so that all the real armed force in the
state as a whole resides with your own soldiers who live with
you in your home base.
Generations ago, the experts in Florence used to say that
you had to hold Pistoia by playing on its factions and Pisa by
holding its fortresses. So they encouraged factionalism in
some of the towns they held, the better to control them. In
times when there was a certain balance between opposing
parties in Italy this was probably an effective policy, but I
don’t think we should take it as a rule today. I don’t think
factional divisions ever really improved the situation. On the
contrary, when an enemy approaches, a subject town that’s
divided in factions will fall at once. The weaker of the factions
will always join forces with the attacker and the other faction
won’t be strong enough to beat them both.
The Venetians were reasoning along the same lines, I
believe, when they fomented divisions between Guelphs and
Ghibellines in the towns they held; they didn’t let the factions
get as far as bloodshed but encouraged divergences so that
people would be too busy with their own disputes to unite
against Venice. It wasn’t, as things turned out, a successful
policy. After the Venetians’ defeat at Vaila`, one or other of
the factions immediately took courage and seized control
of the various towns. This kind of policy actually indicates
weakness on a ruler’s part; in a healthy, confident state such
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differences would never be allowed; they are only useful in
peacetime when they make it easier to keep people under
control. In times of war everyone can see how flawed the
policy is.
There’s no doubt that rulers achieve greatness by over-
coming the obstacles and enemies they find in their path. So
when destiny wants to make a ruler great, particularly a new
ruler who, unlike a hereditary king, really needs to build up
his reputation, it sends him enemies and prompts them to
attack him. That way he has the chance to beat them and
climb the ladder his enemies have put in front of him. Hence
many people reckon that when the opportunity presents itself
a smart ruler will shrewdly provoke hostility so that he can
then increase his reputation by crushing it.
Rulers, and especially those new to power, have found that
men they initially doubted prove more loyal and useful than
those they trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci ran Siena more with the
men he had doubted than the others. But it’s hard to lay down
firm rules here because things vary from case to case. I’ll just
say this: that a ruler can very easily win over men who
opposed him when he came to power, if they are not in a
position to support themselves with their own resources.
They’ll be forced to behave more loyally than others in that
they know they have to work hard to offset the negative
impression the ruler initially had of them. So a ruler can
always get more out of such men than out of people who feel
too safe in his service and don’t really make an effort.
Since the discussion demands it, I wouldn’t like to leave
out a reminder to any ruler who has taken a new state with
inside help that he must think hard about why the local people
who helped him did so. If they didn’t act out of natural
friendship for the new ruler, but only because the previous
government wasn’t giving them what they wanted, it will
be extremely demanding and difficult to keep their support,
because the new ruler won’t be able to give them what they
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want either. Looking carefully at the reasons for this and
drawing on the examples available from ancient and modern
history, we find that it is much easier to win over those who
were content with the previous government, and hence your
enemies, than the men who were not content and so made an
alliance with you and helped you take the country.
One way rulers have tried to secure their power is by build-
ing fortresses to curb and discourage potential aggressors and
to offer a safe refuge in case of sudden attack. I approve of
this policy, if only because it has been used for centuries. All
the same, there is the recent example of Niccolo` Vitelli who
demolished two fortresses in Citta` di Castello in order to hold
the town. When Guidobaldo retook possession of his lands
after Cesare Borgia’s occupation, he razed every fortress in
the state to the ground, convinced that he’d be less likely to
lose it again without them. And when the Bentivoglio family
returned to power in Bologna it did the same thing. So,
whether fortresses are useful or not will depend on the circum-
stances; in one situation they’ll be a help and in another they’ll
be dangerous. We can sum up the reasons for this as follows.
The ruler who is more afraid of his people than of foreign
enemies must build fortresses; but the ruler who is more
afraid of foreign enemies should do without them. The castle
Francesco Sforza built in Milan has provoked and will go on
provoking more rebellions against the Sforza family than any
other cause of unrest in the whole state. Your best fortress is
not to be hated by the people, because even if you do have
fortresses, they won’t save you if the people hate you. Once
the people have decided to take up arms against you they’ll
never be short of foreign support. In recent times there are no
examples of fortresses having proved useful to any ruler at
all, with the exception of the Countess of Forlı`, Caterina
Sforza, when her husband, Count Girolamo Riario, was mur-
dered. Taking refuge in the fortress, she was able to survive
the rebels’ assault, wait till help came from Milan, then take
9780141442259_ThePrince_TXT.indd   84 28/05/2015   14:14
84 the prince
differences would never be allowed; they are only useful in
peacetime when they make it easier to keep people under
control. In times of war everyone can see how flawed the
policy is.
There’s no doubt that rulers achieve greatness by over-
coming the obstacles and enemies they find in their path. So
when destiny wants to make a ruler great, particularly a new
ruler who, unlike a hereditary king, really needs to build up
his reputation, it sends him enemies and prompts them to
attack him. That way he has the chance to beat them and
climb the ladder his enemies have put in front of him. Hence
many people reckon that when the opportunity presents itself
a smart ruler will shrewdly provoke hostility so that he can
then increase his reputation by crushing it.
Rulers, and especially those new to power, have found that
men they initially doubted prove more loyal and useful than
those they trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci ran Siena more with the
men he had doubted than the others. But it’s hard to lay down
firm rules here because things vary from case to case. I’ll just
say this: that a ruler can very easily win over men who
opposed him when he came to power, if they are not in a
position to support themselves with their own resources.
They’ll be forced to behave more loyally than others in that
they know they have to work hard to offset the negative
impression the ruler initially had of them. So a ruler can
always get more out of such men than out of people who feel
too safe in his service and don’t really make an effort.
Since the discussion demands it, I wouldn’t like to leave
out a reminder to any ruler who has taken a new state with
inside help that he must think hard about why the local people
who helped him did so. If they didn’t act out of natural
friendship for the new ruler, but only because the previous
government wasn’t giving them what they wanted, it will
be extremely demanding and difficult to keep their support,
because the new ruler won’t be able to give them what they
whether fortresses and other strategies are useful 85
want either. Looking carefully at the reasons for this and
drawing on the examples available from ancient and modern
history, we find that it is much easier to win over those who
were content with the previous government, and hence your
enemies, than the men who were not content and so made an
alliance with you and helped you take the country.
One way rulers have tried to secure their power is by build-
ing fortresses to curb and discourage potential aggressors and
to offer a safe refuge in case of sudden attack. I approve of
this policy, if only because it has been used for centuries. All
the same, there is the recent example of Niccolo` Vitelli who
demolished two fortresses in Citta` di Castello in order to hold
the town. When Guidobaldo retook possession of his lands
after Cesare Borgia’s occupation, he razed every fortress in
the state to the ground, convinced that he’d be less likely to
lose it again without them. And when the Bentivoglio family
returned to power in Bologna it did the same thing. So,
whether fortresses are useful or not will depend on the circum-
stances; in one situation they’ll be a help and in another they’ll
be dangerous. We can sum up the reasons for this as follows.
The ruler who is more afraid of his people than of foreign
enemies must build fortresses; but the ruler who is more
afraid of foreign enemies should do without them. The castle
Francesco Sforza built in Milan has provoked and will go on
provoking more rebellions against the Sforza family than any
other cause of unrest in the whole state. Your best fortress is
not to be hated by the people, because even if you do have
fortresses, they won’t save you if the people hate you. Once
the people have decided to take up arms against you they’ll
never be short of foreign support. In recent times there are no
examples of fortresses having proved useful to any ruler at
all, with the exception of the Countess of Forlı`, Caterina
Sforza, when her husband, Count Girolamo Riario, was mur-
dered. Taking refuge in the fortress, she was able to survive
the rebels’ assault, wait till help came from Milan, then take
9780141442259_ThePrince_TXT.indd   85 28/05/2015   14:14
86 the prince
control again. Circumstances were such at the time that no
foreign enemies were in a position to help the people. Later,
however, her fortresses were not much use when Cesare
Borgia attacked the town, and the people, who were hostile
to her, fought on his side. Both then and earlier she would
have been safer had she avoided making an enemy of the
people rather than counting on fortresses. All things con-
sidered, I’ll give my approval both to rulers who build fort-
resses and to those who don’t, but I’ll always criticize any
ruler who imagines it doesn’t matter whether the people hate
him or not and trusts in fortresses for his security.
21
What a ruler should do to win respect
Nothing wins a ruler respect like great military victories and
a display of remarkable personal qualities. One example in
our own times is Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of
Spain. One might almost describe him as a ruler new to power
because from being a weak king he has become the most
famous and honoured of Christendom, and when you look
at his achievements you find they are all remarkable and
some of them extraordinary. At the beginning of his reign he
launched an invasion of Granada, a campaign that laid the
foundation of his power. It was important that he did it at a
moment of domestic quiet when he didn’t have to worry
about possible interruptions: the war then kept the Castilian
barons busy so that they didn’t start plotting changes inside
Spain. Meanwhile, and without their even noticing, Ferdi-
nand’s power and reputation were increasing at their expense.
Supplying his armies with money from the Church and the
people, he was able to sustain a long war that allowed him to
establish, then consolidate, a military force that would do
him proud in the future. After that was done, to ensure the
Church’s support for even larger campaigns, he perpetrated
an act of cruelty dressed up as piety, stripping the Marrano
Jews of their wealth and expelling them from his kingdom, a
move that could hardly have beenmore distressing or striking.
Once again under cover of religion, he attacked Africa, then
moved into Italy and finally attacked France. So he was always
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planning and doing great things, keeping his people in a state
of suspense and admiration, concentrated as they were on the
outcome of his various campaigns. Since each of these came
as a consequence of the one before, he never gave the more
powerful men in the country any slack time between wars
when they could plot against him.
A leader can also win acclaim by giving impressive demon-
strations of character in his handling of domestic affairs, as
Bernabo` Visconti did in Milan; whenever anyone does any-
thing remarkable, whether for good or ill, in civil life, you
think up some reward or punishment that will cause a stir.
But above all a ruler must make sure that everything he
does gives people the impression that he is a great man of
remarkable abilities.
A ruler will also be respected when he is a genuine friend
and a genuine enemy, that is, when he declares himself unam-
biguously for one side and against the other. This policy will
always bring better results than neutrality. For example, if
you have two powerful neighbours who go to war, you may
or may not have reason to fear the winner afterwards. Either
way it will always be better to take sides and fight hard. If
you do have cause to fear but stay neutral, you’ll still be
gobbled up by the winner to the amusement and satisfaction
of the loser; you’ll have no excuses, no defence and nowhere
to hide. Because a winner doesn’t want half-hearted friends
who don’t help him in a crisis; and the loser will have nothing
to do with you since you didn’t choose to fight alongside him
and share his fate.
When Antiochus was sent to Greece by the Aetolians to
push back the Romans, he sent ambassadors to the Achaeans,
who were allied to the Romans, asking them to remain neu-
tral, while for their part the Romans encouraged them to join
the war on their side. The Achaean council debated the matter
and after Antiochus’s ambassador had spoken, asking them
to remain neutral, the Roman ambassador replied: ‘With
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regard to this invitation to remain neutral, nothing could be
more damaging to your interests: you’ll get no thanks, no
consideration and will be taken as a reward by whoever wins.’
The contender who is not your ally will always try to get
you to stay neutral and your ally will always try to get you to
fight. Indecisive rulers who want to avoid immediate danger
usually decide to stay neutral, and usually things end badly
for them. But if you declare yourself courageously for one
side or the other and your ally wins, he’ll be indebted to you
and there’ll be a bond of friendship between you, so that even
if he is more powerful now and has you at his mercy he’s
not going to be so shameless as to take advantage of the
circumstances and become an example of ingratitude. Vic-
tories are never so decisive that the winner can override every
principle, justice in particular. But if your ally loses, you’re
still his friend and he’ll offer what help he can: you become
companions in misfortune, and your luck could always turn.
In the event that the two neighbours going to war are not
so powerful that you need fear the winner, it is even more
sensible to take sides and get involved: you’ll be destroying
one with the help of another who, if he had any sense, would
be protecting the loser. And when your ally wins, which with
your help is inevitable, he’ll be at your mercy.
Here it’s worth noting that a ruler must never ally himself
with someone more powerful in order to attack his enemies,
unless, as I said above, it is absolutely necessary. Because
when you win you’ll be at your ally’s mercy, and whenever
possible rulers must avoid placing themselves in another’s
power. The Venetians allied themselves with France to attack
the Duke of Milan. It was an alliance they could have avoided
and it led to disaster. But when such an alliance can’t be
avoided, as was the case with Florence when the pope and
Spain took their armies to attack Lombardy, then a ruler must
take sides for the reasons set out above. In general, a ruler
must never imagine that any decision he takes is safe; on the
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contrary he should reckon that any decision is potentially
dangerous. It is in the nature of things that every time you try
to avoid one danger you run into another. Good sense consists
in being able to assess the dangers and choose the lesser of
various evils.
A ruler must also show that he admires achievement in
others, giving work to men of ability and rewarding people
who excel in this or that craft. What’s more, he should
reassure his subjects that they can go calmly about their
business as merchants or farmers, or whatever other trade
they practise, without worrying that if they increase their
wealth they’ll be in danger of having it taken away from them,
or that if they start up a business they’ll be punitively taxed.
On the contrary, a ruler should offer incentives to people who
want to do this kind of thing and to whoever plans to bring
prosperity to his city or state. Then at the right times of the
year he should entertain people with shows and festivals. And
since every city is divided into guilds and districts, he should
respect these groups and go to their meetings from time to
time, showing what a humane and generous person he is,
though without ever forgetting the authority of his position,
something he must always keep to the fore.
22
A ruler’s ministers
A ruler’s choice of ministers is an important matter. The
quality of the ministers will reflect his good sense or lack of
it and give people their first impression of the way the ruler’s
mind is working. If his ministers are capable and loyal, people
will always reckon a ruler astute, because he was able to
recognize their ability and command their loyalty. When they
are not, people will always have reason to criticize, because
the first mistake the ruler made was in his choice of ministers.
Everyone who knew Antonio da Venafro, Pandolfo Petrucci’s
minister in Siena, thought Pandolfo extremely smart for
having chosen him.
There are actually three kinds of mind: one kind grasps
things unaided, the second sees what another has grasped,
the third grasps nothing and sees nothing. The first kind is
extremely valuable, the second valuable, the third useless. So
although Pandolfo didn’t have the first kind of mind, he cer-
tainly had the second; if someone is sharp enough to recognize
what’s right and wrong in what another man says and does,
then even if he doesn’t have the creativity to make policy
himself, he can still see which of his minister’s policies are
positive and negative, encourage the good ones and correct
the bad. The minister, meanwhile, will realize that he can’t
fool the ruler and so will have to behave.
There is one infallible way of checking a minister’s creden-
tials: when you see the man thinking more for himself than
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for you, when his policies are all designed to enhance his own
interests, then he’ll never make a good minister and you’ll
never be able to trust him. A minister running a state must
never think of himself, only of the ruler, and should concen-
trate exclusively on the ruler’s business. To make sure he does
so, the ruler, for his part, must take an interest in the minister,
grant him wealth and respect, oblige him and share honours
and appointments with him. That way the minister will see
that he can’t survive without the ruler. He’ll have so many
honours he won’t want any more, so much wealth he won’t
look for more, and so many appointments that he’ll guard
against any change of the status quo. When rulers and their
ministers arrange their relationships this way, they can trust
each other. When they don’t, one or the other is bound to
come to a bad end.
23
Avoiding flatterers
There’s another important issue we need to consider, a mis-
take rulers can only avoid if they are very canny, or very
good at choosing their ministers. I’m talking about flatterers.
Courts are always full of them and men are so ready to
congratulate themselves on their achievements and to imagine
themselves more successful than they are that it is hard not
to fall into this error. Then if you do try to defend yourself
from flatterers you run the risk of having people despise you.
Because the only way to guard against flattery is to have
people understand that you don’t mind them telling you the
truth. But when anyone and everyone can tell you the truth,
you lose respect.
So the sensible ruler must find a middle way, choosing
intelligent men for ministers and giving them and only them
the right to tell him the truth, and only on the issues he asks
about, not in general. However, the ruler should ask his
ministers about everything and listen to their opinions, then
make up his mind on his own, following his own criteria. In
responding to these advisers, as a group or separately, he
should make it clear that the more openly they speak, the
more welcome their advice will be. After which, he shouldn’t
take advice from anyone else, but get on with whatever has
been decided and be firm in his decisions. Try a different
approach and you’ll either be ruined by flatterers or change
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your mind so often listening to everyone’s opinions that
people will lose their respect for you.
Let me offer an example from modern times. Bishop Luca
Rainaldi, a man close to the present Emperor Maximilian,
said that the emperor never took advice from anyone and
never got his own policies enacted; this is because he did
the opposite of what I proposed above. Being secretive, the
emperor tends not to explain his plans to anyone and doesn’t
seek advice. But when he starts putting his policies into action
and people see what he’s up to, his ministers tell him he’s got
it wrong and all too readily he changes his mind. As a result,
whatever he does one day he undoes the next and nobody
understands what he wants or means to do and no one can
make plans in response to his policies.
So a ruler must always take advice, but only when he wants
it, not when others want to give it to him. In fact he should
discourage people from giving him advice unasked. On the
other hand he should ask a great deal and listen patiently
when an adviser responds truthfully. And if he realizes some-
one is keeping quiet out of fear, he should show his irritation.
Many people think that when a ruler has a reputation for
being sensible it’s thanks to the good advice he’s getting from
his ministers and not because he’s shrewd himself. But they’re
wrong. There’s a general and infallible rule here: that a leader
who isn’t sensible himself can never get good advice, unless
he just happens to have put the government entirely in the
hands of a single minister who turns out to be extremely
shrewd. In this case he may well get good advice, but the
situation won’t last long because the minister will soon grab
the state for himself. If on the other hand he’s taking advice
from more than one person, an ingenuous ruler will find
himself listening to very different opinions and won’t know
how to make sense of them. Each of his advisers will be
thinking of his own interests and the ruler won’t be able to
control them or even sense what’s going on. It’s not a case of
avoiding flatterers 95
finding better ministers; men will always be out to trick you
unless you force them to be honest. In conclusion: a ruler isn’t
smart because he’s getting proper advice; on the contrary, it’s
his good sense that makes the right advice possible.
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Why Italian rulers have lost their states
Followed carefully, the guidelines I’ve laid down will allow a
ruler who’s just taken over a state to assume the aura of a
hereditary king and give him even greater security and staying
power than if his government was well established. People
watch what a new ruler does far more attentively than they
do a hereditary one and if his achievements are impressive
they’ll have a greater hold on people and command greater
loyalty than an old royal bloodline. Men are more interested
in the present than the past and when things are going well
they’ll be happy and won’t look elsewhere; on the contrary,
they’ll do everything they can to defend a ruler so long as he
doesn’t let himself down in other ways. So he’ll enjoy the
double glory of having both founded a new kingdom and
graced and consolidated it with good laws, a good army, good
allies and good policies. Conversely, the man who’s born to
power but behaves so stupidly as to lose it is shamed twice
over.
Turning now to those Italian rulers who’ve lost power in
recent years – the King of Naples, for example, and the Duke
of Milan and others too – the first thing we find is that they
all had poor armies, this for the reasons I discussed at length
above. Then we see that some of them had the people against
them, or if they did have the people’s support they couldn’t
keep the nobles on their side. Without these failings you don’t
lose a state that’s strong enough to field an army. Philip of
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Macedonia – not Alexander’s father but the Philip beaten by
Titus Quintius – had nothing like the resources of the Romans
and Greeks who attacked him: all the same, being a military
man and a leader who knew how to please the people and
keep the nobles on his side, he held out for many years and
though in the end he did lose control of a few towns, at least
he hung on to his kingdom.
So these rulers of ours, who were well-established kings
and dukes yet still lost their states, should spare us their
bad-luck stories; they have only themselves to blame. In
peacetime they never imagined anything could change (it’s a
common shortcoming not to prepare for the storm while the
weather is fair) and when trouble struck their first thought
was to run for it rather than defend themselves; they hoped
the people would be incensed by the barbarity of the invaders
and call them back. This isn’t a bad policy when you have no
alternative, but to trust in that reaction when you could have
taken other precautions is a serious failing; a ruler should
never be resigned to falling from power because he’s counting
on finding someone to prop him up again afterwards. Maybe
people won’t oblige, and even if they do, you won’t be safe,
because your strategy was spineless and involved relying on
others. The only good, sure, lasting forms of defence are those
based on yourself and your own strength.
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The role of luck in human affairs, and how
to defend against it
I realize that many people have believed and still do believe
that the world is run by God and by fortune and that however
shrewd men may be they can’t do anything about it and have
no way of protecting themselves. As a result they may decide
that it’s hardly worth making an effort and just leave events
to chance. This attitude is more prevalent these days as a
result of the huge changes we’ve witnessed and are still wit-
nessing every day, things that no one could have predicted.
Sometimes, thinking it over, I have leaned a bit that way
myself.
All the same, and so as not to give up on our free will, I
reckon it may be true that luck decides the half of what we
do, but it leaves the other half, more or less, to us. It’s like
one of those raging rivers that sometimes rise and flood the
plain, tearing down trees and buildings, dragging soil from
one place and dumping it down in another. Everybody runs
for safety, no one can resist the rush, there’s no way you can
stop it. Still, the fact that a river is like this doesn’t prevent us
from preparing for trouble when levels are low, building
banks and dykes, so that when the water rises the next time
it can be contained in a single channel and the rush of the
river in flood is not so uncontrolled and destructive.
Fortune’s the same. It shows its power where no one has
taken steps to contain it, flooding into places where it finds
neither banks nor dykes that can hold it back. And if you
the role of luck in human affairs 99
look at Italy, which has been both the scene of revolutionary
changes and the agent that set them in motion, you’ll see it’s
a land that has neither banks nor dykes to protect it. Had the
country been properly protected, like Germany, Spain and
France, either the flood wouldn’t have had such drastic effects
or it wouldn’t have happened at all.
I think that is all that need be said in general terms about
how to deal with the problem of luck.
Going into detail, though, we’ve all seen how a ruler may
be doing well one day and then lose power the next without
any apparent change in his character or qualities. I believe
this is mostly due to the attitude I mentioned above: that is,
the ruler trusts entirely to luck and collapses when it changes.
I’m also convinced that the successful ruler is the one who
adapts to changing times; while the leader who fails does so
because his approach is out of step with circumstances.
All men want glory and wealth, but they set out to achieve
those goals in different ways. Some are cautious, others impul-
sive; some use violence, others finesse; some are patient, others
quite the opposite. And all these different approaches can be
successful. It’s also true that two men can both be cautious
but with different results: one is successful and the other fails.
Or again you see two men being equally successful but with
different approaches, one cautious, the other impulsive. This
depends entirely on whether their approach suits the circum-
stances, which in turn is why, as I said, twomen with different
approaches may both succeed while, of two with the same
approach, one may succeed and the other not.
This explains why people’s fortunes go up and down. If
someone is behaving cautiously and patiently and the times
and circumstances are such that the approach works, he’ll be
successful. But if times and circumstances change, everything
goes wrong for him, because he hasn’t changed his approach
to match. You won’t find anyone shrewd enough to adapt his
character like this, in part because you can’t alter your natural
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bias and in part because, if a person has always been successful
with a particular approach, he won’t easily be persuaded to
drop it. So when the time comes for the cautious man to act
impulsively, he can’t, and he comes unstuck. If he did change
personality in line with times and circumstances, his luck
would hold steady.
Pope Julius II always acted impulsively and lived in times
and circumstances so well suited to this approach that things
always went well for him. Think of his first achievement,
taking Bologna while Giovanni Bentivoglio was still alive.
The Venetians were against the idea, the King of Spain like-
wise, and Julius was still negotiating the matter with the
French. All the same, and with his usual ferocity and impetu-
ousness, the pope set out and led the expedition himself. This
put the Venetians and Spanish in a quandary and they were
unable to react, the Venetians out of fear and the Spanish
because they hoped to recover the whole of the Kingdom of
Naples. Meanwhile, the King of France was brought on
board: he needed Rome as an ally to check the Venetians and
decided that once Julius had made his move he couldn’t deny
him armed support without too obviously slighting him.
With this impulsive decision, then, Julius achieved more
than any other pope with all the good sense in the world
would ever have achieved. Had he waited to have everything
arranged and negotiated before leaving Rome, as any other
pope would have done, the plan would never have worked.
The King of France would have come up with endless excuses
and the Venetians and Spanish with endless warnings. I don’t
want to go into Julius’s other campaigns, which were all of a
kind and all successful. His early death spared him the experi-
ence of failure. Because if times had changed and circum-
stances demanded caution, he would have been finished. The
man would never have changed his ways, because they were
natural to him.
To conclude then: fortune varies but men go on regardless.
the role of luck in human affairs 101
When their approach suits the times they’re successful, and
when it doesn’t they’re not. My opinion on the matter is this:
it’s better to be impulsive than cautious; fortune is female and
if you want to stay on top of her you have to slap and thrust.
You’ll see she’s more likely to yield that way than to men who
go about her coldly. And being a woman she likes her men
young, because they’re not so cagey, they’re wilder and more
daring when they master her.
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An appeal to conquer Italy and free it from
foreign occupation
Going back over everything I’ve said, I’ve been asking myself
whether the time is right, in Italy now, for a new ruler;
whether there’s the sort of material available here that would
give a shrewd man with the right qualities the chance to
impose some form, winning honour for himself and doing
good to the people as a whole. And my impression is that a
lot of things are running the way of a new man, so many in
fact that I don’t know what time was ever more right than
the present. If, as I said earlier, Moses could only emerge after
the people of Israel had been enslaved in Egypt, Cyrus show
his great spirit after the Persians were crushed by the Medes,
Theseus prove his excellence after the Athenianswere defeated
anddispersed, so today, for us towitness the qualities of a great
Italian, the country had to be reduced to its present state:
more slave than the Jews, more crushed than the Persians,
more divided than the Athenians, leaderless, lawless, beaten,
plundered, broken and overrun, ruined in every way.
There was one man* who showed glimpses of greatness,
the kind of thing that made you think he was sent by God
for the country’s redemption, but then at the height of his
achievements his luck turned. So now Italy lies, half-dead,
waiting to see who will heal her wounds and put an end to
the devastation of Lombardy, the extortionate taxation of
* Presumably Borgia.
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Tuscany and Naples, who will clean up the sores that have
festered too long. You can see the country is praying God to
send someone to save her from the cruelty and barbarity of
these foreigners. You can see she is ready and willing to march
beneath a flag, if only someone would raise one up.
What I can’t see is any family the country could put its faith
in right now if not your illustrious house,* blessed as it is with
fine qualities and fortune, favoured by God and the Church –
actually running the Church, in fact – and hence well placed to
lead Italy to redemption. And if you keep in mind the lives and
achievements of the men I’ve written about, then the project
won’t be too difficult. It’s true they were rare men, remarkable
men, but nevertheless they were still men, and none of them
had a better opportunity than you have now. The things they
did had no greater justification, nor were they any easier; God
was no kinder to them than he has been to you. Justice is defi-
nitely on our side because ‘war is just when there’s no alterna-
tive and arms are sacred when they are your only hope.’ The
situation is more than favourable, and when circumstances
are favourable things can’t be too hard; all you have to do is
take the men I’ve proposed as your models. What’s more,
God has shown us amazing, unprecedented signs: the sea
parted; a cloud led the way for you; stone has gushed water;
manna has rained on us from heaven; everything has worked
together to make you great. The rest is up to you. God doesn’t
like doing everything himself, he doesn’t want to deprive us
of our free will and our share of glory.
It’s no surprise if none of the Italians I’ve spoken about
have been able to do what I believe your family can do, or
again if all our recent wars and revolutions have given the
impression that the country has lost its capacity to fight. This
is because the old states were badly organized and no one
knew how to improve things. Nothing brings more honour
* Machiavelli is addressing Lorenzo de’ Medici.
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to a new ruler than the new laws and institutions he intro-
duces. When they are well thought out and show vision they
bring a ruler respect and admiration. Italy is hardly lacking
in raw material for the man who wants to give form to it. The
limbs are healthy and strong; all they need is a head to guide
them. Look how much stronger, defter and more skilful
Italians are than foreigners in duels or small skirmishes. But
when it comes to armies they can’t compete. Because they are
badly led. The capable men are ignored, the incapable are
convinced they are capable, and to date no one has had the
talent and luck to score the sort of success that would force
the others to stand aside. That’s why in all these wars over
the past twenty years, whenever an army has been entirely
made up of Italians it has always failed miserably, as witness
first the battle of Taro, then those of Alessandria, Capua,
Genova, Vaila`, Bologna and Mestre.
So if your illustrious family should choose to follow in the
steps of those excellent men who came to the rescue of their
peoples, the first thing that needs to be done, the real foun-
dation of any such achievement, is to establish an army of
your own citizens. You can’t have more loyal, determined
and better soldiers than your own. And if each man taken
singly is good, when they’re all together and find themselves
led, fed and respected by their own ruler they’ll be even better.
Founding an army like this is absolutely essential if we
are to use Italian mettle to defend ourselves against foreign
enemies.
It’s true that the Swiss and Spanish infantries are thought
to be formidable, but both have weak points that would allow
a third force not only to face them but to feel confident of
beating them. The Spanish can’t stand up to cavalry and the
Swiss are in trouble when they run into infantry as determined
as themselves. That’s why, as we’ve seen and will see again,
the Spanish can’t turn back a French cavalry attack and the
Swiss collapse in front of a Spanish-style infantry. And though
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we haven’t had complete proof of this Swiss vulnerability, we
got a glimpse of it at the battle of Ravenna when the Spanish
infantry took on the Germans, who use the same tactics as
the Swiss. Relying on their agility and their small round
shields, the Spanish got under the German pikes, where, safe
themselves, they could strike at will. At this point the Germans
were helpless and if the cavalry hadn’t turned up to push the
Spanish back they’d all have been killed. Knowing the weak
points of these two armies, then, it’s quite possible to train a
new army that could hold back a cavalry attack and wouldn’t
be unsettled by infantry combat: it’s a question of what
weapons you have andwhat new tactics you can invent. These
are the kinds of developments that enhance a new ruler’s
reputation and bring him great prestige.
It would be a big mistake, then, after all this time, to pass
up the chance of rescuing Italy.Words can’t express the loving
welcome such a saviour would get in all the towns that have
suffered from this torrent of foreign invaders: the thirst for
revenge, the unswerving trust, the devotion, the tears. What
doors would be closed to such a man? Who would refuse to
obey him? What envy could stand in his way? What Italian
would not bow his knee? Everybody loathes this barbarous
occupation. So, may your noble house undertake this duty
with the spirit and hope that inspire just causes, so that our
country may be glorified under your banner, and under your
protection Petrarch’s words be fulfilled:
Virtue against fury
Shall take up arms; and the fight be short;
For ancient valour
Is not dead in Italian hearts.*
*Virtu` contro a furore
Prendera` l’arme; e fia el combatter corto;
Che´ l’antico valore
Nelli italici cor non e` ancor morto.
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.Glossary of Proper Names
Machiavelli would have expected his readers to be familiar with the
exploits of the men he mentions from contemporary and modern
times, while they would not have known so much about some of
the figures he cites from ancient history. In an attempt to put today’s
reader in something of the same position, I have been more generous
with information on the figures from modern history, and less so
with those from Roman times and before.
achilles Greek hero in the Trojan War, son of the immortal
nymph Thetis and raised by Chiron the centaur.
acuto , giovanni Italianization of John Hawkwood (1320–
94). Having served in the English army in France, in 1360
Hawkwood joined mercenary soldiers in Burgundy and later
commanded the so-called White Company fighting for different
states and factions in Italy. Constantly playing off his employers
against their enemies, he built up considerable wealth. From 1390
on he commanded Florentine armies in their war against the
Viscontis of Milan.
agathocles (361–289 bc) Ruler of Syracuse (317–289 bc)
and King of Sicily (304–289 bc). Seized power in Syracuse, exil-
ing and murdering thousands in the process. His formation of a
strong army and domination of Sicily led to protracted conflict
with Carthage.
albinus Decimus Clodius Ceionius Septimius (c.150–197).
Roman military commander in Britain who proclaimed himself
emperor on the murder of Pertinax in 193. Albinus initially allied
himself with Severus in Rome who had also proclaimed himself
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emperor, but the two fell out and in 197, having lost the Battle
of Lugdunum (modern Lyons), Albinus either killed himself or
was killed.
alexander Alexander the Great (356–323 bc), King of Mace-
donia (336–323 bc). He conquered Greece, Persia, and much of
Asia.
alexander Marcus Aurelius Alexander Severus (208–235),
Roman emperor (222–235). Adopted as his heir in 221 by the
emperor Heliogabalus, who was also his first cousin, Alexander
was eventually murdered by his own soldiers.
alexander vi Rodrigo Borgia (1431–1503). Born in Valencia
with the Spanish surname Borja, later Italianized to Borgia.
Elected pope in 1492, Alexander openly recognized as many as
eight illegitimate children, all of whom he tried to place in high
positions. The most famous were Cesare Borgia and Lucrezia
Borgia. Involved in endless intrigues to extend his territories and
increase his wealth, Alexander was considered the most corrupt
and grasping of the Renaissance popes. Although frequently
accused of murder, usually by poison, there is no evidence that
his own sudden illness and death in 1503 were the result of
poisoning.
antiochus Antiochus the Great (c.241–187 bc), King of Syria
(223–187 bc). Spent most of his reign in military campaigns
rebuilding the state he had inherited and conquering much of
Asia Minor. In 192 bc he invaded Greece but was beaten by the
Romans and eventually lost Asia Minor to them as well.
antoninus caracalla see caracalla .
ascanio See sforza , cardinal .
baglioni The Baglioni family ruled Perugia, a town midway
between Florence and Rome, in the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries.
bentivogli , giovanni (1438–1508) Son of Annibale, ruler of
Bologna, who was murdered in 1445 when Giovanni was just a
child. After a long interregnum Giovanni eventually took his
father’s place in 1462, but was forced to flee when Pope Julius II
attacked the town in 1506.
bergamo , bartolomeo da Bartolomeo Colleone (c.1395–
1475). Mercenary leader in the service of Venice and commander
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of Venetian forces against Milan after Carmagnola was killed.
Colleone was remarkable for not changing sides or seeking to
play one side off against another. He is celebrated in the famous
Colleonemonument by Andrea Verocchio in Venice, which shows
the leader on his horse.
bernabo` See visconti .
borgia , cesare (c.1475–1507) Illegitimate son of Cardinal
Rodrigo Borgia, later Pope Alexander VI, Cesare Borgia was
made Bishop of Pamplona at fifteen and a cardinal at eighteen.
In 1497 the murder of his elder brother Giovanni made him the
main beneficiary of his father’s plans for territorial expansion.
Cesare was suspected of Giovanni’s murder but nothing was
proved. In 1498 he negotiated with Louis XII in Paris on behalf
of his father; the king’s marriage was dissolved, allowing him to
marry the widow of Charles VIII, while Louis agreed to an
aggressive military alliance with the pope to capture Naples.
Cesare then became the first person in history to resign his pos-
ition as cardinal, upon which Louis made him Duke of Valenti-
nois, hence the nickname, Duke Valentino. The alliance with
Louis was reinforced by Borgia’s marriage to Charlotte d’Albret,
the king’s cousin, and Borgia was serving with Louis’s army when
it captured Milan in 1499. Prompted by his father and with
Louis’s military support, Borgia set out to conquer the Romagna,
taking the towns of Fano, Pesaro, Rimini, Cesena, Forlı`, Faenza
and Imola. In 1501 the pope declared him Duke of Romagna.
Borgia successfully commanded French troops at the siege of
Naples in 1501, returning to the Romagna to capture Urbino and
Camerino in 1502. In this period he appointed Leonardo da Vinci
as his military architect and engineer. Faced with a revolt by
mercenary leaders in his service, he invited them to Senigallia to
negotiate and had them imprisoned and executed. The death of
his father in 1503 eventually led to the loss of the Romagna,
imprisonment and exile to Spain, where Borgia died in the service
of his brother-in-law King John III of Navarre.
borgia , rodrigo See alexander vi .
borgia , valentino Duke Valentino. See borgia, cesare.
braccio Andrea Braccio da Montone (1368–1424). Successful
mercenary commander who fought numerous campaigns both
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for and against most of the major states in Italy, eventually
becoming ruler of Perugia.
caesar Julius Caesar (c.100–44 bc). After successful military
campaigns in Gaul and Britain, Julius Caesar made himself dic-
tator, taking the first step to transforming the Roman Republic
into the Roman Empire. He was assassinated by a group of
senators including his former friend Marcus Junius Brutus.
canneschi A family that vied with the Bentivogli family for
power in Bologna. The Bentivoglis were supported by Venice and
Florence while the Canneschis were allied to the Viscontis, dukes
of Milan. In 1445, with Milanese support, Battista Canneschi,
head of the family, had Annibale Bentivogli murdered. The people
of Bologna, however, turned against the Canneschis and lynched
Battista, after which the rest of the family fled.
caracalla Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Caracalla (188–217),
Roman emperor (211–217). On the death of his father, the
emperor Severus, Antoninus took power with his brother Geta,
but soon had him murdered, together with all his supporters. He
extended Roman citizenship to all free citizens of the empire,
keeping the support of the army by increasing soldiers’ pay.
Unpopular with the people, Antoninus was eventually murdered
by a member of his own guard, perhaps on the instigation of
Macrinus, the next emperor.
carmagnola Francesco Bussone (c.1432–82), Count of Car-
magnola, a small town near Turin. Carmagnola was a mercenary
leader hired first by Duke Visconti of Milan, then later by the
Venetians to fight Milan. Failing to follow up an initial victory at
the battle of Maclodio in 1427, Carmagnola was accused of
treachery, arrested and beheaded.
charles vii (1403–61) King of France (1422–61). Inspired by
Joan of Arc, Charles united France under one ruler, driving the
English from all their French possessions with the exception of
Calais. He built up a powerful standing army.
charles viii (1470–98) King of France (1483–98). Having
taken effective power in 1492 after the regency of his sister Anne
and encouraged by both the pope and Ludovico Sforza, Duke of
Milan, to assert his claim to the throne of Naples, Charles
assembled an army of 25,000 men and in 1494 marched into
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Italy. Having subduedNaples’ ally, Florence, Charles tookNaples
itself in 1495. At this point the other Italian powers, including
the pope and Duke Ludovico, turned against him and drove him
out of the peninsula.
colonna , cardinal Giovanni Colonna. Made a cardinal in
1480, Giovanni plotted with Charles VIII against Alexander VI.
colonna Apowerful family inmedieval andRenaissance Rome,
notorious for their long feud with the Orsini family. The Colonna
family produced one pope, Martin V (ruled 1417–31), but were
later excommunicated and their estates confiscated by Alexander
VI. The feud between the families was ended by papal bull in
1511.
commodus Lucius Aurelius Commodus Antoninus (161–193),
Roman emperor (180–93). The son of Marcus Aurelius, Com-
modus rejected his father’s stoic asceticism, giving himself over
to pleasure and amusement while allowing a series of favourites
to run the empire. Boastful about his physique, he regularly took
part in naked gladiatorial combat. Eventually a conspiracy
against him led to his being strangled by the wrestler Narcissus.
conio , alberigo da Alberigo da Barbiano (c.1348–1409)
was originally from the Romagna but later became Count of
Conio, a small town in the hills above the Italian Riviera. He
was the first mercenary commander to insist that his army (the
Company of St George) be made up exclusively of Italians, a
development that led to a reduction in the use of foreign mercen-
aries. Alberigo fought for Milan against Florence, dying in battle
in 1409.
cyrus (c.576–529 bc) Founder of the Persian empire, which he
extended to include much of central and south-west Asia.
darius Last king of Persia (336–331 bc), Darius was repeatedly
defeated in battle by Alexander the Great and finally deposed and
murdered by one of his provincial governors.
david (c.1012–972 bc) The second King of Israel (after Saul,
his father). Famous for his legendary defeat of the Philistine giant
Goliath, using only a sling and stones. As king, David built up an
empire, capturing Jerusalem, which he made his capital, as well
as areas of modern Jordan and Syria.
epaminondas (418–362 bc) Theban statesman and military
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commander, he ended Spartan pre-eminence in Greece, making
Thebes the dominant power.
fabius maximus (c.280–203 bc) Statesman and military com-
mander, five times consul and twice dictator of Rome. Famous
for his cautious delaying tactics against Hannibal in the Second
Punic War and his hostility towards Scipio.
ferdinand of aragon (1452–1516) At age seventeen Ferdi-
nand married Isabella of Castile, then eighteen, thus taking a first
step towards uniting Spain. He ruled Castile with his wife from
1474 and became King of Aragon in 1479. After a long campaign
to capture Granada, the last territory held by the Muslims in
Spain, Ferdinand was finally victorious in 1492. In the same year
he expelled the Jews from both Castile and Aragon. The second
half of his reign was spent countering French expansionism in
Italy. From 1494 to 1496 he aided Italian leaders in their battle
to drive Charles VIII of France out of Italy. In 1501 he signed an
agreement with Louis XII to split the Kingdom of Naples between
them, but later turned against France, capturing the whole of the
kingdom by 1504. By the time of his death, Spain was the most
powerful country in Europe, a power enhanced when Ferdinand
was succeeded by his grandson, Charles of Austria, who was also
Holy Roman Emperor.
ferrara , duke of Machiavelli is actually referring to two
dukes in a family that had ruled Ferrara for some four centuries.
(1) Ercole d’Este (1431–1505), duke from 1471–1505. Educated
inNaples, Ercole married the daughter of King Ferrante of Naples
and became one of the great patrons of Renaissance art. In 1481,
in alliance with Ferrante, he fought against the Venetians and the
papacy, losing a considerable amount of territory. He remained
neutral in the so-called Italian War of 1494–98, but after the
French took Milan in 1499 he asked for and was granted French
protection.
(2) Alfonso d’Este (1476–34), duke from 1505–34. Alfonso
married, first, Anna Sforza, sister of Gian Galeazzo Sforza and,
later, Lucrezia Borgia, daughter of Pope Alexander VI. In 1508 he
joined the League of Cambrai, which sought to destroy Venetian
power and partition its territories. After Pope Julius II went over
to the Venetian side, Alfonso remained loyal to France, as a result
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of which he was excommunicated and attacked by both Venice
and the papacy. He resisted successfully, partly thanks to French
help, and partly due to Ferrara’s superior cannons whose manu-
facture was a matter of special concern and pride to the duke. In
1526–27 Alfonso took part in the expedition of Charles V (Holy
Roman Emperor and King of Spain) which led to the sacking of
Rome.
filippo , duke See visconti , filippo .
fogliani , giovanni A leading citizen of Fermo, Fogliani was
killed in 1501.
forli` , countess of Caterina Sforza (1463–1509), an illegiti-
mate daughter of Galeazzo Sforza, Duke of Milan. She married
Girolamo Riario, officially the nephew but possibly the son of
Pope Sixtus IV. Riario was Count of Forlı` and after his murder
in 1488 Caterina took control of the town until it was captured
by Cesare Borgia in 1500. She is famous for having refused to
hand over the citadel of Forlı` to rebels despite their threatening
to kill her children, whom they held hostage. Exposing her gen-
itals from the castle walls, she told them she was perfectly capable
of producing more children.
gracchi , the The brothers Tiberius Gracchus and Gaius Sem-
pronius Gracchus were members of a prominent family in Rome
in the second century bc. Both became Tribunes of the Plebs and
both were murdered after attempting to limit the power of the
nobles and introduce reforms in favour of the plebs.
guidobaldo , duke of urbino (1472–1508) Guidobaldo
da Montefeltro succeeded his father as Duke of Urbino in 1482.
He fought as a military captain for Pope Alexander VI and
Charles VIII of France, and later for Venice against Charles.
Under attack from Cesare Borgia in 1497, he fled the town,
returning when Borgia’s mercenaries proved disloyal. Under
Guidobaldo’s rule, the court of Urbino was among the most
refined in Europe and is considered to have been the inspiration
of Baldassare Castiglione’s Book of the Courtier, which discusses
the qualities of the perfect courtier.
hamilcar Hamilcar Barca (c.270–228 bc). Successful com-
mander of the Carthaginians in the First Punic War against
Roman forces in Sicily in 247 bc. Launched an invasion of
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Hispania in 236 bc and became virtual dictator of Carthage
before being killed in battle. Father of Hannibal.
hannibal (247–182 bc) Son of Hamilcar. Commander of
Carthaginian forces from 221 bc, he took an army, which in-
cluded war elephants, across the Iberian peninsula, over the
Pyrenees and Alps and down into northern Italy in what became
known as the Second Punic War. Despite impressive victories he
was forced to return home when the Romans attacked Carthage,
and was defeated at the Battle of Zama (201 bc) by Scipio Afri-
canus. He then served for many years as chief magistrate of
Carthage, introducing all kinds of reforms, before the Romans
forced him into exile. Eventually, to avoid falling into Roman
hands, he killed himself by poisoning.
heliogabalus (c.203–222) Romanemperor (218–22).Grand-
son of the aunt of murdered emperor Caracalla, and priest in the
cult of the sun deity El Gabal, Heliogabalus was proclaimed
the true successor to Caracalla, with some people claiming he
was Caracalla’s illegitimate son by a union between first cousins.
Installed as emperor after the emperor Macrinus had been
defeated and executed, he attempted to revolutionize Roman
religious traditions and flouted sexual taboos, marrying five times
before, aged eighteen, he wasmurdered and replaced by his cousin
Severus Alexander.
hiero of syracuse Hiero II, King of Syracuse (270–215 bc).
Illegitimate son of a nobleman and one-time general with Pyrrhus,
Hiero became commander of Syracusan forces on the departure
of Pyrrhus in 275 bc and was elected ruler of the town after
defeating the Mamertines (Mamertina was present-day Messina).
After fighting and losing a war with Roman forces, he made a
pact with Rome in 263 bc, which assured his kingdom’s security
in return for support for the Romans in their war with Carthage.
Hiero was a relative of Archimedes, whose inventions, particu-
larly in the military field, he supported.
joanna , queen (1373–1435) Joanna II ruled Naples from
1414 to 1435. Childless herself, she allowed her court to be run
by her favourites and lovers, playing off the Anjou and Aragon
families by offering prominent members of each succession to
her throne. Conflict between the royal lines saw the two most
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successful mercenary commanders of the period, Francesco Sforza
and Braccio da Montone, pitted against each other.
julian Marcus Didius Julianus (c.133–193). Consul under Per-
tinax, Julian was proclaimed emperor by the Praetorian Guard
after they had murdered Pertinax. He reigned for only sixty-six
days before he himself was murdered when Septimius Severus,
who had refused to recognize his leadership, arrived in Rome.
julius ii Giuliano della Rovere (1443–1513), Cardinal of San
Pietro ad Vincula, was made pope in 1503 after the twenty-six-
day reign of Pius III, who had been elected after the death of
Alexander VI. Julius had for many years been a fierce rival of
Alexander and was unlikely to be supportive of his son Cesare
Borgia. He rapidly dismantled the Borgia family’s power and set
about ending the feud between the dominant Orsini and Colonna
families. Having thus secured his authority in Rome, he reasserted
papal territorial rights in the Romagna, attacking the Venetians
and taking Perugia and Bologna in 1506. This gave the papacy
unprecedented temporal power. In 1508 he formed the League
of Cambrai together with France, Spain and the Holy Roman
Empire to expel the Venetians from Romagna altogether. But
after the Venetians were defeated at Agnadello (or Vaila`) in 1509,
Julius feared French domination and joined forces with Venice to
drive Louis XII out of Italy. Julius was hugely influential as a
patron of the arts. He had the foundation stone of St Peter’s
Basilica laid in 1506 and commissioned Michelangelo to paint
the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel.
leo x Giovanni de’Medici (1475–1521). Made a cardinal at age
thirteen, Giovanni, son of Lorenzo de’ Medici, was elected pope
in 1513, taking the name of Leo X. His papacy was memorable
for the sale of indulgences to pay for building work on St Peter’s
Basilica, his determined promotion of his Medici relations
and his response to Martin Luther’s ninety-five theses against
indulgences. In 1513 he joined forces with the Venetians and
various foreign powers to expel the French from Italy, but
later allied himself with the French against the Holy Roman
Empire.
louis xi (1423–83) King of France (1461–83). Louis increased
the power of the king in relation to the barons and added
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Burgundy and Anjou to the French throne. In a treaty of 1474 he
gained the right to levy troops in Switzerland.
louis xii (1462–1515) King of France (1498–1515). Louis was
the king who got France most determinedly involved in the affairs
of Italy. Originally Duke of Orleans, he succeeded his cousin
Charles VIII in 1498 and quickly made a deal with Pope Alex-
ander VI that allowed him to renounce his first wife and marry
Charles’s widow, thus adding Brittany to the French crown. Since
the house of Orleans had claims to both Milan and Naples, Louis
made an agreement with Venice to split Milan’s territory and
took the town in 1499. Ludovico Sforza, Duke of Milan, took it
back in 1500 but was driven out again. Louis then used the same
policy in the south, reaching an agreement with Spain to divide
the Kingdom of Naples and taking the town for France in 1501.
However, the occupying powers fell out over the terms of the
partition and in 1503 the Spanish defeated the French at Gari-
gliano. In 1508 Louis joined the Holy Roman Empire, England,
the Papal States, Florence and Spain in the so-called League of
Cambrai, an aggressive alliance against the Venetians. Louis led
the alliance’s army and scored a comprehensive victory over the
Venetians at Agnadello (or Vaila`) in 1509. But the consequent
increase in the power of both Rome and France caused the two
powers to fall out and in 1510 Pope Julius II, together with
England, Spain, Switzerland and theHoly Roman Empire, formed
the Holy League to drive France out of Italy, a goal that was
finally achieved at the battle of Novara in 1513. Two years later,
however, Louis’s successor, Francis I, would return to take Milan
and much of northern Italy.
luca rainaldi , bishop An ambassador for the Emperor
Maximilian.
ludovico ii Also known as Ludovico il Moro. See sforza ,
ludovico .
macrinus Marcus Opellius Macrinus (c.165–218). Roman
emperor (217–18). Macrinus was the first emperor not to have
been a senator or a member of a senatorial family. He rose from
humble origins to bureaucratic service under Severus and was
then appointed prefect by Caracalla and proclaimed emperor
after Caracalla was murdered (many believed that Macrinus him-
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self was responsible for the murder). His brief reign was spent
entirely in the east, wheremilitary setbacks eroded his power-base
until eventually he was defeated by supporters of the fourteen-
year-oldHeliogabalus, grandson of Caracalla’s aunt, JuliaMaesa.
mantua , marquis of Francesco Gonzaga (1466–1519). Vic-
torious mercenary commander of the forces of the League of
Venice against Charles VIII of France at the battle of Fornovo in
1495.
marcus aurelius Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (121–180),
Roman emperor (161–180). A Stoic philosopher, his workMedi-
tations, written in Greek while campaigning with his army, is
still considered a masterpiece. A successful reformer in domestic
policy, he faced serious military threats from Parthia and from
various tribes in Germany and Gaul. He died of natural causes
and was immediately deified.
maximilian (1459–1519) Habsburg ruler of the Holy Roman
Empire (1486–1519). Maximilian aimed to unify the empire’s
heterogeneous possessions by centralizing the administration. He
also hoped to recover the empire’s dominant position in Italy and
to become leader of the Christian world by launching a crusade
against Islam. While his domestic reforms enjoyed a certain
amount of success, his foreign policies were confused and ineffect-
ive and led to the loss of Switzerland, which became an indepen-
dent confederation in 1499. Although Maximilian hoped to
regain territory from Venice, he was constantly thwarted by the
need to give precedence to countering French expansionism in
the peninsula. In 1495 he joined the League of Venice, which
aimed to expel the French from Italy, but gained nothing from
participation. In 1496 he was invited by the Duke of Milan (his
wife’s uncle) to send an army to meet the threat of a French
invasion, but France did not attack. Persuaded to move south to
help Pisa resist the Florentines, the imperial army surprisingly
failed to save the town. In 1507 he began a long-drawn-out
attempt to take territory from Venice, but without making sig-
nificant progress. In 1512Maximilian joined the Holy League to
push the French out of Italy. When Francis I once again took
Milan for the French in 1515, Maximilian became involved in
yet another, this time unsuccessful, attempt to keep France north
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Burgundy and Anjou to the French throne. In a treaty of 1474 he
gained the right to levy troops in Switzerland.
louis xii (1462–1515) King of France (1498–1515). Louis was
the king who got France most determinedly involved in the affairs
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of the Alps.Maximilianwas succeeded by his grandsonCharles V,
who became King of Spain as well.
maximinus Gaius Julius Verus Maximinus (c.173–238),
Roman emperor (235–238). Born in Thrace and from a humble
background,Maximinus rose to become a seasonedmilitary com-
mander and led an army rebellion against the young emperor
Alexander Severus, who was abandoned by his own troops and
murdered. Hated by the aristocratic Senate, Maximinus faced
numerous rebellions and conspiracies, which he ruthlessly sup-
pressed, until he was eventually murdered by his own troops.
moses Old Testament Hebrew leader who led the Jews out of
their captivity in Egypt to ‘the promised land’.
nabis Ruler of Sparta (207–192 bc), ruthless in his determin-
ation to return Sparta to its former glory. After a period of
successful territorial expansionism, Nabis was attacked by the
Romans in alliance with his other enemies. Decisively beaten by
Philopoemen, he nevertheless managed to hold on to the city of
Sparta before being murdered by a group of Aetolians who were
supposedly coming to his aid.
niger , gaius pescennius (c.140–194) Roman governor of
Syria, who proclaimed himself emperor after the murder of Perti-
nax in 193, and was defeated and killed by the forces of Septimius
Severus in 194.
oliverotto Oliverotto Euffreducci (c.1475–1502). Mercen-
ary commander who took power in Fermo in 1502 and used
ruthless force to eliminate his enemies. Oliverotto was killed by
Borgia at Senigallia in 1502.
orco , remirro de Ramiro de Lorqua (c.1452–1502). Mili-
tary commander in the service of Cesare Borgia. After being
involved in many military campaigns on Borgia’s behalf, he was
given the governorship of the Romagna in 1501. Arrested on
corruption charges, he was beheaded in 1502.
orsini One of the two powerful Roman families (the other was
the Colonna) whose feuding dominated political life in Rome
from the second half of the thirteenth century to the end of the
fifteenth. Both families had mercenary armies. Cesare Borgia used
the Orsini army in his early campaigns but broke with them when
he suspected them of conspiring against him. He later invited the
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Orsini leaders to Senigallia with the pretence of negotiating an
agreement and had them killed.
niccolo` orsini Count of Pitigliano (1442–1510). Mercenary
commander who led Venetian forces in their war against the
League of Cambrai, and joint commander with his cousin Bar-
tolomeo d’Alviano at the battle of Agnadello (or Vaila`) at which,
largely thanks to disagreements between the two, the Venetians
were routed.
paulo , signor Paulo Orsini was leader of the Orsini faction
during the period of Cesare Borgia’s rise to power. He accepted
the invitation to negotiate at Senigallia, where Borgia had him
strangled on arrival.
pertinax Publius Helvius Pertinax (126–193) was Roman
emperor for three months in 193. Proclaimed emperor after the
assassination of Commodus, Pertinax failed to give the army the
financial rewards they expected, while his attempts to impose
discipline antagonized them. He was murdered when 300 mutin-
ous soldiers of the Praetorian Guard stormed his palace.
petrarch FrancescoPetrarca (1304–74). Scholar,poetandearly
Humanist whose work on the sonnet form was to be hugely influ-
ential in European poetry for centuries to come. The linesMachia-
velli quotes at the conclusion of The Prince are taken from poem
XVI of Il canzoniere, in which Petrarch appeals to Italian leaders
to stop using foreign mercenaries to fight Italian civil wars.
petrucci , pandolfo (1452–1512) A powerful figure in Siena
from 1487when the faction he belonged to toppled its opponents
in a coup. From 1502 he became ruler of the town, though
always officially maintaining republican institutions. In his role
as ambassador of Florence, Machiavelli negotiated with him on
several occasions.
philip of macedonia Machiavelli actually refers to two
Philips.
(1) Philip II (382–336 bc) King of Macedonia (359–336 bc),
father of Alexander the Great. Coming to power after the death
of his older brothers, Philip II rebuilt the Kingdom of Macedonia
with a series of wars and astute treaties. He was murdered by one
of his bodyguards.
(2) Philip V (238–178 bc) King of Macedonia (220–178 bc).
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in a coup. From 1502 he became ruler of the town, though
always officially maintaining republican institutions. In his role
as ambassador of Florence, Machiavelli negotiated with him on
several occasions.
philip of macedonia Machiavelli actually refers to two
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Followed a successful expansionist policy until the Romans, who
had finally defeated the Carthaginians, turned their attention to
the threat he posed in 200 bc and comprehensively defeated him
in 197 bc, confining him within the borders of Macedonia.
philopoemen (253–183 bc) Greek statesman and general who
led the Achaean army on numerous occasions.
pitigliano , count of See orsini niccolo` .
pyrrhus (318–272 bc) King of Epirus, Pyrrhus was an ex-
tremely successful military commander and a constant threat to
the Romans in southern Italy and Sicily, where he also fought
the Carthaginians. His costly victory at the Battle of Asculum in
279 bc led to the use of the expression ‘Pyrrhic victory’.
romulus Legendary founder and first king of Rome.
rouen , Cardinal of, later Archbishop of Georges d’Amboise
(1460–1510). D’Amboise was already adviser to the Duke of
Orleans when the latter acceded to the French throne (1498) as
Louis XII. Louis at once made d’Amboise prime minister and
persuaded Alexander VI to appoint him as cardinal as part of a
more general agreement between the two. D’Amboise encouraged
Louis in his Italian adventures and drew on the support of Cesare
Borgia in an attempt to have himself elected pope on the death
of Borgia’s father Alexander VI.
rovere , giuliano de See julius ii .
san giorgio Cardinal Raffaello Riario of Savona.
san severino , ruberto da Mercenary commander who led
Venetian forces in 1482 and died fighting for Venice in 1487.
saul First king of Israel, chosen by the people about 1025 bc.
savonarola , girolamo (1452–98) Born in Ferrara, Savona-
rola studied philosophy and medicine before taking up a religious
vocation in the Dominican Order of friar preachers. He first
preached in Florence between 1482 and 1487 but was largely
ignored until, on the advice of the Humanist Pico della Miran-
dola, Lorenzo de’ Medici recalled him to Florence to head the
influential monastery of San Marco in 1490. He then began a
cycle of sermons denouncing corruption in the town and proph-
esying doom and foreign invasion. When Charles VIII invaded
Italy in 1494 and the Medici fled, his preaching appeared to be
vindicated and he became head of the Florentine government,
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leading the city as a theocracy from 1494 to 1498 and encourag-
ing people to burn anything profane (books, paintings) on his
so-called Bonfire of the Vanities. His impassioned preaching
against every form of corruption in the Church and his insistence
on a return to scriptural purity eventually led to his being excom-
municated by Alexander VI, and when he lost support in Florence
he was arrested, tortured and burned at the stake in the town’s
central piazza.
scali , giorgio One of the leaders of the briefly successful
Ciompi (wool-workers) rebellion in Florence in 1378. Involved
in an attempt to stop magistrates punishing a friend, he was
arrested and beheaded in 1382.
scipio Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus (c.234–183 bc). A
Roman general and statesman best known for his defeat ofHanni-
bal at the Battle of Zama in 201 bc. This decisive victory won
him the name Africanus. Accused in the Senate of accepting bribes
from enemies, he retired from Rome to his home on the coast of
Campania.
severus , lucius septimius (146–211) Roman emperor
(193–211), notorious for his militarization of Roman bureau-
cracy and the empire in general. After holding military commands
under emperors Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, on the murder
of the emperor Pertinax in 193 he led his legions to Rome and
seized power. In 194 he defeated Pescennius Niger, who had
proclaimed himself emperor in the east, and in 196 he defeated
another would-be emperor, Clodius Albinus, in Gaul. In the last
years of his life he engaged in a long military campaign in Britain,
dying in York in 211.
sforza , cardinal Ascanio Sforza (1455–1505). Fifth child of
Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan, and younger brother of Gal-
eazzo and Ludovico who each in turn became duke. Appointed
as cardinal in 1484, Ascanio made several fruitless attempts to
be elected pope. Acting as a spy for Milan in Rome, he was
demoted by Alexander VI when Milan aided the French invasion
of 1494. Ascanio was subsequently reinstated but lost his power-
base when the French took Milan under Louis XII. He was
imprisoned by the French for three years before Georges
d’Amboise, Archbishop of Rouen and adviser to Louis, persuaded
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the king to release him in the hope that Ascanio would support
his, Rouen’s, candidature for the papacy.
sforza , caterina See forli´ , countess of .
sforza , francesco (1401–66) Themost successful mercenary
commander of his century, Francesco frequently fought for
Filippo Visconti, Duke of Milan (1412–47). Visconti had no
sons and only one daughter, Bianca Maria, whom he offered in
marriage to Sforza to keep the powerful commander on Milan’s
side, frequently delaying the wedding so as to retain his bar-
gaining power. Having eventually married Bianca Maria in 1441,
Sforza expected to become duke on Visconti’s death in 1447, but
the people of Milan declared a republic. Sforza at first served the
republic in a war against Venice, but then betrayed it and took
Milan for himself, becoming duke in 1450.
sforza , giacomo Giacomo (Muzio) Attendolo (1369–1424).
Father of Francesco Sforza, who would become Duke of Milan.
Joined the mercenary army of Alberigo da Barbiano in the 1380s
and received the nickname Sforza for his strength and determin-
ation. Sforza served as mercenary commander for many Italian
leaders and frequently found himself opposed to Braccio da
Montone, who had also started his mercenary career under
Alberigo da Barbiano. He was eventually killed in the service of
Joanna of Naples.
sforza , ludovico (1452–1508) Second son of Francesco
Sforza, and Duke of Milan (1494–1500). When Ludovico’s older
brother and duke, Galeazzo Maria, was assassinated in 1476,
power officially passed to his seven-year-old son Gian Galeazzo,
but Ludovico seized control of the state and eventually became
duke when Gian Galeazzo died in 1494. Since Naples favoured
Gian Galeazzo’s attempt to regain his title, Ludovico supported
the claim of Charles VIII to theNeapolitan throne and encouraged
his invasion of Italy in 1494. However, the extent of French
successes led him to join the League of Venice, an anti-French
alliance, which pushed Charles out of Italy. In 1499, Ludovico
lost Milan to Charles’s successor, Louis XII. He managed to
recover the city briefly in 1500 but was then defeated and
imprisoned by the French until his death in 1508. He is chiefly
remembered for his patronage of Leonardo da Vinci.
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sixtus Francesco della Rovere (1414–84) was elected pope in
1471, taking the name of Sixtus IV. Sixtus was renowned for his
nepotism and in 1478 took part in the Pazzi conspiracy to topple
theMedici in Florence. Following the failed assassination attempt
on Lorenzo il Magnifico and the execution of the would-be
assassins, Sixtus excommunicated Lorenzo, placed Florence
under interdiction and, in alliance with Naples, declared war on
the town. Sixtus’s nephew, Giuliano della Rovere, would become
Pope Julius II in 1503.
soderini , piero (1450–1522) Elected Gonfaloniere of
Florence and hence head of state for life in 1502, Soderini was a
friend of Machiavelli and promoted his career, but Machiavelli
found him indecisive and eventually lost respect for him. In line
with his predecessor, Savonarola, Soderini maintained an alliance
with France throughout his period of government, but he was not
an able statesman and had no protection to fall back on once the
French were driven out of Italy by the Holy League of papal,
Spanish and imperial forces. In 1512 Soderini attempted to resist
Spanish forces at Prato, but had to flee the city as the League’s
forces advanced and a Medici regime was reinstated.
theseus Legendary Greek hero, son of Aegeus, King of Athens.
He slew the Minotaur in the Cretan labyrinth and was the first
lover of the adolescent Helen of Troy. He united the region of
Attica under the administration of Athens.
titus quintius Flaminius Titus Quintius (c.228–174 bc). A
Roman general who led the campaign against Philip V of
Macedonia. Titus defeated Philip at the battle of Cynoscephalae
in Thessaly in 197. Philip was forced to retreat from all his Greek
possessions but his Macedonian kingdom was left intact.
venafro , antonio da Antonio Giordano (1459–1530).
Having helped Pandolfo Petrucci become the ruler of Siena,
Antonio was chosen as his first minister and chief adviser and
was entrusted with important diplomatic missions to Rome and
other courts. In 1502 he was at Magione when Cesare Borgia’s
mercenaries conspired to betray him. When Petrucci’s son,
Borghese, lost power in 1516, Antonio returned to his home town
of Venafro but later went to serve the government of Naples,
where he died.
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republic in a war against Venice, but then betrayed it and took
Milan for himself, becoming duke in 1450.
sforza , giacomo Giacomo (Muzio) Attendolo (1369–1424).
Father of Francesco Sforza, who would become Duke of Milan.
Joined the mercenary army of Alberigo da Barbiano in the 1380s
and received the nickname Sforza for his strength and determin-
ation. Sforza served as mercenary commander for many Italian
leaders and frequently found himself opposed to Braccio da
Montone, who had also started his mercenary career under
Alberigo da Barbiano. He was eventually killed in the service of
Joanna of Naples.
sforza , ludovico (1452–1508) Second son of Francesco
Sforza, and Duke of Milan (1494–1500). When Ludovico’s older
brother and duke, Galeazzo Maria, was assassinated in 1476,
power officially passed to his seven-year-old son Gian Galeazzo,
but Ludovico seized control of the state and eventually became
duke when Gian Galeazzo died in 1494. Since Naples favoured
Gian Galeazzo’s attempt to regain his title, Ludovico supported
the claim of Charles VIII to theNeapolitan throne and encouraged
his invasion of Italy in 1494. However, the extent of French
successes led him to join the League of Venice, an anti-French
alliance, which pushed Charles out of Italy. In 1499, Ludovico
lost Milan to Charles’s successor, Louis XII. He managed to
recover the city briefly in 1500 but was then defeated and
imprisoned by the French until his death in 1508. He is chiefly
remembered for his patronage of Leonardo da Vinci.
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sixtus Francesco della Rovere (1414–84) was elected pope in
1471, taking the name of Sixtus IV. Sixtus was renowned for his
nepotism and in 1478 took part in the Pazzi conspiracy to topple
theMedici in Florence. Following the failed assassination attempt
on Lorenzo il Magnifico and the execution of the would-be
assassins, Sixtus excommunicated Lorenzo, placed Florence
under interdiction and, in alliance with Naples, declared war on
the town. Sixtus’s nephew, Giuliano della Rovere, would become
Pope Julius II in 1503.
soderini , piero (1450–1522) Elected Gonfaloniere of
Florence and hence head of state for life in 1502, Soderini was a
friend of Machiavelli and promoted his career, but Machiavelli
found him indecisive and eventually lost respect for him. In line
with his predecessor, Savonarola, Soderini maintained an alliance
with France throughout his period of government, but he was not
an able statesman and had no protection to fall back on once the
French were driven out of Italy by the Holy League of papal,
Spanish and imperial forces. In 1512 Soderini attempted to resist
Spanish forces at Prato, but had to flee the city as the League’s
forces advanced and a Medici regime was reinstated.
theseus Legendary Greek hero, son of Aegeus, King of Athens.
He slew the Minotaur in the Cretan labyrinth and was the first
lover of the adolescent Helen of Troy. He united the region of
Attica under the administration of Athens.
titus quintius Flaminius Titus Quintius (c.228–174 bc). A
Roman general who led the campaign against Philip V of
Macedonia. Titus defeated Philip at the battle of Cynoscephalae
in Thessaly in 197. Philip was forced to retreat from all his Greek
possessions but his Macedonian kingdom was left intact.
venafro , antonio da Antonio Giordano (1459–1530).
Having helped Pandolfo Petrucci become the ruler of Siena,
Antonio was chosen as his first minister and chief adviser and
was entrusted with important diplomatic missions to Rome and
other courts. In 1502 he was at Magione when Cesare Borgia’s
mercenaries conspired to betray him. When Petrucci’s son,
Borghese, lost power in 1516, Antonio returned to his home town
of Venafro but later went to serve the government of Naples,
where he died.
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visconti , Bernabo` (1323–85) Ruled Milan together with two
brothers from 1354 to 1385. Imprisoned and killed by his nephew
Gian Galeazzo Visconti.
visconti , filippo (1392–1447) Duke of Milan (1412–47).
Filippo was a cruel and paranoid manipulator who rebuilt the
Duchy of Milan with the services of mercenary leaders such
as Carmagnola and Francesco Sforza. To keep Sforza loyal, he
promised him his only child and heir, Bianca Maria, in marriage,
then made him wait many years for the wedding.
vitelli , niccolo` (1414–86) Military commander in constant
battle with papal forces for the control of Citta` di Castello, a
town near Perugia, in Umbria. Forced out of the town by Sixtus
IV in 1475, he received support from the Medici after the failed
Pazzi conspiracy in which the pope had been involved. On
recovering the town, he destroyed the fortresses that Sixtus had
built in his absence.
vitelli , paulo (1461–99) Son of Niccolo` Vitelli. A mercenary
commander who led the Florentine army in its siege of Pisa in
1498. Having breached the walls, Paulo behaved with inexplic-
able caution, failing to push home his advantage, as a result of
which he was suspected of treachery, arrested and executed.
vitelli , the Noble family of mercenary commanders who con-
trolled the town of Citta` di Castello, near Perugia in Umbria, for
most of the fifteenth century.
vitellozzo Vitellozzo Vitelli (c.1458–1502). Son of Niccolo`
and brother of Paulo, Vitellozzo was serving Florence with Paulo
when the latter was arrested and executed for treachery. Vitel-
lozzo escaped and served Cesare Borgia. Together with the Orsini
faction, he conspired against Borgia and was among the conspira-
tors killed in Senigallia in 1502.
xenophon (431–354 bc) An Athenian and friend of Socrates,
Xenophon was opposed to democracy and spent much of his life
in Sparta. He joined a group of 10,000 mercenaries who served
Cyrus during his campaign against Artaxerxes in Asia Minor in
401. After Cyrus was killed, Xenophon was one of the generals
who led the mercenaries on their 1,000-mile retreat home (fewer
than 6,000 survived). He wrote about the campaign in Anabasis,
one of his many books.
.
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